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ARTICLES	A	FIDUCIARY	THEORY	OF	PROSECUTION	
BRUCE	A.	GREEN*	AND	REBECCA	ROIPHE**	
Scholars	have	failed	to	arrive	at	a	unifying	theory	of	prosecution,	one	
that	 explains	 the	 complex	 role	 that	 prosecutors	 play	 in	 our	democratic	
system.	This	Article	draws	on	a	developing	body	of	 legal	 scholarship	on	
fiduciary	 theory	 to	 offer	 a	 new	 paradigm	 that	 grounds	 prosecutors’	
obligations	 in	 their	historical	 role	as	 fiduciaries.	Casting	prosecutors	as	
fiduciaries	 clarifies	 the	 prosecutor’s	 obligation	 to	 seek	 justice,	 focuses	
attention	on	the	duties	of	care	and	loyalty,	and	prioritizes	criminal	justice	
considerations	over	other	public	policy	interests	in	prosecutorial	charging	
and	plea-bargaining	decisions.	As	fiduciaries,	prosecutors	are	required	to	
engage	in	an	explicit	deliberative	process	for	making	these	discretionary	
decisions.	Finally,	fiduciary	theory	offers	some	insight	into	prosecutorial	
regulation	by	 clarifying	 that	 both	accountability	 and	 independence	are	
aimed	at	 aligning	prosecutors’	 interest	with	 that	 of	 the	public.	 This,	 in	
turn,	 leads	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 proper	 regulation	 should	 aim	 to	
maximize	both	and	helps	identify	when	one	might	be	more	beneficial	than	
the	other.	 TABLE	OF	CONTENTS	Introduction	............................................................................................................	102	I.				Prosecutors	as	Fiduciaries—History	and	Theory........................	110																																																										 *	 Louis	Stein	Chair,	Fordham	University	School	of	Law.		 **	 Professor	of	Law,	New	York	Law	School.	We	would	like	to	thank	the	participants	in	 the	 Legal	 Ethics	 and	 Fiduciary	 Theory	Workshop	 held	 at	 the	 Kylemore	 Abbey	 in	Ireland	in	June	2019	for	their	insights	and	for	the	opportunity	to	bring	these	two	fields	of	 inquiry	 together.	 We	 would	 also	 like	 to	 thank	 the	 Criminal	 Justice	 Schmooze	participants	for	their	thoughts	on	an	earlier	draft.	
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	 1.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Daniel	 Markovits,	 Sharing	 Ex	 Ante	 and	 Sharing	 Ex	 Post:	 The	 Non-
Contractual	Basis	of	Fiduciary	Relations,	in	PHILOSOPHICAL	FOUNDATIONS	OF	FIDUCIARY	LAW	209,	209–10	(Andrew	S.	Gold	&	Paul	B.	Miller	eds.,	2014)	(contrasting	fiduciary	law	with	contract	law	and	arguing	that	fiduciary	law	“cannot	be	understood	on	the	contractarian	model”);	 Paul	 B.	 Miller,	 The	 Fiduciary	 Relationship,	 in	 PHILOSOPHICAL	 FOUNDATIONS	 OF	FIDUCIARY	LAW,	supra,	at	63	(defining	the	fiduciary	relationship	through	a	powers-based	theory);	Deborah	A.	DeMott,	Beyond	Metaphor:	An	Analysis	of	Fiduciary	Obligation,	1988	DUKE	 L.J.	 879	 (providing	 an	 overview	 of	 fiduciary	 principles	 while	 arguing	 that	analogizing	fiduciary	obligation	with	contract	principles	is	a	faulty	approach);	Frank	H.	Easterbrook	&	Daniel	R.	Fischel,	Contract	and	Fiduciary	Duty,	36	J.L.	&	ECON.	425,	425–27	(1993)	 (explaining	 fiduciary	 duty	 through	a	 contractual	 perspective,	 noting	 that	 the	duty	of	loyalty	common	in	fiduciary	relationships	“replaces	detailed	contractual	terms”);	Tamar	Frankel,	Fiduciary	Law,	71	CALIF.	L.	REV.	795	(1983)	(analyzing	the	history	and	nature	of	 fiduciary	relations	as	a	group	rather	than	by	type	of	 fiduciary);	Stephen	R.	Galoob	 &	 Ethan	 J.	 Leib,	 Intentions,	 Compliance,	 and	 Fiduciary	 Obligations,	 20	 LEGAL	THEORY	 106	 (2014)	 (investigating	 the	 intentional	 obligation	 of	 loyalty	 in	 fiduciary	relations);	D.	Gordon	Smith,	The	Critical	Resource	Theory	of	Fiduciary	Duty,	55	VAND.	L.	REV.	1399,	1401	(2002)	(providing	a	uniform	theory	of	fiduciary	duty	by	differentiating	
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This	 effort	 in	 turn	 contributes	 to	 the	 scholarship	on	 fiduciary	 theory.	While	scholars	have	used	fiduciary	theory	to	analyze	the	role	of	public	officials,	including	judges,	they	have	not	applied	it	to	prosecutors,	who	serve	a	fiduciary	role	not	only	as	public	officials	but	also	as	lawyers.2	We	bring	the	theory	to	bear	on	two	related	but	intransigent	problems	that	preoccupy	scholars	of	prosecutorial	ethics	in	the	United	States.	The	first	of	these	problems	is	how	prosecutors	should	make	discretionary	decisions,	 especially	 regarding	 charging	 and	 plea	 bargaining.3	 The	second	is	how	prosecutors	should	be	held	accountable	for	making	these	discretionary	 decisions	 without	 compromising	 professional	independence.4	 In	 making	 discretionary	 decisions,	 it	 is	 unclear	 how	prosecutors	 ought	 to	 identify	 relevant	 considerations	 and	 balance	competing	public	concerns.	Unless	we	understand	how	prosecutors	should	balance	 these	 various	 interests,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 determine	 how	 to	 hold	prosecutors	accountable	for	failing	to	do	so	properly.	Even	if	we	could	agree	about	 what	 constitutes	 a	 failure	 of	 discretionary	 decision	 making,	preserving	 prosecutorial	 independence	 requires	 some	 sacrifice	 in	monitoring	and	accountability.	
																																																								between	 fiduciary	 and	 nonfiduciary	 relations	 and	 “rationaliz[ing]	 the	 content	 of	fiduciary	obligations”).	
	 2.	 E.g.,	Evan	J.	Criddle,	Fiduciary	Foundations	of	Administrative	Law,	54	UCLA	L.	REV.	117,	117	(2006)	(applying	fiduciary	principles	to	administrative	law	to	minimize	abuse	of	discretion);	Ethan	J.	Leib	et	al.,	A	Fiduciary	Theory	of	Judging,	101	CALIF.	L.	REV.	699,	705	(2013)	(applying	fiduciary	principles	to	the	public	law	context	and	to	the	judiciary,	specifically);	Paul	B.	Miller	&	Andrew	S.	Gold,	Fiduciary	Governance,	57	WM.	&	MARY	L.	REV.	513	(2015)	(discussing	a	kind	of	 fiduciary	relationship	 in	which	the	fiduciary	 is	charged	with	pursuing	abstract	interests	instead	of	the	interests	of	a	person).	
	 3.	 See	 Rachel	 E.	 Barkow,	 Institutional	 Design	 and	 the	 Policing	 of	 Prosecutors:	
Lessons	 from	Administrative	 Law,	 61	 STAN.	 L.	REV.	 869,	 876–78	 (2009)	 (arguing	 that	prosecutors’	 offices	 should	 take	 their	 cue	 from	 administrative	 law	 by	 separating	functions	and	increasing	supervision);	David	Alan	Sklansky,	The	Nature	and	Function	of	
Prosecutorial	 Power,	 106	 J.	 CRIM.	 L.	 &	 CRIMINOLOGY	 473,	 480–83	 (2016)	 (noting	 that	prosecutors	have	vast	discretion	and	that	prosecutorial	power	has	only	increased	over	time).	
	 4.	 See	 Stephanos	 Bibas,	 Prosecutorial	 Regulation	 Versus	 Prosecutorial	
Accountability,	157	U.	PA.	L.	REV.	959,	959–60	(2009)	(arguing	that	prosecutors’	offices	should	change	internal	structure	and	management	to	regulate	prosecutorial	discretion);	Angela	 J.	 Davis,	 The	 American	 Prosecutor:	 Independence,	 Power,	 and	 the	 Threat	 of	
Tyranny,	 86	 IOWA	 L.	 REV.	 393,	 408–12	 (2001)	 (arguing	 that	 prosecutors	 utilize	unrestrained	 discretion—that	 has	 no	 historical	 or	 constitutional	 justification—to	engage	in	misconduct	that	leaves	victims	with	little	to	no	remedy);	Daniel	C.	Richman,	Old	Chief	v.	United	States:	Stipulating	Away	Prosecutorial	Accountability?,	83	VA.	L.	REV.	939,	963–64	(1997).	
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Recently,	 scholars	 have	 theorized	 unique	 qualities	 about	 fiduciary	relationships.	They	explain	that	all	fiduciaries	have	discretionary	power	over	 the	 beneficiary,	who	 is	 inherently	 vulnerable.5	 Beneficiaries	 are	asked	to	trust	their	important	interests	to	the	fiduciary,	in	part	because	monitoring	costs	are	usually	high.6	Scholars	have	drawn	on	this	work	to	develop	 a	 theory	 of	 fiduciary	 governance,	 in	which	 public	 officials,	 a	different	but	related	brand	of	fiduciary,	often	serve	an	abstract	interest	on	behalf	of	the	public.7	Prosecutors	fit	this	mold	because	they	pursue	the	public’s	abstract	interest	in	justice.	Scholars	and	critics	have	pointed	out	 both	 prosecutors’	 vast	 discretion	 and	 the	 very	 real	 potential	 for	abuse	at	the	public’s	expense.8	While	scholars	have	advanced	different	theories	 of	 prosecution	 in	 this	 country,9	 viewing	 prosecutors	 as	fiduciaries	is	more	consistent	with	historical	understandings	and	has	a	greater	 practical	 value	 in	 shaping	 our	 understandings	 of	 what	prosecutors	should	do	and	how	we	ought	to	hold	them	accountable.	Most	agree	that	prosecutorial	discretion	is	an	inevitable	aspect	of	the	criminal	justice	system,	but	there	is	little	consensus	on	how	prosecutors	should	 prioritize	 competing	 concerns.	 Prosecutors	 tend	 to	 make	decisions	 in	 an	 impressionistic	way,	weighing	multiple	 interests	 that	may	 be	 in	 tension,	 such	 as	 the	 interests	 in	 truth-seeking,	 legality,	deterrence,	 retribution,	 proportionality,	 equality,	 efficiency,	 and	economy.	Respect	for	the	legislature’s	judgment	in	defining	particular	conduct	as	a	crime	may	suggest	enforcing	the	criminal	law	whenever	a	crime	can	be	proven,	but	the	legislature	assumes	that	prosecutors	will	not	prosecute	every	guilty	person	because	a	punishment	in	a	given	case	may	 be	 unnecessarily	 harsh	 or	 costly.	 Prosecuting	 a	 particular																																																									
	 5.	 E.g.,	Miller,	supra	note	1,	at	69–75.		 6.	 Leib	et	al.,	supra	note	2,	at	706.	
	 7.	 See	Miller	&	Gold,	supra	note	2,	at	565–78	(illustrating	that	while	distinct	from	private	fiduciary	law,	public	fiduciary	law	is	applicable	to	the	judiciary,	the	executive	branch,	and	the	legislative	branch).	
	 8.	 See	Davis,	supra	note	4,	at	436–39	(arguing	that	the	“breadth	of	prosecutorial	discretion”	 available	 in	 the	 charging	power	 leads	 to	 selective	 prosecution	 and	 other	forms	 of	 prosecutorial	misconduct	 that	 have	 yet	 to	 be	adequately	 addressed	by	 the	Supreme	Court	or	through	other	accountability	mechanisms).	
	 9.	 See	Jeffrey	Bellin,	Theories	of	Prosecution,	108	CALIF.	L.	REV.	(forthcoming	2020)	(arguing	 that	 prosecutors	 owe	 an	 obligation	 to	 the	 law);	 Eric	 S.	 Fish,	 Prosecutorial	
Constitutionalism,	90	S.	CALIF.	L.	REV.	237,	253–54	(2017)	(explaining	that	prosecutors	should	enforce	constitutional	protections	for	defendants	when	the	adversarial	system	fails	to	do	so);	Bruce	A.	Green,	Why	Should	Prosecutors	“Seek	Justice”?,	26	FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	607,	612	(1999)	(arguing	from	both	a	historical	and	contemporary	perspective	that	prosecutors	have	a	duty	to	seek	justice).	
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3529379
2020]	 A	FIDUCIARY	THEORY	OF	PROSECUTION	 105	
 
individual	may	deter	that	individual	and	others,	but	this	abstract	benefit	may	 not	 be	 worth	 the	 literal	 costs	 of	 the	 prosecution,	 not	 only	 to	taxpayers	but	to	witnesses,	jurors,	and	others.	A	conviction	followed	by	imprisonment	would	achieve	deterrence	but	at	a	greater	cost	to	both	the	accused	 and	 the	 public.	 When	 multiple	 interests	 are	 in	 tension,	 the	challenge	is	to	identify	some	decision-making	criteria	and	processes	for	prosecutors	to	employ,	beyond	simply	“taking	everything	into	account,”	both	 to	 give	 prosecutors	 guidance	 and	 to	 give	 the	 public	 a	 basis	 for	judging	how	well	prosecutors	are	exercising	discretion.	Courts	 and	 scholars	 of	 prosecution	 in	 the	 United	States	 agree	 that	prosecutors	have	 a	duty	 to	 seek	 justice.	 Fiduciary	 theory	helps	make	that	 obligation	 less	 amorphous.	 Prosecutors,	 this	 Article	 argues,	 are	fiduciaries	who	 represent	 the	 public	 but	 are	 appointed	 or	 elected	 to	pursue	 a	 particular	 abstract	 public	 interest,	 the	 interest	 in	 justice.10	Viewing	prosecutors	as	fiduciaries,	against	the	background	of	fiduciary	theory,	makes	three	principal	contributions.	First,	this	analysis	focuses	attention	on	the	fiduciary	duties	of	care	and	loyalty	that	a	prosecutor	owes	to	the	public	as	a	beneficiary	or	client.	These	 duties	 are	 not	 incorporated	 in	 the	 duty	 to	 seek	 justice,	which	speaks	to	the	public’s	principal	objective	in	a	criminal	case.	These	are	further	(but	underexamined)	duties	that	address	the	manner	in	which	prosecutors	should	pursue	the	public’s	objectives.	Analyzing	duties	of	loyalty	 and	 care	 shows	 that	 ordinary	 regulatory	 processes	 are	 less	robust	 for	 prosecutors	 than	 for	 other	 lawyers	 and	 other	 fiduciaries	generally,	in	that	they	fail	both	to	define	the	nature	of	these	duties	and	to	 enforce	 them.	 From	 a	 normative	perspective,	 this	 leaves	 a	 host	 of	unanswered,	 and	 potentially	 controversial,	 questions	 about	 how	prosecutors	should	conduct	their	work	as	competent	and	disinterested	public	 officials	 and	professionals.	 From	 a	 regulatory	 perspective,	 the	implication	is	that,	for	prosecutors,	a	premium	is	placed	on	alternative	modes	of	accountability.	Second,	 fiduciary	 theory	 helps	 to	 narrow	 the	 appropriate	considerations	for	discretionary	decisions.	It	does	so	by	reminding	us	that	 there	may	be	 relevant	 considerations	 that	are	not	 central	 to	 the	prosecutor’s	 fiduciary	 obligation	 to	 pursue	 the	 public’s	 interest	 in	justice.	There	are	considerations	that	are	intrinsic	to	determinations	of	justice,	meaning	that	they	bear	directly	on	the	justness	of	a	particular	prosecution.	These	intrinsic	considerations	include	avoiding	wrongful																																																									
	 10.	 See	generally	Miller	&	Gold,	supra	note	2,	at	523–24	(explaining	that	the	role	of	public	fiduciaries	often	involves	pursuit	of	an	abstract	interest	on	behalf	of	the	public).	
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convictions,	treating	people	proportionally	and	equally,	and	using	the	process	 to	 incapacitate	 dangerous	 individuals,	 deter	 future	 offenses,	and	secure	retribution	and	restitution	for	victims.	Extrinsic	concerns,	on	the	other	hand,	may	be	relevant	to	a	particular	prosecutorial	decision	but	are	 not	 central	 to	 the	 justness	 of	 the	 case.	 These	 extrinsic	 concerns	include	 foreign	 policy	 implications	 of	 a	 particular	 prosecution	 or	 its	intersection	with	immigration	policy.	Prosecutors	must	balance	intrinsic	concerns	 in	 light	 of	 the	 law,	 traditions,	 and	 facts	 that	 are	 necessarily	inaccessible	to	the	public.	They	can	also	consider	public	concerns	that	are	extrinsic	to	the	justness	of	a	particular	case	so	long	as	doing	so	would	not	result	in	injustice.	The	fiduciary	obligation	to	pursue	the	public’s	interest	in	justice	makes	that	abstract	goal	primary	and	renders	all	other	extrinsic	public	 interests	 subordinate.	 That	 prosecutors	must	mediate	 among	 a	constellation	of	interests,11	and	give	priority	to	criminal	justice	interests,	limits	the	extent	to	which	prosecutors	with	different	values	can	diverge	in	their	approach	to	decision	making.12	Third,	fiduciary	theory	helps	narrow	the	range	of	proper	prosecutorial	regulation.	A	related	 challenge	 in	 regulating	prosecutors	 is	achieving	a	proper	balance	between	prosecutorial	accountability	and	independence.	It	is	essential	to	hold	prosecutors	accountable	when	they	fail	to	fulfill	their	obligations	 because	 the	 potential	 for	 harm	 is	 so	 grave.	 For	 example,	prosecutors	at	times	fail	to	comply	with	the	constitutional	duty	to	provide	exculpatory	evidence	to	the	defense	or	abuse	their	authority	in	deciding	whether	 to	 institute	 criminal	 charges	 or	 to	 plea	 bargain.13	 Although	critics	call	for	greater	accountability	to	address	these	abuses	of	power,14	both	 the	structure	of	American	government	and	 the	rule	of	 law	 itself	require	prosecutors,	like	judges,	to	be	independent	of	those	who	might																																																									
	 11.	 Id.		 12.	 Cf.	Note,	The	Paradox	of	“Progressive	Prosecution”,	132	Harv.	L.	Rev.	748,	770	(2018)	(“The	paradox	of	‘progressive	prosecution’	is	that	the	criminal	legal	system	is	an	oppressive	 institution.	 Attempting	 to	 make	 the	 ‘most	 powerful’	 actor	 in	 such	 an	institution	more	progressive	seems	to	miss	the	point.”	(footnote	omitted)).		 13.	 Bruce	 Green	 &	 Ellen	 Yaroshefsky,	 Prosecutorial	 Accountability	 2.0,	 92	NOTRE	DAME	L.	REV.	51,	59–60	(2016).	
	 14.	 See	Barkow,	supra	note	3,	at	874–84	(outlining	prosecutors’	adjudicative	and	enforcement	 powers	 and	 explaining	 how	 the	 accumulation	 of	 these	 powers	 is	problematic);	 Davis,	 supra	 note	 4,	 at	 395–448;	 Bruce	 A.	 Green	&	 Fred	 C.	 Zacharias,	
Regulating	Federal	Prosecutors’	Ethics,	55	VAND.	L.	REV.	381,	469–78	(2002)	(discussing	the	pros	and	cons	of	various	methods	for	regulating	prosecutorial	conduct);	Ronald	F.	Wright,	Reinventing	American	Prosecution	Systems,	46	CRIME	&	JUST.	395,	396–99	(2017)	(explaining	prosecutors’	role,	along	with	the	complicity	of	the	legislature,	in	expanding	the	incarceration	rate).	
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otherwise	 hold	 them	 accountable.15	 It	 is	more	 than	 just	 a	 theoretical	concern	that	if	prosecutors	were	subject	to	direct	oversight	and	control	by	other	government	actors,	politicians	might	seek	to	use	prosecutors	to	 do	 their	 partisan	 or	 personal	 bidding,	 which	 would	 undermine	prosecutors’	 fiduciary	 responsibility	 to	 pursue	 the	 public	 interest	 in	achieving	 justice.16	 Independence	 also	 requires	 some	 distance	 from	factions	of	citizens	with	well-articulated	interests,	and	it	even	requires	that	prosecutors	be	insulated	from	(although	perhaps	not	oblivious	to)	a	public	consensus	in	favor	of	a	particular	act	or	outcome.17	Striking	 a	 balance	 between	 prosecutorial	 accountability	 and	independence	is	particularly	difficult	when	it	comes	to	charging	and	plea	bargaining	because	 these	decisions	 are	both	momentous	 and	by	nature	discretionary.	 When	 prosecutors,	 as	 trial	 lawyers,	 act	 unlawfully	 or	abusively	in	the	manner	in	which	they	conduct	criminal	investigations	and	proceedings,	 courts	 have	 constitutional	 and	 inherent	 authority	 to	 hold	them	accountable.18	As	a	practical	matter,	courts	tend	to	be	circumspect	in	their	oversight	of	prosecutors’	investigative	and	trial	conduct,	but	at	least	as	a	 legal	matter,	 courts	have	considerable	authority	both	 to	define	and	remedy	 prosecutors’	 trial	 misconduct	 and	 to	 sanction	 prosecutors	 for	wrongdoing	in	their	role	as	advocates.19	In	contrast,	courts	do	not	regulate	prosecutors’	 charging	 and	 plea	 bargaining	 decisions	 except	 in	 the	 most																																																									
	 15.	 See	generally	Bruce	A.	Green	&	Rebecca	Roiphe,	Can	the	President	Control	 the	
Department	of	Justice?,	70	ALA.	L.	REV.	1	(2018)	(arguing	that	federal	prosecutors	are—and	must	be—independent	of	the	President).	
	 16.	 See	 id.	 at	 55	 (describing	how	 the	 professionalization	 of	 the	DOJ	emphasized	independence	of	prosecutors	from	partisan	influence);	Bruce	A.	Green	&	Rebecca	Roiphe,	
May	Federal	Prosecutors	Take	Direction	from	the	President?,	87	FORDHAM	L.	REV.	1817	(2019)	(discussing	the	“consequences	for	prosecutors	who	receive	the	president’s	orders”).		 17.	 This	is	essentially,	on	a	more	explicit	and	grander	scale,	the	kind	of	independent	role	 that	 all	 lawyers	 are	 supposed	 to	 play.	 Robert	W.	 Gordon,	 The	 Independence	 of	
Lawyers,	68	B.U.	L.	REV.	1,	9–30	(1988).	For	a	discussion	of	a	judge’s	failure	to	maintain	this	sort	of	independence	from	the	public,	see	Bruce	A.	Green	&	Rebecca	Roiphe,	Punishment	
Without	 Process:	 “Victim	 Impact”	 Proceedings	 for	 Dead	 Defendants,	 FLR	 ONLINE	 (2019),	https://fordhamlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/	 Green-Roiphe_November_FLRO_4.pdf	[https://perma.cc/QE9N-V5WX].	
	 18.	 See,	e.g.,	Massameno	v.	Statewide	Grievance	Comm.,	663	A.2d	317,	322	(Conn.	1995)	 (rejecting	 the	 claim	 that	 disciplining	 the	 state	 prosecutor	 would	 violate	separation	of	powers);	State	v.	Davis,	972	P.2d	1099,	1105	(Kan.	1999)	(affirming	the	trial	court’s	order	holding	the	prosecutor	in	criminal	contempt	for	failing	to	comply	with	discovery	order).	See	generally	Green	&	Zacharias,	supra	note	14,	at	405–12	(describing	federal	courts’	authority	to	regulate	federal	prosecutors).		 19.	 Green	&	Zacharias,	supra	note	14,	at	403–05	(explaining	how	federal	courts	can	directly	 and	 indirectly	 sanction	 prosecutors	 by	 reprimanding	 them	 off	 the	 record,	instituting	fines,	or	negatively	interpreting	a	particular	prosecutor’s	arguments).	
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extreme	 situations.20	 These	 discretionary	 decisions,	 which	 implicate	prosecutors’	role	as	public	officials	more	than	as	trial	lawyers,	are	free	from	judicial	review	largely	because	judicial	interference	threatens	to	undermine	prosecutors’	 effectiveness	 and	 inordinately	 entangle	 courts	 in	 executive	branch	decision	making.	And	yet,	in	many	ways,	decisions	about	whether	to	initiate	and	dismiss	criminal	charges	are	prosecutors’	most	significant	ones	both	for	individual	defendants	and	for	the	community	and,	therefore,	are	the	decisions	for	which	prosecutors	most	need	to	be	publicly	accountable.	In	 addition	 to	 shedding	 light	 on	how	prosecutors	 should	 approach	decision	making,	fiduciary	theory	offers	insight	into	how	to	achieve	the	proper	balance	between	accountability	and	independence	in	the	context	of	 criminal	 prosecution.	 While	 at	 times	 in	 tension,	 prosecutorial	accountability	 and	 independence	 are	 not	 contradictory	 aspirations.	Both	accountability	and	independence	are	mechanisms	to	promote	and	protect	 prosecutors’	 core	 fiduciary	 duties	 of	 care	 and	 loyalty.	 Each	addresses	risks	that	threaten	to	distort	prosecutorial	adherence	to	the	needs	and	 interests	of	 the	public	 in	achieving	 justice.	While	 fiduciary	theory	 does	 not	 provide	 an	 algorithm	 for	 determining	 when	 to	emphasize	one	over	the	other,	it	may	help	to	craft	an	institutional	design	for	prosecutors’	offices	that	can	maximize	both.	A	 key	 and	 often	 controversial	 question	 in	 determining	 the	 proper	balance	between	accountability	and	independence	is	how	much	control	the	 public	 ought	 to	 have	 over	 prosecutors	 either	 directly	 or	 through	other	public	monitors.	Fiduciary	 theory	may	help	solve	 this	puzzle	 in	two	 ways.	 First,	 fiduciary	 theory	 helps	 clarify	 that	 both	 aims	 are	designed	to	ensure	loyalty	to	the	client,	and	second,	it	helps	determine	which	sorts	of	decisions	need	 to	be	 insulated	 from	popular	 input	and	control.	The	fiduciary	obligation	for	prosecutors	is	to	pursue	the	public’s	interest	 in	 justice.	 The	 public	 should	 not	 have	 direct	 input	 in	determining	and	weighing	considerations	that	directly	bear	on	criminal	justice	in	particular	cases.	These	traditional	criminal	justice	questions	are	embodied	in	decisional	law	and	the	Constitution	and	developed	by	the	 traditions	and	practices	of	prosecutors	over	 time.	The	discretionary	power	of	prosecutors	at	the	core	of	their	fiduciary	mission	derives	from	making	these	sorts	of	calculations	in	the	best	interest	of	the	public	rather	than	 at	 its	 behest.	 Extrinsic	 considerations	 that	 might	 also	 affect	prosecutors’	decisions,	such	as	foreign	policy	questions	or	the	intersection																																																									
	 20.	 See	 Davis,	 supra	 note	 4,	 at	 435–37	 (describing	 how	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	promoted	 expansive	 prosecutorial	 discretion	 and	 discouraged	 challenges	 to	prosecutors’	abuse	of	the	charging	power).	
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between	 prosecution	 and	 immigration	 policy,	 are	 less	 central	 to	prosecutors’	fiduciary	mission,	and	there	is	no	reason	why	the	public	either	directly	or	through	other	elected	officials	could	not	have	more	input	into	these	secondary	public	policy	concerns.	Part	 I	of	 this	Article	offers	both	historical	and	 theoretical	bases	 for	drawing	on	fiduciary	theory	to	explain	the	U.S.	prosecutor’s	role.	From	an	historical	perspective,	prosecutors	were,	at	times	throughout	early	American	history,	regarded	as	fiduciaries.21	Thought	of	as	repositories	of	 a	 public	 trust,	 prosecutors	 are,	 like	 public	 officials	 generally,	fiduciaries.	 But	 most	 of	 these	 historical	 references	 are	 used	 as	 a	rhetorical	flourish.	They	do	not	offer	much	in	terms	of	content	for	the	unique	relationship	that	prosecutors	have	to	the	public.	For	many	of	the	same	reasons	that	theorists	have	cast	public	officials,	including	judges,	as	fiduciaries,	prosecutors	too	can	be	characterized	as	fiduciaries—that	is,	as	professionals	who	hold	a	trust	and	wield	considerable	discretion	on	behalf	of	a	vulnerable	beneficiary.	Drawing	on	the	fiduciary	theory	of	governance,	this	 Part	 concludes	 that	 while	 prosecutors’	 beneficiary	 is	 the	 public,	prosecutors	 serve	 the	 public	 not	 by	 satisfying	 the	 preferences	 of	 an	amalgam	of	citizens	at	a	particular	moment	in	time	but	by	pursuing	the	abstract	public	 interest	 in	 justice	 that	 is,	 and	 ought	 to	 be,	 elaborated	within	prosecutors’	offices	over	time.	In	Part	II,	we	examine	prosecutors’	role	as	a	fiduciary,	focusing	on	the	core	fiduciary	duties	of	care	and	loyalty.	This	exercise	illuminates	the	complexity	 of	 prosecutors’	 role,	 particularly	 in	making	 discretionary	charging	and	plea-bargaining	decisions.	Rather	than	simply	relying	on	intuition,	prosecutors	should	explicitly	and	consciously	consider	particular	relevant	factors.	For	the	idea	of	justice	to	develop	more	particular	meaning	over	time,	the	policies	and	practices	that	surround	the	duty	of	loyalty	and	care	must	be	articulated,	reviewed,	and	revised	in	the	context	of	individual	investigations	 and	 prosecutions.	 By	 exploring	 the	 complex	 nature	 of	discretionary	decision	making,	this	section	highlights	the	importance	of	both	accountability	and	independence.	Finally,	in	Part	III,	we	consider	whether	fiduciary	theory	helps	determine	how	 to	 enhance	 prosecutorial	 accountability	 and	 independence.	 We	conclude	 with	 cautious	 optimism.	 Fiduciary	 governance	 mandates	 a	balance	 between	 insulation	 and	 responsiveness.	 Prosecutors	 should	 be	insulated	from	direct	popular	control	but	only	insofar	as	that	allows	them	to	develop	stable	norms	and	principles	governing	decision	making.	To	that																																																										 21.	 See	Miller	&	Gold,	supra	note	2,	at	565–78	(explaining	that	public	officials	often	served	as	fiduciary	on	behalf	of	the	public).	
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end,	oversight	should	include	a	mechanism	for	ensuring	that	prosecutors	are	explicitly	weighing	proper	concerns	in	making	discretionary	decisions	and	developing	more	concrete	goals	and	priorities	that	give	substance	to	the	mandate	to	do	justice.	That	oversight	requires	not	only	some	degree	of	transparency	but	 also	 reciprocity.	 In	 other	words,	 prosecutors	 ought	 to	serve	as	educators,	explaining	the	value	of	the	norms	and	traditions	that	govern	their	work.	I.				PROSECUTORS	AS	FIDUCIARIES—HISTORY	AND	THEORY	
A.			The	Historical	Background	to	U.S.	Prosecutors’	Fiduciary	Role	The	shift	from	private	to	public	prosecutions	in	America	could	be	seen	as	a	shift	from	a	private	service	model	to	a	public	fiduciary	model.22	In	the	 Middle	 Ages,	 crime	 was	 originally	 seen	 as	 a	 personal	 offense,	 a	wrong	 inflicted	 on	 the	 victim.23	 This	 view	 persisted	 through	 the	nineteenth	 century	 in	 England	 and	 America.	 Private	 prosecution	 in	England	 was	 justified,	 in	 part,	 as	 a	 restriction	 on	 the	 power	 of	 the	Crown.24	While	a	limited	system	of	public	prosecution	developed	over	time,	England	did	not	officially	recognize	public	prosecution	until	1879	when	 the	Office	 of	 Public	 Prosecutions	was	 created.25	 In	 nineteenth-century	England,	however,	even	private	prosecutions	were	thought	to	be	brought	in	the	public	interest:	the	prosecutor	“has	as	much	a	public	duty	 to	discharge	 as	 the	 sovereign	 himself,	 and	 has	 a	 public	 trust	 to	exercise.”26	The	American	colonies	borrowed	significantly	from	the	British	system,	and	 early	 prosecutions	 were	 primarily	 brought	 by	 individual	 victims.	Colonists	similarly	resisted	the	public	prosecution	model	as	fraught	with	the	potential	for	abuse.27	However,	a	growing	population,	increased	crime,																																																										 22.	 Nicholas	 R.	 Parrillo,	 Fiduciary	 Government	 and	 Public	 Officers’	 Incentives,	 in	FIDUCIARY	GOVERNMENT	146,	156	(Evan	J.	Criddle	et	al.	eds.,	2018)	(arguing	that	the	shift	in	public	officials’	 compensation	from	private	to	public	 funding	demonstrates	a	 shift	from	a	service	model	toward	a	fiduciary	model	of	government).		 23.	 Juan	Cardenas,	The	Crime	Victim	in	the	Prosecutorial	Process,	9	HARV.	J.L.	&	PUB.	POL’Y	357,	359	(1986).		 24.	 Douglas	Hay,	Controlling	the	English	Prosecutor,	21	OSGOODE	HALL	L.J.	165,	167	(1983).		 25.	 Prosecution	of	Offences	Act,	1879,	42	&	43	Vict.	c.	22	(Eng.).	
	 26.	 Would	the	Ends	of	Justice	Be	Promoted	by	the	Appointment	of	a	Public	Prosecutor?,	4	PHILOMATHIC	J.	&	LITERARY	REV.	309,	345	(1826).		 27.	 Cardenas,	supra	note	23,	at	368;	William	F.	McDonald,	Towards	a	Bicentennial	
Revolution	 in	Criminal	 Justice:	The	Return	of	 the	Victim,	 13	AM.	CRIM.	L.	REV.	649,	653	(1976).	
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and	the	chaos	created	by	laws	giving	rewards	for	successful	prosecution	led	to	criticism	of	private	prosecution	and	calls	for	a	public	alternative.28	Critics	of	private	prosecution	emphasized	that	the	system	introduced	problems,	as	crime	victims	and	their	paid	advocates	sought	unfair	financial	benefit.29	By	 the	American	Revolution,	many	colonies	 had	moved	 toward	partial	public	prosecution.30	Proponents	 of	 public	 prosecution	 in	 nineteenth-century	 America	emphasized	how	the	private	model	vindicated	the	private	interests	of	parties	at	the	public	expense.	Increasingly,	the	prosecutor	came	to	be	viewed	as	a	fiduciary	of	the	public	at	large	or	of	the	public	interest	in	the	abstract,	not	as	an	agent	of	an	individual	victim.	There	was	a	practical	significance	 to	 the	 shift.	When	 the	 defendant’s	 guilt	was	 uncertain,	 a	private	lawyer	might	vigorously	prosecute	out	of	fidelity	to	the	victim-client	 if	 not	 as	 a	matter	 of	 self-interest,	whereas	 a	 public	prosecutor	would	 be	 expected	 to	 refrain	 from	 doing	 so	 to	 avoid	 convicting	 an	innocent	person.	In	1888,	recognizing	this	concern,	a	Wisconsin	court	declared	 private	 prosecution	 unconstitutional,	 explaining,	 “[t]he	prosecuting	officer	represents	the	public	interests,	which	can	never	be	promoted	by	the	conviction	of	the	innocent.	His	object,	like	that	of	the	court,	should	be	simply	justice;	and	he	has	no	right	to	sacrifice	this	to	the	pride	of	professional	success.”31	Another	court	explicitly	described	the	prosecutor’s	role	as	a	“public	trust,	committed	by	the	public	to	an	individual.”32	
																																																									 28.	 Cardenas,	supra	note	23,	at	368–69.	
	 29.	 Id.	at	369.	
	 30.	 Id.	at	371.		 31.	 Biemel	v.	State,	37	N.W.	244,	247	(Wis.	1888);	see	also	Meister	v.	People,	31	Mich.	99,	 103–04	 (1875)	 (arguing	 that	 prosecutors	 owe	 a	 “[d]uty	 of	 impartiality”	 that	 is	inconsistent	with	the	privately	funded	prosecution).		 32.	 State	ex	rel.	Gibson	v.	Friedley,	34	N.E.	872,	875	(Ind.	1893);	see	also	State	ex	rel.	Black	v.	Taylor,	106	S.W.	1023,	1027	(Mo.	1907)	(refusing	to	allow	the	Attorney	General	to	“farm	out”	his	obligations	to	private	parties	because	prosecution	is	a	“public	trust”);	People	ex	rel.	Peabody	v.	Attorney	General,	13	How.	Pr.	179,	183	(N.Y.	Sup.	Ct.	1856)	(refusing	to	grant	a	writ	of	mandamus	forcing	the	Attorney	General	to	bring	an	action	on	the	application	of	a	private	party	and	stating:	“Our	legislature	have	seen	fit	to	invest	the	attorney	 general	with	 this	 discretion.	 His	 office	 is	 a	 public	 trust.	 It	 is	 a	 legal	presumption	that	he	will	do	his	duty—that	he	will	act	with	strict	impartiality.	 In	this	confidence	he	has	been	endowed	with	a	large	discretion,	not	only	in	cases	like	this,	but	in	other	matters	of	public	concern.	The	exercise	of	such	discretion	 is,	 in	 its	nature,	a	judicial	act,	 from	which	there	 is	no	appeal,	and	over	which	courts	have	no	control”);	Commonwealth	v.	Burrell,	7	Pa.	34,	39	(Sup.	Ct.	1847)	(“[T]he	office	of	 the	attorney-general	is	a	public	trust	.	.	.	.”).	
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Likewise,	 one	 of	 the	 founders	 of	 modern	 legal	 ethics,	 George	Sharswood,	conceptualized	prosecutors	as	public	trustees—that	 is,	as	fiduciaries	of	the	general	public.	In	1869,	he	wrote:	There	is	no	obligation	on	an	attorney	to	minister	to	the	bad	passions	of	his	client;	it	is	but	rarely	that	a	criminal	prosecution	is	pursued	for	a	valuable	private	end,	the	restoration	of	goods,	the	maintenance	of	the	good	name	of	the	prosecutor,	or	closing	the	mouth	of	a	man	who	has	perjured	himself	in	a	court	of	justice.	The	office	of	the	Attorney-General	 is	 a	 public	 trust,	which	 involves	 in	 the	 discharge	 of	 it,	 the	exertion	of	an	almost	boundless	discretion,	by	an	officer	who	stands	as	impartial	as	a	judge.33	While	analogizing	prosecutors	to	judges	in	their	obligation	of	impartiality,	Sharswood	did	not	otherwise	specify	prosecutors’	fiduciary	obligations	as	holders	of	the	public	trust.	It	 would	 be	 an	 overstatement	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 private	 service	model	 of	 prosecution	 was	 entirely	 supplanted.	 Private	 prosecution	persisted	for	quite	some	time	in	the	United	States,	and	remnants	of	it	still	 exist.34	Meanwhile,	 early	 concerns	 about	 the	 dangers	 of	 political	control	of	prosecution	expressed	by	proponents	of	private	prosecution	subsided	but	did	not	abate.	At	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	professionalism	emerged	as	a	way	to	address	concerns	that	prosecutors	would	use	the	state’s	criminal	justice	authority	 to	promote	narrow	parochial	or	partisan	 interests.35	Prosecutors,	as	professionals,	would	be	constrained	by	ethical	norms,	experience,	and	training	not	only	in	their	actions	but	also	in	the	process	by	which	they	make	decisions.36	Just	as	judges	draw	on	judicial	norms,	such	as	those	governing	the	interpretation	of	statutes	and	application	of	precedent,	 prosecutors	 too	 look	 to	 evolving	 written	 and	 unwritten	prosecutorial	 traditions.37	 These	 contemporary	 understandings	 are	consistent	with	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 prosecutor	 as	 a	 fiduciary	who	 exercises	discretion	on	behalf	of	others	who	are	 vulnerable	and	dependent.	 	 This	understanding	 also	 offers	 a	 rationale	 for	 subjecting	 prosecutors	 to																																																										 33.	 GEORGE	SHARSWOOD,	AN	ESSAY	ON	PROFESSIONAL	ETHICS	95	(3d	ed.	1869).		 34.	 Roger	A.	Fairfax,	Jr.,	Delegation	of	the	Criminal	Prosecution	Function	to	Private	
Actors,	43	U.C.	DAVIS	L.	REV.	411,	413–15	(2009).		 35.	 Green	&	Roiphe,	supra	note	15,	at	49–55.		 36.	 Stephen	R.	Galoob	&	Ethan	J.	Leib,	Fiduciary	Political	Theory	and	Legitimacy,	in	FIDUCIARY	GOVERNMENT,	supra	note	22,	at	163,	165–66	(arguing	that	what	distinguishes	legitimate	fiduciary	relationships	is	limits	on	the	fiduciary’s	cognitive	function).	
	 37.	 See	Bruce	A.	Green	&	Fred	C.	Zacharias,	Prosecutorial	Accountability,	2004	Wis.	L.	 Rev.	 837,	 870–83	 (describing	 prosecutors’	 decisions	making	 based	 on	 principles	derived	from	legislation,	the	purposes	of	criminal	law,	and	elsewhere).	
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normative	constraints	intended	to	minimize	the	risk	of	self-dealing	and	other	abuses	of	discretion.	
B.			Theoretical	Background	The	theory	of	fiduciary	governance	has	drawn	on	the	private	law	and	theory	 of	 fiduciaries	 to	 develop	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 and	responsibilities	 of	 public	 officials,	 including	 judges.38	 As	 lawyers	appearing	in	court	on	behalf	of	a	client,	prosecutors	are	fiduciaries	in	the	most	classical	sense.	But	like	other	public	officials,	prosecutors	are	also	a	different	sort	of	fiduciary.	Instead	of	serving	a	defined	interest	of	a	 particular	 beneficiary,	 this	 fiduciary	 administers	 the	 law	 on	 the	public’s	 behalf	 in	 furtherance	 of	 an	 abstract	 public	 purpose.39	 In	deciding	whether	to	initiate	an	investigation	or	criminal	charge,	to	plea	bargain	or	to	dismiss	a	prosecution,	prosecutors	do	not	take	direction	from	 clients	 or	 defer	 to	 clients’	 objectives.	 Nor	 do	 they	 engage	 in	ministerial	 acts.	 They	 exercise	 discretion	 as	 other	 public	 officials,	particularly	judges,	do.	The	 fiduciary	relationship	 is	defined	as	one	 involving	discretionary	power	and	structural	vulnerability.40	Trustees,	for	instance,	exercise	a	great	deal	of	discretionary	power	over	the	beneficiary,	who,	as	a	result,	is	 vulnerable	 to	 abuse.	 A	 hallmark	 of	 the	 relationship	 is	 trust,	 and	monitoring	costs	are	usually	high.41	Prosecutors	fit	this	mold.	Scholars	and	critics	have	pointed	out	both	prosecutors’	vast	discretion	and	the	very	real	potential	for	abuse	at	the	expense	of	the	public.42	Arguments	 that	 judges	 are	 fiduciaries	 are	 largely	 applicable	 to	prosecutors	 as	well.43	 Prosecutors	 have	 been	 described	 as	 quasi-judicial																																																									
	 38.	 See	Miller	&	Gold,	supra	note	2,	at	567–70.		 39.	 In	 this	 role	prosecutors	are	 involved	in	administration	for	abstract	purposes	rather	than	for	an	individual	or	set	of	individuals.	Id.	at	523.	Miller	and	Gold	put	it	this	way:	 “A	 fiduciary	 relationship	 is	 one	 in	 which	 one	 person	 (the	 fiduciary)	 enjoys	discretionary	 power	 to	 pursue	 an	 abstract	 other-regarding	 purpose	.	.	.	 of	 another	person	(an	individual	beneficiary	or	ascertained	set	of	beneficiaries).”	Id.	at	549.		 40.	 Miller,	supra	note	1,	at	69–75.		 41.	 Leib	et	al.,	supra	note	2,	at	706.	
	 42.	 See,	e.g.,	Bibas,	supra	note	4,	at	961	(“Prosecutors	have	great	leeway	to	abuse	their	powers	and	 indulge	 their	 self-interests,	 biases,	 or	 arbitrariness.”);	Davis,	supra	note	4,	at	408–16	(surveying	“prosecutorial	discretion	and	how	it	is	abused”);	Bruce	A.	Green,	Prosecutorial	Discretion:	The	Difficulty	and	Necessity	of	Public	Inquiry,	123	DICK.	L.	REV.	589,	606–18	(2019)	(discussing	why	prosecutorial	abuse	of	discretion	is	hard	to	define	and	detect).	
	 43.	 See	Leib	et	al.,	supra	note	2	(applying	fiduciary	principles	in	public	law	to	the	judiciary).	
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officials—“minister[s]	of	 justice.”44	 In	exercising	discretion	 in	 the	criminal	context,	prosecutors	both	determine	the	relevant	public	interests	and	decide	how	to	balance	and	pursue	them	in	particular	factual	circumstances.	In	other	words,	 their	 role	 is	 constitutive	 in	defining	 the	abstract	 interest	 they	 are	supposed	 to	 serve	 and	 instrumental	 in	 furthering	 it	 in	 particular	 cases.	Prosecutors	do	not	have	a	traditional	beneficiary	who	defines	the	objectives	of	the	fiduciary	relationship.	They	discern,	and	contribute	to	developing,	the	collective	understanding	of	justice	as	they	implement	it	in	any	given	case.	It	is	almost	universally	recognized	that	U.S.	prosecutors’	duty	is	to	“seek	justice.”45	 But	 in	 concrete	 cases,	 it	 is	 a	 challenge	 to	 give	 substance	 and	meaning	to	this	vague	mandate.46	To	some	extent,	the	law	establishes	the	outer	limits	of	this	obligation	by,	among	other	things,	restricting	how	prosecutors	 acquire	 evidence,	 prescribing	 the	 minimum	 amount	 of	information	 they	must	disclose	 to	 the	defense,	 and	precluding	certain	
																																																								
	 44.	 See,	e.g.,	MODEL	RULES	OF	PROF’L	CONDUCT	r.	3.8	cmt.	1	(AM.	BAR	ASS’N	2016)	(“A	prosecutor	 has	 the	 responsibility	 of	 a	minister	 of	 justice	 and	 not	 simply	 that	 of	 an	advocate.”).	See	generally	Daniel	Epps,	Adversarial	Asymmetry	in	the	Criminal	Process,	91	N.Y.U.	L.	REV.	762,	833	(2016)	(contrasting	“punishment-maximizing”	prosecution	with	“an	 idealized	 vision	 of	 the	 prosecutor	 as	 minister	 of	 justice”);	 Eric	 S.	 Fish,	 Against	
Adversary	 Prosecution,	 103	 IOWA	 L.	 REV.	 1419,	 1463–68	 (2018)	 (describing	 the	significance	of	conceptualizing	prosecutors	as	“minister[s]	of	justice”).		 45.	 For	 a	 description	 and	 explanation	 for	 why	 prosecutors	 have	 a	 duty	 to	 seek	justice,	see	Green,	supra	note	9,	at	633–37.	
	 46.	 See,	e.g.,	Bellin,	supra	note	9,	at	11	(arguing	that	the	duty	to	“advocate	for	justice”	is	 too	 vague	 to	 give	 prosecutors	 meaningful	 guidance,	 and	 that	 greater	 guidance	 is	provided	by	conceptualizing	prosecutors	as	“servant[s]	of	the	law”);	Bibas,	supra	note	4,	at	961	 (“In	 theory,	prosecutors	are	beholden	 to	 the	public	 interest	or	 justice.	These	concepts,	however,	 are	 so	diffuse	and	elastic	 that	 they	do	not	 constrain	prosecutors	much,	 certainly	 not	 in	 the	 way	 that	 an	 identifiable	 client	 would.”).	 Others	 see	prosecutors’	“duty	to	seek	justice”	as	a	useful	starting	point	for	ascertaining	prosecutors’	particular	obligations.	See,	e.g.,	Fish,	supra	note	9,	at	305	(“In	the	many	situations	where	judges	are	unable	to	fully	implement	constitutional	protections,	prosecutors	should	step	in	and	perform	the	task	themselves.	The	theoretical	resources	for	this	role	can	be	found	in	commonplace	maxims	about	prosecutors:	they	have	a	duty	to	‘seek	justice,’	not	just	obtain	convictions,	and	they	are	obligated	to	uphold	the	Constitution	through	their	oaths	of	office.”);	Fred	C.	Zacharias,	Structuring	the	Ethics	of	Prosecutorial	Trial	Practice:	Can	
Prosecutors	Do	Justice?,	44	VAND.	L.	REV.	45,	46	(1991)	(arguing	that	prosecutors’	duty	to	do	 justice	 implies	 specific	 obligations	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 inadequacies	 of	 the	adversarial	process);	see	also	Lissa	Griffin	&	Ellen	Yaroshefsky,	Ministers	of	Justice	and	
Mass	Incarceration,	30	GEO.	J.	LEGAL	ETHICS	301	(2017)	(arguing	for	changes	within	the	prosecutorial	 system	 to	better	balance	prosecutors’	 roles	as	ministers	of	 justice	 and	advocates	in	light	of	prosecutors’	contribution	to	mass	incarceration);	K.	Babe	Howell,	
Prosecutorial	Discretion	and	the	Duty	to	Seek	Justice	in	an	Overburdened	Criminal	Justice	
System,	27	GEO.	J.	LEGAL	ETHICS	285	(2014).	
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jury	arguments.47	But	within	the	confines	of	the	law,	prosecutors	have	vast	discretion.	 Some	 guidance	 may	 be	 implicit	 in	 the	 law.48	 Professional	tradition	or	consensus	and	office	policies	may	also	work	to	fill	in	the	gaps.	But	 prosecutors	 interpret	 this	 guidance	 differently	 and	 take	 vastly	divergent	 approaches	 to	 discretionary	 decision	 making.	 Identifying	 the	prosecutor	as	a	public	fiduciary	suggests	that	the	diversity	of	approaches	may	 not	 be	 a	 problem	 as	 long	 as	 prosecutors	 follow	 a	 set	 process	 for	deliberately	and	consciously	discerning	and	pursuing	the	interests	of	the	beneficiary.	This	raises	the	question	of	who	or	what	is	the	prosecutor’s	beneficiary?	Fiduciary	theorists	have	sought	to	define	the	beneficiary	of	 judges,49	the	legislature,50	and	administrative	agencies.51	We	know	who	the	prosecutor’s	client	is—the	public	entity	named	in	the	caption	of	the	criminal	indictment	(the	United	States,	the	State,	the	Commonwealth,	the	People	of	the	State,	etc.).	Is	the	beneficiary	the	entire	public	in	the	abstract	sense	or	some	segment	of	the	public?	If	so,	is	there	a	tension	between	the	prosecutor’s	fiduciary	duties	as	a	lawyer	and	the	prosecutor’s	fiduciary	duties	as	a	public	official?	Does	the	prosecutor	 owe	 particularly	 strong	 obligations	 to	 some	 subgroup	 of	 the	public,	 like	 the	 victim,	 or	 even	 the	 accused?	 While	 the	 prosecutor’s	beneficiary	is	the	public,	the	public’s	objective	in	the	criminal	context	is	to	render	or	achieve	 justice;	hence,	the	prosecutor’s	duty	as	a	fiduciary	 is	to	pursue	the	public’s	abstract	interest	in	justice,	which	entails	a	constellation	of	interests	and	values.	Prosecutors	and	other	public	officials	balance	competing	concerns	of	a	complex	group,	but	they	also	balance	the	interests	of	the	public	with	the	needs	of	the	state	and	the	proper	functioning	of	the	criminal	justice	system.	As	Evan	Criddle	and	Evan	Fox-Decent	have	argued,	both	public	fiduciaries	and	private	 fiduciaries	 are	required	 to	engage	 in	a	 careful	balancing	of	competing	interests.	Tensions	arise	both	among	a	group	of																																																									
	 47.	 See	 Fish,	 supra	 note	 9,	 at	275–78	 (describing	ABA	Model	 Rule	 3.8	and	 state	model	rule	equivalents	that	impose	requirements	on	prosecutors).	See	generally	Green	&	Zacharias,	supra	note	14	(detailing	the	various	ethical	rules	implemented	on	the	state	and	federal	level,	along	with	other	prosecutorial	accountability	mechanisms).	
	 48.	 See	Bellin,	supra	note	9,	at	49–51.	
	 49.	 E.g.,	Leib	et	al.,	supra	note	2	(applying	fiduciary	principles	to	the	 judiciary	to	analyze	the	role	of	judges	in	democracy).	
	 50.	 E.g.,	 D.	 Theodore	 Rave,	 Politicians	 as	 Fiduciaries,	 126	 HARV.	 L.	 REV.	 671,	 676	(2013)	 (arguing	 that	 courts	 should	 apply	 a	 fiduciary	 duty	 of	 loyalty	 to	 political	representatives	to	hold	them	accountable	for	political	gerrymandering).		 51.	 Evan	J.	Criddle,	Fiduciary	Administration:	Rethinking	Popular	Representation	in	
Agency	Rulemaking,	88	TEX.	L.	REV.	441,	466–68	(2010).	
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beneficiaries	and	between	the	beneficiary	and	the	state.52	A	prosecutor,	like	other	fiduciaries,	could	be	seen	as	owing	first	order	obligations	to	the	public	and	a	separate	second	order	fiduciary	obligation	to	the	courts	and	criminal	justice	system.	Alternatively,	the	prosecutor’s	obligation	to	the	public,	courts,	and	the	criminal	justice	system	could	all	derive	from	the	 fiduciary	 obligation	 to	 the	 public.	 In	 either	 iteration,	 fiduciary	obligation	shifts	from	loyalty	to	a	duty	of	fairness	and	reasonableness	in	this	context.	The	prosecutor	must	be	fair	in	assessing	the	interest	of	the	beneficiary	 and	 in	 balancing	 competing	 priorities	 and	 values.	 Values	embraced	 by	 some	 members	 of	 the	 public	 might	 overlap	 with	 the	interests	of	the	state	in	a	properly	functioning	criminal	justice	system,	while	others	may	not.	Prosecutors’	duties	to	fairly	consider	the	interests	of	 the	 public	 as	 a	 whole	 may	 involve	 at	 least	 offering	 reasons	 for	prioritizing	some	criminal	justice	ends	over	others.	Again,	prosecutorial	independence	 from	 powerful	 majorities	 is	 crucial	 to	 preserve	 this	discretionary	balancing.	Drawing	on	fiduciary	theory,	this	Article	argues	that	the	prosecutor’s	obligation	 is	 to	 pursue	 the	 public’s	 abstract	 and	 evolving	 interest	 in	justice.	 Other	 public	 officials	 may	 have	 a	 more	 defined	 mandate.	Administrative	agencies,	for	instance,	usually	have	a	particular	mission.	For	example,	the	Federal	Election	Commission	is	tasked	with	enforcing	and	administering	the	federal	election	laws.53	The	prosecutor’s	mandate,	in	contrast,	 is	vague	and	subject	to	multiple	conflicting	interpretations.	Even	so,	as	fiduciaries,	prosecutors	are	required	to	continually	take	part	in	an	ongoing	process	of	exposition.	This	exposition	ought	to	take	place	according	to	the	traditions	and	policies	of	the	prosecutor’s	office.	Like	the	limits	 of	 permissible	 judicial	 reasoning,	 these	 practices	 will	 limit	discretion	and	confine	the	process	in	a	way	that	ought	to	reassure	us	that	we	are	not	simply	subject	to	any	one	prosecutor’s	idiosyncratic	view	of	justice.	At	any	given	moment,	there	will	be	competing	understandings,	but	 if	 prosecutors	 engage	 in	 a	deliberate	 and	 transparent	 process	 of	seeking	 to	 define	 justice	 in	 a	 consistent	 and	 rational	way	within	 the	context	 of	 the	 traditions,	 policies,	 and	 practices	 of	 the	 office,	 that	abstract	ideal	will	gain	meaning,	and	hopefully	some	consensus,	through	practice	over	time.	
																																																									 52.	 Evan	 J.	 Criddle	 &	 Evan	 Fox-Decent,	 Guardians	 of	 Legal	 Order:	 The	 Dual	
Commissions	of	Public	Fiduciaries,	in	FIDUCIARY	GOVERNMENT,	supra	note	22,	at	67.	
	 53.	 Mission	and	History,	FED.	ELECTION	COMM’N,	https://www.fec.gov/about/	mission-and-history	[https://perma.cc/EQ67-JVT3].	
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One	 difference	 between	 prosecutors’	 objective	 and	 the	 abstract	objectives	 pursued	 by	 most	 other	 fiduciaries	 is	 that	 justice	 is	exceedingly	 vague.	 In	 a	donative	 trust	 or	 a	 corporation,	 the	 trustee’s	mission	may	be	a	group	goal,	like	the	goal	of	profit	maximization	in	the	corporate	context,	but	it	is	defined.	Without	such	specifically	designed	purpose,	 one	 may	 wonder	 whether	 prosecutors	 are	 doing	 anything	other	 than	 indulging	 their	 own	 personal	 views	 and	 priorities.	 In	 the	context	of	prosecution,	what	gives	justice	meaning	beyond	the	personal	view	 of	 the	 prosecutor	 is	 developed	 traditions	 and	 practices	 of	prosecutors’	 offices.	 Monitoring	 and	 accountability,	 therefore,	 must	focus	on	the	effectiveness	of	these	norms	and	practices.	If	we	define	prosecutors’	 objectives	 in	 this	way,	what	 then	are	 the	duties	of	care	and	loyalty	in	the	context	of	a	criminal	prosecution?	In	the	private	 fiduciary	 context,	 where	 there	 is	 a	 discernable	 beneficiary	 or	group	of	beneficiaries,	loyalty	can	denote	obedience	to	the	beneficiary,	or	it	 can	 mean	 pursuing	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 the	 beneficiary	 even	 if	 the	beneficiary	prefers	a	different	 course,54	 but,	at	 the	 very	 least,	 it	means	avoiding	opportunism	and	eschewing	the	interests	of	third	parties.	Unlike	an	ordinary	fiduciary	for	a	private	party,	but	like	other	public	officials,	the	prosecutor	does	not	exercise	discretion	for	the	benefit	of	a	person	or	even	a	group	of	people	who	can	give	guidance	or	direction.	If	 we	 conceive	 of	 the	 prosecutor’s	 objective	 as	 the	 abstract	 public	interest	in	justice,	it	becomes	clear	that	prosecutors	ought	not	operate	with	conflicts	of	 interest	 that	 threaten	 to	warp	disinterested	decision	making	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 public.	We	 have	 argued	 previously	 that	 the	absence	of	such	conflicts	is	the	key	to	proper	prosecutorial	conduct.55	But	 even	 if	 they	 avoid	 conflicts	 of	 interest,	 how	 do	 prosecutors	 give	content	to	these	duties	when	the	law	is	not	explicit	and	decisions	are	entrusted	 to	 their	 discretion?	 Do	 the	 duties	 of	 care	 and	 loyalty	 add	anything	to	the	duties	identified	with	prosecutors’	role	as	ministers	of	justice,	and,	if	so,	are	these	duties	in	tension?	This	concept	of	the	fiduciary	obligation	of	prosecutors	helps	to	clarify	the	complex	relationship	between	independence	and	accountability.	As	Paul	Miller	 and	 Andrew	 Gold	 explain,	 a	 public	 official	 is	 not	 policed	 by	 the	beneficiary	(the	public),	but,	if	at	all,	by	individuals	and	institutions	who,	as	co-fiduciaries,	are	assigned	a	monitoring	role.56	In	fact,	there	is	reason	to																																																										 54.	 Miller	&	Gold,	supra	note	2,	at	558–59.	
	 55.	 See	generally	Bruce	A.	Green	&	Rebecca	Roiphe,	Rethinking	Prosecutors’	Conflicts	
of	Interest,	58	B.C.	L.	REV.	463	(2017).		 56.	 Miller	&	Gold,	supra	note	2,	at	555.	
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maintain	distance	from	direct	popular	control	because	prosecutors	ought	not	define	 justice	by	 the	 interest	of	 the	collectivity	or	any	subset	of	 the	collectivity	 at	 any	 given	 time.	 Instead,	 they	 ought	 to	 build	 on	 past	understandings.	In	this	way,	the	abstract	purpose,	like	the	common	law,	is	evolving	and	changing	with	time.57	For	prosecutors,	 however,	 these	 co-fiduciary	monitors	 are	 few	and	weak.	The	gap	in	monitoring	is	necessary	because	prosecutors	must	be	afforded	 independence	 from	 both	 political	 influence	 and	 popular	control	 to	 pursue	 even-handed	 justice.	 But	 given	 this	 absence	 of	external	 control,	 prosecutors	must	be	held	 accountable	 in	 a	different	way.	 Rather	 than	 imagining	 public	 officials	 entering	 into	 a	 kind	 of	contract	 with	 citizens,	 fiduciary	 theory	 helps	 highlight	 the	 need	 for	disinterested	decision	making	by	public	officials	and	the	attendant	need	to	 avoid	 conflicts	 of	 interest	 that	 might	 compromise	 that	 neutral	approach.58	It	further	pushes	us	to	recognize	the	need	for	mechanisms	of	 accountability	 that	 acknowledge	 the	 complexity	 of	 a	 fiduciary	relationship	when	the	beneficiary	is	an	abstraction	(the	public),	not	a	defined	 individual	 or	 group	 of	 individuals,	 and	 the	 beneficiary’s	principal	objective	is	an	idea	(justice)	that	is	a	distillation	of	interests	shared	by	the	public	over	time.	The	best	form	of	accountability	in	this	context	may	be	institutional	in	the	following	sense:	prosecutors’	offices	must	 maintain	 required,	 transparent,	 and	 deliberate	 processes	 and	procedures	 for	decision	making.	Prosecutors	need	not	be	 transparent	about	 individual	 deliberations.	 But	 they	 must	 be	 transparent	 about	prosecutors’	 compliance	with	 these	 procedures	 and	 how	 the	 various	mechanisms	 within	 their	 offices	 work	 to	 align	 prosecutors’	deliberations	with	the	abstract	public	interest	in	justice.59	The	virtually	unbridled	power	in	prosecutors’	offices	is	troubling.	The	internal	 structure	 of	 these	 offices	 ought	 to	 be	 altered	 to	 improve	monitoring	 without	 compromising	 independence	 too	 seriously.	 That	said,	 imperfect	 monitoring	 is	 an	 inevitable	 condition	 of	 public																																																									
	 57.	 Id.	at	526.	Some	have	criticized	the	idea	that	judges	are	fiduciaries	for	abstract	interests	like	the	law.	See	Leib	et	al.,	supra	note	2,	at	702–03	&	n.16.	But	this	seems	more	apt	when	it	comes	to	prosecutors.	The	public	interest	in	justice	has	to	be	defined	over	time	and	with	reference	to	prosecutors’	work,	including	the	errors	and	misconduct	that	has	been	exposed.		 58.	 Miller	&	Gold,	supra	note	2,	at	557–58	&	n.132.		 59.	 These	 mechanisms	 should	 work	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 goal	 of	 justice	 and	 the	definition	 of	 that	 goal	 persists	 over	 time	 despite	 the	 change	 in	 the	makeup	 of	 the	citizenry.	How	we	understand	justice	may	evolve,	but	it	may	not	be	radically	displaced	because	one	set	of	citizens	so	chooses.	Id.	at	525.	
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fiduciaries.60	The	character	of	the	fiduciary,	the	integrity	of	the	public	official,	 is	 also	 critical	 to	 a	well-functioning	 relationship.61	 Therefore,	reforms	should	focus	not	only	on	transparency	and	processes,	but	also	on	improving	culture	and	education	to	ensure	that	those	who	wield	this	sort	of	power	use	it	prudently.	II.				PROSECUTORS’	FIDUCIARY	DUTIES	Prosecutors’	 fiduciary	 role	 is	 complex.	 As	 a	 public	 official,	 the	prosecutor,	on	behalf	of	the	public,	has	authority	to	identify	general	policy	objectives	in	criminal	justice	and	to	decide	how	to	pursue	these	objectives	in	any	individual	case,	including	when,	as	is	typically	true,	these	objectives	are	at	cross-purposes.62	As	a	lawyer	in	the	adversary	process,	a	prosecutor	serves	a	more	 conventional	 fiduciary	role.	Within	 the	bounds	of	 judicial	procedure	 and	 other	 law,	 advocates	 ordinarily	 strive	 to	 accomplish	 the	objectives	identified	by	their	clients.	In	doing	so,	advocates	exercise	some	discretion	to	decide	how	best	to	accomplish	the	client’s	objectives	while	acting	within	the	law.	But	even	as	an	advocate,	the	prosecutor’s	fiduciary	obligations	are	complex	because	the	objectives	to	be	pursued	on	behalf	of	the	public—the	varying	objectives	 that	 together	 comprise	“justice”—are	often	 themselves	 amorphous,	 and	 because,	 while	 the	 prosecutor	 is	advocating	for	the	public’s	objectives	in	a	criminal	case,	the	prosecutor	as	a	public	 official	 is	 trying	 to	 ascertain	 those	objectives,	which	may	 shift	 or	evolve.	In	both	roles,	prosecutors	owe	the	public	 fiduciary	duties	of	care	and	loyalty—the	two	core	duties	that	fiduciaries	owe	their	principals.	In	general,	these	 concepts	 have	 been	 underemphasized	 and	 underdeveloped	 in	 the	literature	on	prosecutors’	role	and	regulation.	The	literature	addresses	both	prosecutors’	adversarial	role,	 including	prosecutors’	 legal	 obligations	 to	the	defendant	and	to	the	court	and	prosecutors’	exercise	of	discretion	on	behalf	of	the	public	writ	large.63	But	scholars	rarely	identify	care	and	loyalty	 as	 touchstones	 for	 the	 exercise	 of	 prosecutorial	 discretion.	Intuitively,	prosecutors’	duty	of	care	or	loyalty	to	the	public	may	seem	insignificant	since	prosecutors	have	no	identifiable	client	complaining	of	being	disserved	or	betrayed.	Nonetheless,	the	fiduciary	duties	of	care																																																										 60.	 Leib	et	al.,	supra	note	2,	at	708.	
	 61.	 Id.	at	712.		 62.	 Green	&	Roiphe,	supra	note	55,	at	471.	
	 63.	 See,	e.g.,	Fish,	supra	note	9,	at	244–48	(describing	prosecutors’	position	in	the	criminal	justice	system	both	as	adversarial	and	quasi-judicial);	Sklansky,	supra	note	3	(arguing	that	prosecutors	are	“mediating	figures”	who	must	balance	between	“law	and	discretion”).	
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and	 loyalty	 help	 explain	 how	 prosecutors	 ought	 to	 exercise	 discretion,	particularly	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 crucial	 questions	 of	 whether	 to	 bring	charges	 and	 which	 charges	 to	 pursue.	 Emphasizing	 the	 prosecutor’s	fiduciary	role	may	not	provide	concrete	answers	in	individual	cases,	but,	as	this	Part	shows,	it	has	implications	for	how	prosecutors	exercise	discretion	from	 both	 normative	 and	 procedural	 perspectives.	 The	 complexities	 of	prosecutors’	fiduciary	role	add	to	the	importance	of	developing	mechanisms	of	accountability.	
A.			Prosecutors’	Duty	of	Care	and	Competence	Prosecutors	have	a	duty	of	care	both	as	public	officials	and	as	advocates.	As	public	officials	defining	the	objectives	of	an	investigation	or	prosecution,	prosecutors	 have	 broad	 discretion	 like	 that	 of	 other	 executive	 branch	officials	in	higher	office,	but	they	must	exercise	that	discretion	in	light	of	the	public	 interest.64	 Prosecutors	must	 also	 exercise	 care	 as	 advocates—for	example,	 in	 selecting	 investigative	 techniques,	 in	 preparing	 for	 trial,	 in	selecting	legal	theories	and	making	legal	arguments,	in	negotiating	pleas,	in	complying	with	discovery	obligations	and	other	legal	obligations,	and	so	on—in	light	of	the	public	objectives	they	have	identified.65	One	might	expect	that,	at	least	in	the	advocacy	role,	prosecutors	would	be	subject	to	the	same	accountability	 mechanisms	 as	 lawyers	 for	 private	 clients,	 who	 may	 be	disciplined	or	civilly	liable	when	their	professional	work	is	so	substandard	that	it	 violates	 the	 duty	 of	 care.66	 But	 even	 here,	 conventional	 accountability	mechanisms	 are	 likely	 less	 effective.	 With	 an	 eye	 toward	 preserving	prosecutorial	 independence,	 both	 the	 law	 and	 legal	 institutions	 (i.e.,	disciplinary	 authorities	 and	 courts)	 largely	 insulate	 prosecutors	 from	external	monitoring.67	For	prosecutors,	one	potential	monitor	is	the	lawyer	disciplinary	agency	of	 the	 jurisdiction	 where	 the	 prosecutor	 is	 licensed.	 But	 discipline	 has	historically	been	 ineffective	 in	 enforcing	prosecutors’	 duty	 of	 care.68	All																																																										 64.	 Green	&	Roiphe,	supra	note	55,	at	470.		 65.	 Bruce	A.	Green,	Urban	Policing	and	Public	Policy—The	Prosecutor’s	Role,	51	GA.	L.	REV.	1179	,	1189–90	(2017).		 66.	 Susan	R.	Martyn,	Lawyer	Competence	and	Lawyer	Discipline:	Beyond	the	Bar?,	69	GEO.	L.J.	705,	708–11	(1981).		 67.	 Bruce	A.	Green,	Prosecutors	and	Professional	Regulation,	25	GEO.	J.	LEGAL	ETHICS	873,	874–75	(2012).	
	 68.	 See	generally	Fred	C.	Zacharias	&	Bruce	A.	Green,	The	Duty	to	Avoid	Wrongful	
Convictions:	A	Thought	Experiment	in	the	Regulation	of	Prosecutors,	89	B.U.	L.	REV.	1,	16	(2009)	(“In	theory,	prosecutors	are	subject	to	the	.	.	.	obligation	to	‘provide	competent	representation	to	a	client’”	under	state	disciplinary	rules	based	on	Model	Rule	1.1,	but	“[a]s	a	practical	matter,	disciplinary	regulators	have	not	implemented	rules	like	Model	
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lawyers	are	subject	to	a	disciplinary	duty	of	competence,	which	is	enforced	selectively	within	the	lawyer	disciplinary	process,	typically	in	response	to	complaints	by	disgruntled	 clients	who	 can	 show	 extreme	 or	 systematic	neglect.69	Prosecutors,	however,	have	no	clients	who	can	lodge	complaints	with	 the	disciplinary	authorities,	and	complaints	by	criminal	defendants	and	 their	 lawyers	 asserting	 that	 prosecutors	were	 careless	may	 not	 be	taken	seriously.	Disciplinary	authorities	will	take	judges’	complaints	more	seriously.	 In	 other	words,	 discipline	 of	 prosecutors	 for	 incompetence—which,	in	practice,	is	exceedingly	rare—will	be	limited	to	situations	where	courts	are	aggrieved	by	prosecutors’	carelessness.70	Nor	 does	 civil	 litigation	 provide	 a	 meaningful	 oversight	 role	 for	prosecutors.	Unlike	lawyers	representing	private	clients,	prosecutors	have	no	aggrieved	clients	who	might	bring	a	malpractice	or	breach	of	fiduciary	duty	 claim	when	a	prosecutor	performs	 carelessly.	 Criminal	defendants	who	are	injured	by	prosecutors’	legal	violations	have	a	very	limited	right	to	bring	civil	claims,71	but	not	claims	predicated	on	mere	negligence.72	Judges	 generally	 have	 authority	 to	 remedy	 and	 sanction	 lawyers’	wrongdoing	 in	 the	 cases	 over	 which	 the	 judges	 preside,73	 but	 when	prosecutors	violate	the	law	through	carelessness,	courts	are	limited	in	their	ability	 to	 hold	 prosecutors	 accountable.	 In	 some	 cases,	 they	 can	 provide	juridical	 redress,	 which	 may	 be	 accompanied	 by	 public	 criticism	 of	 the	prosecutor.74	 This	 sort	 of	 shaming	 may	 serve	 as	 an	 accountability																																																									Rule	 1.1	 against	 prosecutors.	 Prosecutorial	 neglect	 has	 been	 regulated	 almost	exclusively	through	internal	administrative	sanctions	or	informally	by	courts.”).	
	 69.	 See	generally	Martyn,	supra	note	66,	at	712.		 70.	 For	a	rare	example,	see	Livingston	v.	Va.	State	Bar,	744	S.E.2d	220,	224–25	(Va.	2013)	(upholding	discipline	of	prosecutor	for	negligently	filing	a	succession	of	defective	indictments).		 71.	 Prosecutors	 have	 absolute	 immunity	 from	 civil	 liability	 for	 conduct	 in	 their	advocacy	 role,	 and	 they	 have	 qualified	 immunity	 for	 investigative	 or	 administrative	work.	See	Imbler	v.	Pachtman,	424	U.S.	409,	427–31	(1976).	For	critiques	of	prosecutors’	absolute	 immunity,	 see	Randall	Grometstein	&	 Jennifer	M.	Balboni,	Backing	Out	of	a	
Constitutional	 Ditch:	 Constitutional	 Remedies	 for	 Gross	 Prosecutorial	 Misconduct	 Post	Thompson,	 75	 ALB.	 L.	 REV.	 1243,	 1268–69	 (2012);	 Margaret	 Z.	 Johns,	Reconsidering	
Absolute	Prosecutorial	Immunity,	2005	BYU	L.	REV.	53,	106–07.	
	 72.	 See,	 e.g.,	McGhee	v.	Pottawattamee	Cty.,	 475	F.	 Supp.	2d	862,	909	 (S.D.	 Iowa	2007)	 (stating	 that	 “mere	 negligence”	 is	 never	 sufficient	 to	 overcome	 qualified	immunity).	
	 73.	 See	United	States	v.	Modica,	663	F.2d	1173,	1182–86	(2d	Cir.	1981)	(reviewing	remedies	and	sanctions	available	to	trial	and	appellate	courts	for	prosecutors’	improper	closing	statements).	
	 74.	 See,	e.g.,	People	v.	Velasco-Palacios,	235	Cal.	App.	4th	439,	447	(Ct.	App.	2015)	(upholding	dismissal	of	indictment	as	sanction	for	prosecutor’s	fabrication	of	evidence	during	plea	negotiations).	
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mechanism.75	 But	 courts’	 remedial	 role	 is	 an	 indirect	 and	weak	means	 of	accountability	 and	 one	 that	many	 consider	 inadequate.76	 Courts	 also	have	authority	to	sanction	individual	prosecutors	who	violate	the	law,	but	they	are	unlikely	to	do	so	where	the	violation	is	unintentional.77	Ultimately,	courts	play	a	limited	role	in	elaborating	and	enforcing	a	standard	of	prosecutorial	care,	and	virtually	no	 role	where	 the	 lack	of	 care	 relates	 to	prosecutors’	 exercise	of	discretion	rather	than	to	their	compliance	with	the	law.78	The	lack	of	meaningful	legal	accountability	inhibits	the	development	of	understandings	about	what	it	means	for	prosecutors	to	perform	their	work	with	care.	Courts	do	not	help	define	 the	objectives	 that	prosecutors	are	supposed	to	serve,	whether	in	general	or	in	any	given	case;	nor	do	they	determine	how	prosecutors	are	supposed	to	achieve	those	objectives	other	than	 to	 hold	 prosecutors	 accountable	 when	 they	 break	 the	 law.	 Other	lawyers	look	 to	 their	peers	 to	determine	 the	standard	of	care	because	they	are	potentially	subject	to	civil	liability	for	negligence	when	their	work	falls	below	expectations	of	other	lawyers	in	the	legal	community	performing	similar	work.79	But	no	analogous	legal	mechanism	encourages	prosecutors	to	compare	their	work	with	that	of	other	lawyers.	This	 may	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 a	 serious	 problem	 when	 it	 comes	 to	prosecutors’	work	as	advocates.	In	a	criminal	case,	one	might	think	that	the	prosecution’s	objectives	are	obvious—for	example,	to	secure	a	guilty	verdict	at	trial	or	to	secure	a	guilty	plea—and	one	might	measure	the	quality	 of	 prosecutors’	 work	 by	 its	 likelihood	 of	 achieving	 these																																																									
	 75.	 See	generally	Lara	Bazelon,	For	Shame:	The	Public	Humiliation	of	Prosecutors	by	
Judges	to	Correct	Wrongful	Convictions,	29	GEO.	J.	LEGAL	ETHICS	305,	313	(2016).	
	 76.	 See,	e.g.,	H.	Mitchell	Caldwell,	The	Prosecutor	Prince:	Misconduct,	Accountability,	
and	a	Modest	Proposal,	63	CATH.	U.	L.	REV.	51,	83–84	(2013)	(maintaining	that	there	is	“little	incentive	for	offending	prosecutors	to	refrain	from	future	misconduct”	when	a	judicial	 remedy	 is	 afforded	 but	 no	 personal	 sanction	 is	 imposed	 for	 prosecutorial	misconduct	beyond	perhaps	“a	verbal	reprimand”).	
	 77.	 See,	e.g.,	United	States	v.	Jones,	686	F.	Supp.	2d	147,	148,	152–53	(D.	Mass.	2010)	(declining	to	sanction	prosecutor	for	an	“egregious	error”	in	failing	to	disclose	“plainly	important	 exculpatory	 information”	 because	 she	 was	 contrite	 and	 subsequently	educated	herself	regarding	her	disclosure	obligations).	
	 78.	 See	Bruce	A.	Green	&	Samuel	J.	Levine,	Disciplinary	Regulation	of	Prosecutors	as	
a	Remedy	for	Abuses	of	Prosecutorial	Discretion:	A	Descriptive	and	Normative	Analysis,	14	OHIO	 ST.	 J.	 CRIM.	 L.	 143,	 166–77	 (2016)	 (reviewing	 small	 number	 of	 cases	 in	 which	prosecutors	have	been	disciplined	for	misconduct	relating	to	their	charging	and	plea	bargaining	decisions).	
	 79.	 See,	e.g.,	Gibbons	v.	Price,	514	N.E.2d	127,	136	(Ohio	Ct.	App.	1986)	(“[A]	claim	of	legal	malpractice	[is]	based	on	an	alleged	failure	to	exercise	the	knowledge,	skill	and	ability	ordinarily	possessed	and	exercised	by	members	of	the	legal	profession	similarly	situated	.	.	.	.”).	
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objectives.	Further,	prosecutors’	advocacy	appears	relatively	similar	to	that	of	other	lawyers’	advocacy,	and	therefore,	the	analogous	work	of	other	 advocates	may	 establish	 a	 relevant	 standard.	 But	 prosecutors’	advocacy	role	is	in	fact	distinctive,	and	it	poses	challenges	because,	at	the	same	time	that	prosecutors	may	be	striving	to	secure	a	conviction,	they	may	have	other,	potentially	countervailing,	objectives,	such	as	to	avoid	a	wrongful	conviction	and	to	ensure	the	defense	a	fair	(not	merely	lawful)	process.	Given	these	further	objectives,	some	argue	that	prosecutors	fail	to	exercise	adequate	care	when,	although	acting	lawfully,	they	use	unreliable	evidence,	ignore	or	exploit	defense	lawyers’	substandard	work,	or	withhold	information	that	would	be	useful	to	the	defense.80	The	challenge	of	giving	meaning	to	prosecutors’	duty	of	care	is	even	more	complicated	because	prosecutors	serve	as	public	officials,	making	discretionary	 judgments	 such	 as	 whether	 to	 investigate,	 whether	 to	bring	or	drop	charges,	or	whether	to	plea	bargain.	One	cannot	measure	the	competence	of	these	decisions	by	assessing	how	well	they	achieve	the	 prosecution’s	 objectives	 because	 this	 is	 the	 process	 by	 which	prosecutors	 define	 their	 objectives.	 Discretionary	 decisions	 involve	multiple	 and	 complex	 considerations.	 Further,	 these	 are	 the	 kinds	 of	decisions	 that	 clients	 ordinarily	make	 in	 a	 lawyer-client	 relationship.	Therefore,	 one	 cannot	 look	 to	 the	 ordinary	 work	 of	 trial	 advocates	representing	 private	 clients	 to	 measure	 whether	 prosecutors’	discretionary	judgments	are	or	are	not	competent.	Nor,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 can	 one	 look	 to	 judicial	 decisions	 and	pronouncements	for	a	standard	governing	the	competence	of	prosecutors’	discretionary	 decision	 making.	 The	 very	 premise	 of	 prosecutorial	discretion	is	that,	when	exercised	within	the	law,	it	 is	not	susceptible	to	judicial	review	despite	the	“potential	for	both	individual	and	institutional	abuse.”81	Even	if	ninety-nine	out	of	100	prosecutors	would	decline	to	bring	charges	 in	 a	 case	 because	 the	 defendant’s	 guilt	 is	 too	 doubtful	 and	 the	likelihood	of	a	conviction	is	too	low,	as	long	as	the	prosecutor	meets	the																																																									
	 80.	 See,	e.g.,	Bruce	A.	Green,	Access	to	Criminal	Justice:	Where	Are	the	Prosecutors?,	3	TEX.	 A&M	 L.	 REV.	 515,	 526–27	 (2016)	 (discussing	 a	 prosecutor	 who,	 in	 exploiting	unreliable	evidence,	failed	to	“take	reasonable	steps	to	avoid	convicting	[an]	innocent	[person]”).		 81.	 Bordenkircher	v.	Hayes,	434	U.S.	357,	365	(1978).	Indeed,	even	when	exercised	in	 an	 unconstitutionally	 arbitrary	 fashion,	 prosecutors’	 discretionary	 decisions	may	escape	judicial	review.	United	States	v.	Redondo-Lemos,	955	F.2d	1296,	1300	(9th	Cir.	1992)	(“Our	only	available	course	is	to	deny	the	defendant	a	judicial	remedy	for	what	may	be	a	violation	of	a	constitutional	right—not	to	have	charging	or	plea	bargaining	decisions	made	in	an	arbitrary	or	capricious	manner.”).	
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minimum	legal	standard	of	“probable	cause,”	a	court	will	rarely	interfere	with	the	prosecutor’s	judgment	either	through	the	adjudicative	process	or	 through	 the	 disciplinary	 process.82	 To	 say	 that	 the	 court	 cannot	overturn	 the	 prosecutor’s	 decision	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	 prosecutor	exercised	prosecutorial	authority	competently.	On	the	contrary,	ninety-nine	out	of	100	prosecutors,	and	100%	of	judges,	may	privately	regard	the	decision	as	an	egregious	abuse	of	discretion.	But	 the	point	 is	 that	there	 is	 no	 legal	 process	 for	 developing	 and	 accumulating	 legal	decisions,	 as	 there	 is	 for	 private	 clients,	 to	 express	 the	 prevailing	normative	understanding.	Because	the	quality	of	prosecutors’	discretionary	decision	making	is	not	subject	to	meaningful	legal	review,	other	mechanisms	are	needed	to	establish	and	enforce	norms	of	prosecutorial	competence.	Prosecutors	might	 look	 to	 their	peers	within	 their	 office,	 or	 to	other	prosecutors’	offices,	to	ascertain	expectations.	In	general,	the	former	is	more	likely	than	 the	 latter.83	 The	 organized	 bar	 has	 developed	 norms	 of	prosecutorial	conduct,	including	those	governing	discretionary	decision	making.84	 But,	 in	 part	 because	 of	 prosecutors’	 influence,	 the	 bar’s	writings	provide	limited	guidance.	And	because	prosecutors	regard	the	organized	bar	as	subject	to	capture	by	defense	lawyers,	they	may	ignore	these	writings.85	As	for	prosecutors’	accountability	for	upholding	the	duty	of	care,	 in	the	absence	of	legal	enforcement	mechanisms,	a	heavy	burden	is	placed																																																									
	 82.	 See	Green	&	Levine,	supra	note	78,	at	164–65	(discussing	the	rarity	of	judicial	review	of	prosecutorial	 charging	discretion).	Recently,	 courts	have	been	 scrutinizing	decisions	by	progressive	prosecutors	not	to	charge	in	entire	categories	of	cases.	See	e.g.,	Justin	Jouvenal	&	Rachel	Weiner,	Prosecutors	Won’t	Pursue	Marijuana	Possession	Charges	
in	Two	Northern	Virginia	Counties,	WASH.	POST	(Jan.	2,	2020).	
	 83.	 See	Ellen	Yaroshefsky	&	Bruce	A.	Green,	Prosecutors’	Ethics	in	Context:	Influences	
on	Prosecutorial	Disclosure,	 in	LAWYERS	 IN	PRACTICE:	ETHICAL	DECISION	MAKING	 IN	CONTEXT	269,	279	(Leslie	C.	Levin	&	Lynn	Mather	eds.,	2012)	(“Prosecutors’	offices	are	something	of	an	exception	[to	offices’	 tendency	to	converge	on	a	single	way	of	working],	partly	because	of	their	highly	localized	character.	Since	they	are	not	directly	in	competition	for	business,	 the	 homogenizing	 pressures	 are	much	weaker.	 They	 do	 not	 adopt	 similar	policies	[regarding	disclosures	to	the	defense].”).	
	 84.	 See,	e.g.,	CRIMINAL	JUSTICE	STANDARDS	FOR	THE	PROSECUTION	FUNCTION	STANDARD	3–4.4	(AM.	 BAR	 ASS’N,	 4th	 ed.	 2018)	 [hereinafter	 STANDARDS	 FOR	 THE	 PROSECUTION	 FUNCTION]	(addressing	 “Discretion	 in	 Filing,	 Declining,	 Maintaining,	 and	 Dismissing	 Criminal	Charges”).	
	 85.	 See	 Green,	 supra	 note	 67,	 at	 898	 (“Even	 if	 professional	 conduct	 rules	might	legitimately	 regulate	 them,	 prosecutors	 suggest,	 the	 existing	 process	 for	 developing	professional	conduct	rules	is	illegitimate	because	of	the	influence	of	bar	associations,	which	are	subject	to	capture	by	criminal	defense	interests.”).	
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on	prosecutors	to	regulate	themselves,	which	is	to	say	that	we	rely	on	their	professional	commitment	to	standards	of	care	as	they	have	come	to	 understand	 them.	 Internal	 self-regulation	 by	 a	 prosecutor’s	 office	may	be	the	most	meaningful	mechanism	to	ensure	the	accountability	of	subordinate	prosecutors.86	The	elected	prosecutor,	or	chief	appointed	prosecutor,	 has	 a	 stake	 in	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 office’s	 work	 and	 can	therefore	 be	 expected	 to	 police	 both	 advocacy	 and	 discretionary	decision	making	by	subordinate	lawyers.	But	at	the	same	time,	a	chief	prosecutor	 who	 makes	 discretionary	 decisions	 badly	 cannot	 be	expected	to	enforce	a	high	standard	of	care	but,	on	the	contrary,	is	likely	to	influence	subordinates	to	make	their	own	decisions	just	as	badly.		
B.			Prosecutors’	Duty	of	Loyalty	Like	other	fiduciaries,	prosecutors	have	a	fiduciary	duty	of	loyalty.	As	lawyers	for	the	public,	their	loyalty	duty	may	seem	comparable	to	that	of	 a	 lawyer	 for	 a	 private	 entity.	 Unlike	 many	 fiduciaries	 for	 private	beneficiaries,	such	as	lawyers	for	private	entities	who	can	take	direction	from	duly	authorized	representatives	of	 the	entity-client,	prosecutors	are	the	public	officials	who	make	decisions	for	the	public	entity-client.	In	this	role,	too,	prosecutors	are	fiduciaries.	In	 criminal	 cases,	 there	 may	 be	 several	 threats	 to	 disinterested	prosecutorial	decision	making.	One	risk	is	that	prosecutors	will	act	in	their	own	self-interest	at	the	expense	of	the	public	interest—a	variation	of	what	Thomas	Rave	calls	the	principal-agent	problem.87	Another	is	that	prosecutors	will	serve	the	private	interests	or	preferences	of	identifiable	third	parties.88	Although	these	concerns	apply	equally	to	prosecutors’	role	as	 lawyers	 and	 as	 public	 officials,	 a	 third	 risk	 relates	 uniquely	 to	prosecutors’	 governance	 role.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 governance,	 loyalty	generally	means	serving	the	broader	purpose	or	goal	of	a	community.89	The	risk	is	that	the	prosecutor	will	be	influenced	by	a	sub-group’s	well-articulated	interest	at	the	expense	of	the	broader	public	interest.90	Rave																																																									
	 86.	 See	 generally	 Norman	 Abrams,	 Internal	 Policy:	 Guiding	 the	 Exercise	 of	
Prosecutorial	Discretion,	 19	UCLA	L.	REV.	1,	 7–8	 (1971);	Ronald	F.	Wright,	Sentencing	
Commissions	as	Provocateurs	of	Prosecutorial	Self-Regulation,	105	COLUM.	L.	REV.	1010,	1028	(2005).		 87.	 D.	 Theodore	 Rave,	 Two	 Problems	 of	 Fiduciary	 Governance,	 in	 FIDUCIARY	GOVERNMENT,	supra	note	22,	at	49,	49–50.	
	 88.	 Id.	
	 89.	 See	Leib	et	al.,	supra	note	2,	at	731.	
	 90.	 Id.	at	712.	
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calls	 this	 risk—that	 a	 powerful	 sub-group	 within	 the	 group	 that	comprises	the	beneficiary	can	dominate	at	the	expense	of	the	others—the	 tyranny-of-the-majority	 problem.91	 The	 ordinary	 problem	 of	subgroup	dominance	is	compounded	in	the	case	of	prosecutors	once	we	conceive	of	the	beneficiary’s	objective	as	the	public	interest	in	justice,	the	meaning	of	which	develops	over	time	by	accretion	in	common	law	fashion.	 Given	 that	 this	 objective	 is	 so	 vague	 and	 subject	 to	interpretation,	there	is	a	heightened	risk	that	a	subgroup’s	exercise	of	undue	influence	will	be	indiscernible.92	Scholars	and	courts	assume	that	prosecutors	must	serve	 the	public	and,	 at	 a	minimum,	 avoid	 conflicts	 of	 interest.93	To	 some	extent,	 this	expectation	 is	codified	in	the	 law	and	enforced	by	legal	 institutions.94	Unlike	 lawyers	 for	private	clients,	prosecutors	are	not	subject	 to	civil	lawsuits	for	breach	of	loyalty.	But	courts	require	prosecutors	to	adhere	
																																																									 91.	 Rave,	supra	note	87,	at	49–66.		 92.	 In	 general,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 prove	 and	 defend	 against	 improper	 influence	 on	prosecutorial	 decision	 making	 because	 the	 process	 is	 so	 opaque.	 For	 example,	 the	Manhattan	District	Attorney	 recently	 disputed	 claims	 that	 criminal	 defense	 lawyers’	campaign	 contributions	 influenced	 the	 prosecutors’	 decision	 not	 to	 pursue	 charges	against	 their	 clients,	 leading	 to	 a	 prosecutors’	 reexamination	 of	 campaign	 finance	practices.	 See	 Elizabeth	 Holtzman	 &	 David	 Yassky,	 The	 Lessons	 of	 Cyrus	 Vance’s	
Campaign	 Contributions,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (Nov.	 6,	 2017),	https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/	 06/opinion/cyrus-vance-contributions-weinstein.html;	see	also	CTR.	FOR	ADVANCEMENT	OF	PUB.	INTEGRITY,	RAISING	THE	BAR:	REDUCING	CONFLICTS	 OF	 INTEREST	 AND	 INCREASING	 TRANSPARENCY	 IN	 DISTRICT	 ATTORNEY	 CAMPAIGN	FUNDRAISING	 18	 (2018),	https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/public-integrity/raising_the_bar.pdf	[https://perma.cc/UXG8-4FHE].	Questions	might	also	be	raised	about	whether,	and	when,	subgroup	influence	may	be	appropriate.	 For	 example,	 prosecutors	 are	 obviously	 subject	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 the	police	 or	 other	 investigative	 agents.	 See	 generally	 Jeffrey	 Bellin,	 The	 Power	 of	
Prosecutors,	 94	 N.Y.U.	 L.	 REV.	 171,	 191–94	 (2019)	 (describing	 police	 influence	 on	criminal	 justice	decisions);	Daniel	Richman,	Prosecutors	and	Their	Agents,	Agents	and	
Their	 Prosecutors,	 103	 COLUM.	 L.	 REV.	 749,	 771–72	 (2003).	 Ordinarily,	 investigators’	influence	over	 charging	 and	 plea	bargaining	 decisions	may	 seem	 unremarkable.	 But	their	influence	may	be	problematic,	for	example,	in	cases	where	the	propriety	of	police	or	investigative	conduct	is	in	issue.	
	 93.	 See,	 e.g.,	 In	 re	 Cole,	 738	 N.E.2d	 1035,	 1037	 (Ind.	 2000)	 (finding	 that	 the	prosecutor	“served	a	public	trust	to	enforce	the	 law”	and	“[t]he	state	 is	entitled	to	a	prosecutor’s	 undivided	 loyalty”);	 see	 also	 STANDARDS	 FOR	 THE	 PROSECUTION	 FUNCTION	STANDARDS,	supra	note	84,	at	STANDARD	3–1.3	(“The	prosecutor	generally	serves	the	public	and	not	any	particular	government	agency,	law	enforcement	officer	or	unit,	witness	or	victim.”);	id.	STANDARD	3–1.7	(addressing	prosecutors’	conflicts	of	interest).	
	 94.	 See	generally	Green	&	Roiphe,	supra	note	55,	at	469,	471.	
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to	 the	 conflict	 of	 interest	 rules	 that	 govern	 lawyers	 generally.95	Constitutional	 decisions	 recognize	 prosecutors’	 obligation	 to	 be	disinterested,	which	is	another	way	of	enforcing	a	duty	of	loyalty.96	Judges	exercise	 statutory	 or	 inherent	 authority	 to	 disqualify	 prosecutors,	 and	prosecutors	recuse	themselves,	in	some	situations	where	there	is	a	serious	risk	 that	 prosecutors	 will	 inappropriately	 serve	 private	 interests.97	Interestingly,	the	conflict	of	interest	law	seeks	to	preserve	disinterestedness	in	prosecutors’	role	as	public	officials	exercising	prosecutorial	discretion	no	less	than	in	their	role	as	courtroom	advocates.98	While	incomplete	and	imperfect,	conflicts	of	interest	standards	help	to	ensure	against	the	danger	that	prosecutors	will	seek	to	advance	their	own	personal	interests	instead	of	that	of	the	public.	Conflict	of	interest	rules	 are	most	 likely	 to	apply	when	a	particular	prosecutor	 is	at	risk	of	engaging	in	self-dealing	because	the	particular	prosecutor	has	a	unique	and	tangible	self-interest.99	For	example,	a	prosecutor	who	has	a	financial	stake	in	a	corporation	would	not	be	expected	to	make	prosecutorial	decisions	regarding	 the	 corporation.	And	a	prosecutor	who	 is	 a	 victim	of	 a	 crime	would	not	be	expected	to	prosecute	the	perpetrator.	Prosecutors’	obligation	to	refrain	from	acting	self-interestedly	poses	some	interesting	challenges,	however,	when	the	prosecutor’s	interests	are	 intangible,	 particularly	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 pervasive	 and	unavoidable	 self-interest	 in	 one’s	 own	 reputation	 and	 career	advancement.100	 Prosecutors	 almost	 always	 stand	 to	 benefit																																																									
	 95.	 Id.	at	484–88	&	n.104	(citing	examples).	
	 96.	 Id.	at	488–91.	
	 97.	 Id.	at	491–99.	
	 98.	 See	Young	v.	United	States	ex	rel.	Vuitton	Et	Fils	S.A.,	481	U.S.	787,	807	(1987)	(“[T]he	fact	that	the	judge	makes	the	initial	decision	that	a	contempt	prosecution	should	proceed	is	not	sufficient	to	quell	concern	that	prosecution	by	an	interested	party	may	be	influenced	 by	 improper	 motives.	 A	 prosecutor	 exercises	 considerable	 discretion	 in	matters	such	as	the	determination	of	which	persons	should	be	targets	of	investigation,	what	methods	 of	 investigation	 should	 be	 used,	 what	 information	 will	 be	 sought	 as	evidence,	which	persons	should	be	charged	with	what	offenses,	which	persons	should	be	utilized	as	witnesses,	whether	to	enter	 into	plea	bargains	and	the	terms	on	which	they	 will	 be	 established,	 and	 whether	 any	 individuals	 should	 be	 granted	 immunity.	These	 decisions,	 critical	 to	 the	 conduct	 of	 a	 prosecution,	 are	 all	 made	 outside	 the	supervision	of	the	court.”).	
	 99.	 See	 Green	 &	 Roiphe,	 supra	 note	 55,	 at	 472	 (discussing	 “personal-interest	conflicts	[that]	relate	to	a	particular	prosecutor	in	an	idiosyncratic	way”).	
	 100.	 See	id.	at	480–81	(“Even	prosecutors	who	do	not	seek	professional	advancement	are	jealous	of	their	professional	reputation.	This	broad	self-interest	can	come	into	play	in	 every	 criminal	 case	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 expectations	 of	disinterested	prosecution.”).	
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3529379
128	 AMERICAN	UNIVERSITY	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	69:101	
 
professionally	if	they	conduct	their	work	in	a	manner	that	seems	adept	or	successful	 from	the	view	of	 their	supervisors	or	others.	This	could	theoretically	 provide	 motivation	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 fiduciary	 duties	 of	loyalty	 and	 care,	 but	 is	 often	 charged	 that	 prosecutors	 are	 simply	looking	to	put	notches	on	their	belts,	at	the	expense	of	the	public	interest	in	 “doing	 justice.”101	Prosecutors	 cannot,	 however,	 recuse	 themselves	from	cases	where	their	professional	self-interests	are	implicated.	Even	if	 they	 could,	 it	might	be	 impossible,	 given	how	vague	 the	pursuit	 of	justice	is,	to	tell	when	a	prosecutor’s	assessment	of	the	purpose	or	goal	of	the	public	is	tainted.	If	 self-interested	 prosecutors	 cannot	 simply	 be	 replaced	 by	disinterested	ones,	then	how	can	prosecutors	avoid	or	at	least	minimize	the	effect	of	self-interest	in	decision	making,	and	how	can	the	public	hold	prosecutors	 accountable	when	 they	 fail	 to	 do	 so?	 It	may	 be	 hard	 for	prosecutors	themselves	to	tell	whether	they	are	acting	in	their	own	self-interest	since	they	can	rationalize	self-interested	behavior.102	It	may	be	harder	still	for	the	public	to	determine	whether	prosecutors	are	acting	disloyally.	Much	of	what	prosecutors	do	is	not	publicly	visible,	and	the	public	 can	 at	 best	 infer	 the	 motivations	 behind	 prosecutors’	 visible	conduct.103	 Both	 from	 the	 inside	 and	 from	 the	 outside,	 it	 may	 be	impossible	 to	disentangle	prosecutors’	 professional	 self-interest	 from	the	 public	 interest.	 For	 example,	 when	 prosecutors	 publicize	 their	successes,	their	intent	may	be	to	serve	the	public	interest	by	keeping	the	public	informed	and	instilling	public	confidence	in	their	work.	But	it	is	also	possible	that	prosecutors	are	indifferent	to	the	public	interest	and	are	motivated	simply	to	promote	their	own	career	ambitions.	Not	only																																																									
	 101.	 See	Daniel	S.	Medwed,	The	Zeal	Deal:	Prosecutorial	Resistance	to	Post-Conviction	
Claims	of	Innocence,	84	B.U.	L.	REV.	125,	134–35	(2004)	(“Prosecutors	with	the	highest	conviction	 rates	 (and,	 thus,	 reputations	 as	 the	 best	 performers)	 stand	 the	 greatest	chance	for	advancement	internally.”).		 102.	 There	 is	an	abundant	 literature	on	how	unconscious	thought	processes—e.g.,	cognitive	 biases—influence	 prosecutors’	 decision	 making.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Susan	 Bandes,	
Loyalty	 to	One’s	Convictions:	The	Prosecutor	and	Tunnel	Vision,	 49	HOW.	L.J.	475,	491	(2006);	Barkow,	supra	note	3,	at	883	(“Prosecutors	may	feel	the	need	to	be	able	to	point	to	a	record	of	convictions	and	long	sentences	if	 they	want	to	be	promoted	or	to	 land	high-powered	 jobs	outside	the	government,	and	that	will	affect	their	assessment	of	a	defendant’s	 case.”);	 Alafair	 S.	 Burke,	 Improving	 Prosecutorial	 Decision	 Making:	 Some	
Lessons	 of	 Cognitive	 Science,	 47	 WM.	 &	 MARY	 L.	 REV.	 1587,	 1603–04	 (2006);	 Aviva	Orenstein,	Facing	 the	 Unfaceable:	Dealing	with	 Prosecutorial	Denial	 in	 Postconviction	
Cases	of	Actual	Innocence,	48	SAN	DIEGO	L.	REV.	401,	425–26	(2011).	
	 103.	 See,	 e.g.,	Brandon	L.	Garrett,	Globalized	Corporate	Prosecutions,	 97	VA.	L.	REV.	1775,	1784	(2011)	(referring	to	“the	opaque	machinery	of	prosecutorial	discretion”).	
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is	 it	 impossible	 to	 assess	 prosecutors’	 motivation	 to	 hold	 them	accountable	for	disloyalty,	but	the	ability	of	prosecutors	to	justify	their	self-promotion	 as	 an	 act	 of	 public	 accountability	 suggests	 a	 tension	between	the	duties	of	loyalty	and	accountability.	The	problem	of	averting	conflicts	of	interest	is	even	more	intractable	with	respect	to	what	we	have	called	institutional	conflicts	of	interest—that	 is,	 situations	 where	 prosecutors	 have	 an	 incentive	 to	 serve	 the	institutional	 interest	 of	 the	 prosecutor’s	 office	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	broader	 public	 interest.104	 Prosecutors’	 offices	 have	 reputational	interests	that	may	compromise	their	lawyers’	disinterested	judgment—for	 example,	 when	 the	 office	 has	 convicted	 an	 innocent	 person,	 its	interest	in	avoiding	embarrassment	may	lead	it	to	defend	the	conviction,	even	though	the	public	interest	is	in	correcting	wrongful	convictions.105	Prosecutors’	offices	may	also	have	compromising	financial	interests—for	 example,	 an	 office’s	 interest	 in	 benefitting	 financially	 from	 a	 civil	forfeiture	may	influence	prosecutors	to	pursue	a	prosecution	that	might	be	 undeserved.106	 These	 institutional	 interests	 may	 not	 be	 wholly	illegitimate,	and	in	any	event,	prosecutors	cannot	recuse	themselves	to	avoid	their	influence.	The	law	also	addresses	conflicts	of	interest	arising	out	of	a	prosecutor’s	personal	 relationship	 with	 a	 third	 person,	 such	 as	 a	 defendant	 or	 a	victim.107	 Prosecutors	 are	 expected	 to	 avoid	 situations	 where	 they	 are	strongly	tempted	to	subordinate	the	public	interest	to	the	private	interests	of	 victims,	 suspects,	 defendants	 or	 others,	 although	 the	 law	 is	 not	necessarily	coextensive	with	one’s	intuitions	about	prosecutors’	duty	to	eschew	 private	 interests.	 For	 example,	 prosecutors	 are	 expected	 to	recuse	 themselves,	or	 to	be	disqualified	by	a	court,	when	they	have	a	close	familial	or	economic	relationship	with	a	crime	victim,	defendant,	or	other	interested	third	party.108																																																										 104.	 Green	&	Roiphe,	supra	note	55,	at	477–79.		 105.	 Medwed,	supra	note	101,	at	136.	
	 106.	 Id.	at	135.		 107.	 Green	 &	 Roiphe,	 supra	 note	 55,	 at	 472–73	 (“[A]	 prosecutor’s	 familial	relationship	 to	 a	 defendant	 or	 victim	 may	 undermine	 the	 prosecutor’s	disinterestedness,	leading	the	prosecutor	to	be	unusually	lenient	where	the	defendant	is	a	relative	and	unusually	harsh	where	the	victim	is	one.”).	
	 108.	 See,	e.g.,	People	v.	Vasquez,	137	P.3d	199,	205–06	(Cal.	2006)	(finding	that	court	erroneously	 failed	 to	 disqualify	 prosecutor	where	member	 of	 prosecutor’s	 staff	was	defendant’s	 parent);	 State	 v.	Mantooth,	 788	 S.E.2d	 584,	 587–88	 (Ga.	 Ct.	 App.	 2016)	(upholding	prosecutor’s	recusal	where	member	of	prosecutor’s	staff	was	related	to	the	defendant).	
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But	prosecutors’	responsibility	to	avoid	serving	the	private	interests	of	third	parties	is	not	so	simple	because	fidelity	to	the	public	interest,	to	some	 extent,	 presupposes	 care	 for	 interested	 private	 parties.	 For	example,	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 prosecutors’	 public	 obligation	 to	 pursue	justice	 includes	 concern	 for	 victims’	 interests.109	 Indeed,	 the	 ends	 of	criminal	justice	(which	prosecutors	are	charged	with	serving)	often	include	restitution	for	the	victim	and	retributivism,	and	procedural	laws	establish	victims’	 rights	 which	 prosecutors	 must	 respect	 and,	 to	 some	 extent,	implement.110	What	does	it	mean	to	say	that	a	prosecutor	owes	undivided	loyalty	to	the	public’s	interest	in	justice	if,	at	the	same	time,	the	prosecutor	has	an	obligation	(though	not	a	fiduciary	duty)	of	care	to	the	victim?	Even	prosecutors	 may	 have	 difficulty	 resolving	 this	 riddle.111	 Similarly,	 and	perhaps	more	controversially,	prosecutors	are	supposed	to	have	concern	for	defendants’	rights	and,	perhaps,	defendants’	interests;	it	is	sometimes	said	that,	 as	 public	 representatives,	 prosecutors	 speak	 for	 defendants	 among	others.112	Intuitively,	one	can	understand	that	prosecutors,	in	determining	what	is	in	the	public’s	best	interest,	should	give	some	weight	to	both	victims’	interests	and	defendants’	rights	without	owing	loyalty	to	either.	But,	at	the	very	least,	this	reflects	a	complication	in	prosecutors’	decision	making	that	most	lawyers	for	private	clients	do	not	encounter.	Finally,	insofar	as	there	is	a	risk	that	prosecutors	will	favor	the	interests	of	a	powerful	or	vocal	subgroup,	the	law	is	essentially	silent.	As	public	officials,	prosecutors	might	be	said	to	serve	a	purpose	that	transcends	any	person	or	group	of	people:	they	serve	justice,	an	abstract	principle	distilled	from	the	objectives	of	 an	 abstract	public	 over	 time,	 not	 the	 objectives	 of	 any	particular	individual	or	even	any	group	of	individuals	at	the	moment.113	The	 fiduciary	 obligation	 to	 pursue	 the	 public’s	 interest	 in	 justice	 offers																																																									
	 109.	 See,	e.g.,	People	v.	Superior	Court,	182	P.3d	600,	611–13	(Cal.	2008)	(finding	that	it	was	proper	for	the	prosecutor	to	argue	in	favor	of	minor	victim’s	privacy	interests,	which	were	aligned	with	those	of	the	State,	and	that	doing	so	was	not	tantamount	to	representing	the	victim).	
	 110.	 See,	 e.g.,	 People	 v.	 Subramanyan,	 201	 Cal.	 Rptr.	 3d	 443,	 447–48	 (App.	 Dep’t	Super.	Ct.	2016)	(holding	that	under	Marsy’s	Law,	only	the	prosecutor,	not	the	victim,	has	authority	to	seek	restitution	or	appeal	a	restitution	order).	
	 111.	 See,	 e.g.,	 In	 re	 Flatt-Moore,	 959	N.E.2d	 241,	245–46	 (Ind.	2012)	 (sanctioning	prosecutor	who,	as	a	condition	of	a	plea	bargain,	insisted	that	the	defendant	comply	with	the	victim’s	demand	for	an	excessive	amount	in	restitution).		 112.	 People	 v.	 Dehle,	 83	 Cal.	 Rptr.	 3d	 461,	 466	 (Ct.	App.	 2008)	 (“The	 prosecutor	speaks	not	solely	for	the	victim,	or	the	police,	or	those	who	support	them,	but	for	all	the	People.	That	body	of	‘The	People’	includes	the	defendant	and	his	family	and	those	who	care	about	him.”).		 113.	 Miller	&	Gold,	supra	note	2,	at	571–72.	
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3529379
2020]	 A	FIDUCIARY	THEORY	OF	PROSECUTION	 131	
 
some	 guidance	 for	 prosecutorial	 discretionary	 decision	 making.	 If	prosecutors	owed	a	 general	 obligation	 to	 the	public,	 there	would	be	no	clear	 restriction	 on	 how	 they	 should	 balance	 various	 public	 interests.	Deterrence	could	be	weighed	equally	with	promoting	good	 immigration	policy.	Because,	as	fiduciary	theory	helps	clarify,	the	prosecutor’s	duty	is	to	guard	justice,	not	the	public’s	interest	in	general,	however,	it	follows	that	considerations	intrinsic	to	the	justness	of	a	case	ought	to	take	precedence	over	 any	 other	 public	 value.	 Thus,	 in	 making	 discretionary	 decisions,	prosecutors	 must	 primarily	 consider	 concerns	 such	 as	 protecting	 the	community,	deterring	future	offenses,	rehabilitating	offenders	who	can	be	reformed,	incapacitating	dangerous	offenders,	and	seeking	retribution	and	restitution.	Other	 interests	extrinsic	 to	 the	 justness	of	 the	prosecution,	such	as	foreign	policy	implications	of	a	particular	case	or	its	intersection	with	immigration	policy,	are	not	central	to	a	prosecutor’s	job.	Of	course,	prosecutors	 can	 give	 those	weight	 in	making	discretionary	decisions,	but	only	if	they	can	be	advanced	consistently	with	the	central	fiduciary	mandate	to	ensure	justice.114	This	insight	can	help	explain	why	it	has	been	acceptable	to	engage	in	“spy	swaps,”	where	the	U.S.	government	exchanges	a	foreign	individual	arrested	 or	 charged	with	 espionage	 for	 a	 U.S.	 citizen	 or	 valued	 non-citizen	 held	 abroad.115	 The	 prosecutor	 who	 dismisses	 the	 charges	against	 a	 foreign	defendant	has	not	 violated	 the	 fiduciary	duty	 to	do	justice	because	the	deal,	which	furthers	the	extrinsic	interest	in	foreign	relations,	 does	 not	 result	 in	 an	 injustice.	 After	 all,	 many	 guilty	individuals	go	free	for	a	myriad	of	reasons	in	our	system.	On	the	other	hand,	if	a	prosecutor	were	to	pursue	an	innocent	foreign	individual	in	order	to	gain	a	foreign	policy	advantage	for	the	United	States,	that	would	be	 a	 breach	 of	 fiduciary	 duty	 because	 the	 prosecutor	 will	 have	prioritized	an	extrinsic	consideration	that	resulted	in	the	prosecution	of	an	innocent	individual.116	Of	course,	there	are	some	considerations	that	might	fall	on	the	margin.	For	 instance,	 are	 reducing	 mass	 incarceration	 and	 racial	 injustice	 in	prosecution	intrinsic	or	extrinsic	concerns?	It	is	possible	that	they	are	both.	Over-incarceration	 burdens	 taxpayers	 and	 potentially	 disrupts	communities,	which	makes	it	seem	an	important	extrinsic	concern.	But	the																																																									
	 114.	 See	 Green,	 supra	 note	 65,	 at	 1204–05	 (arguing	 that,	 as	 public	 officials,	“[p]rosecutors	 can	 and	 should	 take	 account	 of	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 social	 policy	considerations	 that	 bear	 on	 their	 work”	 and	 not	 just	 those	 implicating	 traditional	criminal	justice	concerns	such	as	proportionality).	
	 115.	 See	Green	&	Roiphe,	supra	note	15,	at	1834.	
	 116.	 Id.	
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length	 of	 incarceration	 also	 informs	 questions	 of	 deterrence	 and	incapacitation,	which	are	at	 the	 core	of	criminal	 justice.	Similarly,	 racial	injustice	and	bias	may	be	questions	that	bear	on	communities	as	a	whole	and	race	relations,	which	sound	like	extrinsic	concerns.	But	they	may	also	bear	 on	 fairness	 and	 proportionality,	 which	 are	 central	 to	 pursuing	justice	in	an	individual	case.	In	sum,	enforcing	loyalty	is	difficult	where	the	beneficiary	to	whom	prosecutors	 owe	 loyalty	 is	 so	 amorphous;	 the	 objectives	 that	prosecutors	must	pursue	on	their	beneficiary’s	behalf	are	so	vague;	and	prosecutors	have	so	much	discretion	to	discern	the	relevant	objectives,	balance	 them,	and	decide	how	best	 to	pursue	 them.	Like	other	public	officials,	 prosecutors	 typically	 make	 discretionary	 decisions	 by	engaging	in	a	complicated	balancing	of	competing	public	interests.	The	interests	of	particular	segments	of	the	public	may	not	reflect	the	best	interest	of	the	public	in	general.	Because	prosecutors’	decision-making	process	 is	 not	 transparent,	 it	 may	 be	 impossible	 to	 discern	 whether	prosecutors	 are	 privileging	 the	 interests	 of	 a	 vocal	 majority	 or	 even	narrower	 parochial	 interests.	 And,	 particularly	 in	 the	 case	 of	 elected	prosecutors,	prosecutorial	self-interest	may	dovetail	with	the	interests	of	powerful	political	factions.	The	law	neither	prescribes	prosecutors’	discretionary	 decision-making	 criteria	 in	 general	 nor	 excludes	considering	 or	 even	 privileging	 particular	 factions’	 interests	 and	preferences;	 nor	 does	 the	 law	 prescribe	 a	 process	 for	 making	discretionary	 decisions	 that	 reduces	 the	 risk	 that	 particular	 public	interests	will	be	overvalued.	The	limited	ability	of	existing	law	and	legal	institutions	to	ensure	prosecutors’	duty	of	loyalty,	especially	in	the	face	of	public	pressure,	underscores	the	importance	of	alternative	means	of	prosecutorial	accountability.	
C.			Developing	Affirmative	Theories	of	Care	and	Loyalty	To	 a	 large	 extent,	 fiduciary	 theory	 is	 concerned	 with	 avoiding	opportunism	on	the	part	of	the	fiduciary.	It	identifies	abusive	conduct—violations	of	the	fiduciary	duties	of	care	and	loyalty—and	mechanisms	to	identify,	redress,	and	deter	such	bad	conduct.117	But	does	the	theory	offer	anything	positive—an	affirmative	vision	of	good	conduct?	We	assume	that	the	duties	 of	 care	 and	 loyalty	 entail	more	 than	avoiding	negligence	 and	
																																																									 117.	 Galoob	&	Leib,	supra	note	1,	at	117–18.	
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betrayal.118	Any	illumination	would	be	valuable	because	the	law	and	legal	processes	are	so	deficient.	Rules	of	professional	conduct	offer	virtually	no	guidance	to	prosecutors	about	what	it	means	to	make	good	decisions.119	Existing	 professional	 accountability	 mechanisms,	 such	 as	 professional	discipline	and	judicial	sanctions,	are	directed	at	punishing	the	very	worst	conduct,	not	defining	good	conduct,	and,	in	any	event,	they	have	little	to	say	about	prosecutorial	discretion.	In	 the	 case	 of	 private	 clients,	 lawyers	 largely	 accept	 their	 clients’	stated	objectives,	try	to	accomplish	them,	and	defer	to	at	least	certain	decisions	regarding	how	to	do	so.	But	prosecutors	do	not	take	direction.	No	one	would	suggest	that	prosecutors	should	take	a	public	referendum	on	whether	particular	individuals	should	be	prosecuted	or	on	the	terms	of	a	proposed	plea	bargain.	Fiduciary	theory	of	governance	helps	focus	the	 question	 not	 on	 whether	 the	 prosecutor	 has	 been	 loyal	 to	 a	particular	set	of	people	but	rather	to	a	public	purpose,	here,	the	duty	to	seek	justice	in	criminal	cases.	But	the	problem	remains	how	to	give	such	a	 vague	 notion	 a	 concrete	 meaning,	 other	 than	 what	 any	 individual	prosecutor	believes	is	just.	In	determining	the	meaning	of	the	prosecutor’s	mandate,	should	the	public—the	beneficiary	of	a	prosecutor’s	work	as	fiduciary—have	any	voice	 at	 all	 in	 prosecutors’	 decisions	 beyond,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 elected	prosecutors,	 deciding	 which	 prosecutor	 makes	 those	 decisions?	Obviously,	 the	 public	 has	 no	 direct	 voice;	 the	 prosecutor	 acts	 as	 its	decision-making	surrogate.	But	in	making	decisions,	must	prosecutors	look	for	a	way	to	discern,	and	give	weight	to,	popular	demands?	Some	have	suggested	that	prosecutors	should	defer	 to,	or	at	 least	 take	account	 of,	 public	 preferences	 regarding	 decisions	 in	 individual	 cases.120	This,	 however,	misconstrues	prosecutors’	 job.	While	prosecutors’	duty	 to	“seek	justice”	is	a	vague	concept,	it	decidedly	does	not	mean	carrying	out	the	public’s	 will	 in	 each	 individual	 case.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 seeking	 justice																																																									
	 118.	 See	 Leib	et	 al.,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 736	 (“Although	 the	 duty	 [of	 care]	 seemingly	requires	little	more	than	avoiding	negligence,	most	concede	that	it	entails	affirmative	obligations	(unlike	the	mostly	prohibitive	duty	of	loyalty)	.	.	.	.”	(footnote	omitted)).		 119.	 On	the	 limited	reach	of	prosecutorial	ethics	rules,	particularly	with	regard	to	prosecutors’	discretionary	decisions,	see	Bruce	A.	Green,	Prosecutorial	Ethics	as	Usual,	2003	U.	ILL.	L.	REV.	1573,	1587–91	(explaining	that	the	only	exercise	of	discretion	pretrial	or	 during	 trial	 that	 the	 prosecutorial	 ethics	 rules	 addresses	 is	whether	 to	 initiate	 a	criminal	 charge,	 with	 respect	 to	 which	 the	 prosecutorial	 ethics	 rule	 requires	 only	“probable	cause”).	
	 120.	 See,	e.g.,	Russell	M.	Gold,	Promoting	Democracy	in	Prosecution,	86	WASH.	L.	REV.	69,	71	(2011)	(“Because	prosecutors	act	on	the	public’s	behalf,	their	decisions	should	reflect	their	constituents’	preferences.”).	
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3529379
134	 AMERICAN	UNIVERSITY	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	69:101	
 
presupposes	that	prosecutors	stand	as	a	bulwark	against	mob	justice	and	avoid	making	decisions	based	on	the	public’s	(or	their	own)	passions	and	prejudices.121	Prosecutors	are	supposed	to	make	discretionary	decisions	in	individual	cases	in	accordance	with	the	law	and	with	norms	and	traditions	that	are	relatively	constant	over	time	and	that	reflect	generally	applicable	law	enforcement	 considerations	 and	 principles	 (such	 as	 proportionality	 and	equal	 treatment).122	 For	 example,	 prosecutors	 have	 a	 duty	 to	 avoid	convicting	innocent	people,	which	may	require	declining	to	bring	charges	in	light	of	their	own	professional	doubts	about	an	individual’s	guilt,	even	if	the	public	is	clamoring	for	a	prosecution.123	This	is	not	to	say	that	prosecutors	may	 disregard	 public	 preferences;	 it	 is	 simply	 to	 say	 that	 the	 public	preferences	that	prosecutors	implement	are	principally	those	discernable	in	the	Constitution,	other	laws,	and	legal	traditions,	 including	the	norms	and	traditions	governing	criminal	prosecution.124	Particularly	 hard	 questions	 of	 prosecutorial	 discretion	 are	 presented	when	the	cross-cutting	principles	governing	criminal	prosecution	intersect	with	questions	of	social	policy.	The	public	may	have	a	reasonable	claim	that,	at	 least	as	to	social	policy,	 its	preferences	should	carry	 the	day.	Take,	 for																																																									
	 121.	 See	Green	&	Zacharias,	supra	note	37,	at	869–70	(“[W]hatever	else	prosecutors	do,	 they	should	act	nonpolitically.	This	encompasses	both	avoiding	obligations	to	the	political	parties	with	which	they	are	affiliated	.	.	.	and	holding	themselves	above	public	outcry	 and	 frenzy	 about	 particular	 cases.	The	 latter	 principle	 derives	 from	 society’s	aversion	 to	 mob	 justice.”	 (footnotes	 omitted));	 David	 Alan	 Sklansky,	 The	 Changing	
Political	Landscape	for	Elected	Prosecutors,	14	OHIO	ST.	J.	CRIM.	L.	647,	673	(2017)	(“The	danger	of	politicizing	the	handling	of	particular	cases	is,	in	fact,	a	worrisome	aspect	of	the	growing	attention	voters	seem	to	be	paying	to	prosecutorial	elections.”).	
	 122.	 See	Green	&	Zacharias,	 supra	 note	37,	 at	869–70	(“A	nonpolitical	prosecutor	arguably	can	ignore	the	public’s	desires	concerning	a	specific	case	at	a	heated	moment	of	time	while	remaining	true	to	the	public	will	in	a	more	general	sense.	In	other	words,	the	nonpolitical	prosecutor	will	ignore	a	momentary	hue	and	cry	but	continue	to	heed	public	expectations	as	they	are	expressed	over	time	in	the	 law	and	popular	culture.”	(footnote	omitted)).	
	 123.	 See	generally	Alafair	S.	Burke,	Prosecutorial	Agnosticism,	8	OHIO	ST.	J.	CRIM.	L.	79,	79	(2010)	(the	prevailing	view	is	“that	an	ethical	prosecutor	should	pursue	criminal	charges	 against	 a	 defendant	 only	 if	 the	 prosecutor	 personally	 believes	 that	 the	defendant	 is	 guilty”);	 Bennett	 L.	 Gershman,	 A	 Moral	 Standard	 for	 the	 Prosecutor’s	
Exercise	of	the	Charging	Discretion,	20	FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	513,	522	(1993)	(arguing	that	prosecutors	must	be	“morally	certain”	of	the	defendant’s	guilt	before	pursuing	charges).		 124.	 Here,	 the	 beneficiary’s	 objective	 is	 a	 public	 purpose,	 but	 one	 that	 is	 not	expressed	in	a	particular	law	that	a	public	official	is	entrusted	with	implementing,	but	one	 that	acquires	meaning	over	 time.	 It	 is	 embodied	 in	criminal	 law	and	procedure,	combined	with	decades	of	spoken,	written,	and	accepted	norms	of	practice	that	help	define	the	beneficial	purpose.	See	Miller	&	Gold,	supra	note	2,	at	570	(explaining	that	fiduciaries	can	serve	an	abstract	public	purpose).	
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example,	 the	 question	 of	whether	 an	 urban	 prosecutor	 should	prosecute	individuals	for	quality-of-life	offenses,	such	as	defacing	buildings	with	graffiti,	smoking	marijuana	in	public,	or	fare-beating.125	A	prosecutor	has	a	range	of	options.	At	one	extreme,	the	prosecutor	might	almost	entirely	ignore	certain	offenses,	 making	 a	 judgment,	 for	 example,	 never	 to	 prosecute	 fare-beating	cases,	as	Manhattan’s	District	Attorney	did	recently.126	At	 the	other	 extreme,	 the	 prosecutor	 might	 decide	 to	 prosecute	 these	 cases	aggressively	based,	for	example,	on	the	empirically	questionable	“broken	windows”	theory	that	ignoring	quality-of-life	offenses	inevitably	leads	to	more	serious	offenses.127	Or,	taking	an	intermediate	approach,	a	prosecutor	might	 bring	 quality-of-life	 offenders	 to	 a	 community	 court	 or	 other	problem-solving	 court	 in	 which	 some	 alternative	 to	 incarceration	 is	available.128	To	the	extent	that	the	choice	turns	on	social	policy	judgments,	do	public	preferences	carry	weight?	No	one	would	expect	the	public	to	have	the	last	word	on	whether	any	particular	 arrested	 individual	 should	 be	 prosecuted	 for	 a	 quality-of-life	offense	(or	any	other	offense)	because	that	determination	rests	in	part	on	matters	of	evidentiary	fact	and	criminal	justice	principles	that	are	uniquely	within	 the	 prosecutor’s	 expertise,	 such	 as	 whether	 there	 is	 sufficient	evidence	 of	 guilt	 and	whether	 the	particular	defendant	 is	 so	 culpable	 or																																																										 125.	 This	is	a	question	on	which	New	York	City	prosecutors	have	disagreed	and	taken	different	approaches	over	time.	See	Shawn	Cohen	et	al.,	Manhattan	DA	Won’t	Prosecute	
Quality-of-Life	 Offenses	 Anymore,	 N.Y.	 POST	 (Mar.	 1,	 2016),	https://nypost.com/2016/03/01/manhattan-da-wont-prosecute-quality-of-life-offenses-anymore	[https://perma.cc/8XGW-5MZ7].		 126.	 Brendan	 Cheney,	Manhattan	DA	Will	 No	 Longer	 Prosecute	 Turnstile	 Jumping,	POLITICO	 (Feb.	 1,	 2018,	 1:55	 PM),	 https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2018/02/01/manhattan-da-will-no-longer-prosecute-turnstile-jumping-229568	[https://perma.cc/PG7P-NXKH].	For	a	discussion	of	the	separation	of	powers	issues	involved	in	this	sort	of	decision,	see	Jeffrey	Bellin,	Defending	Progressive	Prosecution,	at	9	(2019),	 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3479165	 (arguing	 that	declining	to	prosecute	entire	classes	of	cases	is	a	proper	check	on	legislatures).	
	 127.	 See	Michelle	Chen,	Want	to	See	How	Biased	Broken	Windows	Policing	Is?	Spend	a	
Day	in	Court,	THE	NATION	(May	17,	2018),	https://www.thenation.com/article/want-to-see-how-biased-broken-windows-policing-is-spend-a-day-in-court	 [https://perma.cc	/M5HP-SAUS];	 see	 also	 WILLIAM	 J.	 BRATTON,	 N.Y.	 POLICE	 DEP’T,	 BROKEN	 WINDOWS	 AND	QUALITY-OF-LIFE	 POLICING	 IN	 NEW	 YORK	 CITY	 3,	 5	 (2015),	 http://www.nyc.	gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/qol.pdf	[https://perma.cc/SZB6-DJNP].	
	 128.	 See	Andrew	Denney,	After	25	Years,	NYC’s	Midtown	Community	Court	Still	Takes	
‘Problem-Solving’	 Approach	 to	 Low-Level	 Crime,	 N.Y.	 L.J.	 (Dec.	 7,	 2018),	https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/12/07/after-25-years-nycs-midtown-community-court-still-takes-problem-solving-approach-to-low-level-crime	[https://perma.cc/P5FL-MGGP].	
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dangerous	 relative	 to	 others	 who	 commit	 the	 offense	 as	 to	 deserve	 or	necessitate	 punishment.129	 These	 are	 criminal	 justice	 questions	 that	prosecutors	conventionally	resolve	based	on	the	relevant	evidence	and	their	understanding	of	the	principles	governing	prosecutors’	work.	Likewise,	the	general	question	of	how	to	allocate	resources	as	between,	say,	graffiti	cases	and	arson	cases,	is	one	that	prosecutors	would	conventionally	resolve	based	on	considerations	 intrinsic	 to	the	law.130	The	conventional	understanding	that	arson	is	the	more	serious	wrong,	as	reflected	in	the	legislative	sentencing	scheme,	 would	 lead	 a	 prosecutor	 to	 prioritize	 arson	 cases.	 And	questions	of	how	to	allocate	limited	prosecutorial	resources	also	reflect	an	administrative	judgment	that	is	ordinarily	entrusted	to	prosecutors.	But,	 at	 the	 core,	 there	 is	 also	 a	 criminal	 justice	 policy	 question	 on	which	prosecutors	might	disagree	and	as	to	which	the	public	might	have	a	 view.	 The	 criminalization	 of	 quality-of-life	 offenses	 reflects	 a	legislative	judgment	that	the	public	interest	is	at	least	sometimes	served	by	prosecuting	low-level	offenders.131	Members	of	the	community	may	take	the	view	that,	to	promote	public	safety,	these	offenders	should	be	prosecuted	as	a	matter	of	course.	Conversely,	the	public	may	take	the	view	 that	 prosecuting	 these	 offenders	 undermines	 relationships	between	 the	 law	 enforcement	 officials	 and	 communities	 and	 is	excessively	 disruptive.132	 Underlying	 the	 policy	 question	 may	 be	empirical	questions,	such	as	whether	the	prosecution	of	quality-of-life	offenses	leads	to	the	discovery	of,	or	deters,	more	serious	crimes.	Does	prosecutors’	overarching	duty	to	pursue	justice	in	the	abstract	mean	 that	 prosecutors	 should	 resolve	 public	 policy	 questions	themselves	without	regard	to	public	preferences?	If	not,	to	what	extent	should	prosecutors	defer	 to	 the	public’s	 preferences	 regarding	policy	questions	such	as	this?	Suppose,	for	example,	that	there	is	a	clear	public	demand	 to	 prosecute	 quality-of-life	 offenses	 aggressively	 in	 order	 to	deter	more	serious	crimes.	Does	loyalty	to	the	public	presuppose	that	the	 prosecutor	 defer	 to	 that	 demand,	 even	 if	 the	 prosecutor’s	 own	judgment	 is	 that	 the	 public’s	 preference	 is	 founded	 on	 an	 empirical	misunderstanding	or	that	the	public	interest	is	better	served	by	a	less	aggressive	prosecutorial	approach?	An	elected	prosecutor	may	run	on	a	criminal	justice	policy	platform	and	fairly	claim	that,	once	elected,	it	is	within	the	prosecutor’s	authority																																																									
	 129.	 See	Green,	supra	note	65,	at	1196–97.	
	 130.	 See	Bratton,	supra	note	127,	at	6–7.	
	 131.	 Id.	at	2.	
	 132.	 Id.	at	6.	
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to	determine	and	implement	criminal	justice	policy	within	the	area	of	discretion	afforded	by	the	legislature.	In	other	words,	the	point	of	the	election	is	to	decide	who	has	the	better	judgment	regarding	policy	and	to	 elect	 the	 lawyer	 who	 can	 be	 trusted	 with	 responsibility	 for	 best	resolving	questions	of	policy.	But	that	would	mean	that,	once	elected,	the	prosecutor	can	essentially	ignore	public	preferences	(except	to	the	extent	useful	to	win	reelection).	It	is	unclear	why	an	elected	prosecutor	would	have	a	 stronger	 claim	 than	other	 elected	officials	 to	 set	policy	without	regard	to	the	public	will.	The	 problem	 is	 not	 entirely	 avoided	 by	 appointed	 prosecutors.	 In	federal	cases,	it	may	be	assumed	that	United	States	Attorneys	defer	to	the	policy	preferences	of	the	appointed	Attorney	General	and,	indirectly,	those	of	the	President.133	But	many	policy	questions	may	be	unanswered	or	 unresolved	 at	 higher	 levels,	 leaving	 the	 question	 whether	 United	States	Attorneys	may	 interpose	 their	own	policy	preferences	or	must	discern	and	implement	those	of	the	public.134	If	elected	prosecutors	may	not	decide	policy	questions	entirely	on	the	basis	of	their	own	best	professional	judgment,	but	must	defer,	or	give	weight,	 to	 public	 preferences	 regarding	 broad	 questions	 of	 criminal	justice	policy,	 how	 is	 the	 relevant	policy	 to	be	discerned?	The	public	cannot	be	polled.	Public	preferences	cannot	necessarily	be	inferred	from	existing	 legislation	 or	 even	 vocal	 social	 movements.	 Arguably,	 some	other	elected	representative—a	governor	or	mayor—may	speak	for	the	public.	But	it	is	hard	to	see	why	another	elected	official	would	be	better	able	 than	 the	 elected	prosecutor	 to	 discern	 the	 public	will	 regarding	criminal	justice	policy	questions.	If	 the	 prosecutor	 must	 discern	 the	 public	 will,	 another	 question	remains,	namely,	which	public?	If,	as	we	assume,	the	prosecutor’s	client	is	the	public,	what	do	we	mean	by	that?	Does	a	United	States	Attorney	for	the	Southern	District	of	New	York	have	a	special	obligation	to	the	population	 of	 New	York	 or	 owe	 obligations	 to	 citizens	 of	 the	 United	States?135	Would	a	local	prosecutor	owe	obligations	to	all	citizens	in	the																																																									
	 133.	 See	generally	Rachel	E.	Barkow	&	Mark	Osler,	Designed	to	Fail:	The	President’s	
Deference	to	the	Department	of	Justice	in	Advancing	Criminal	Justice	Reform,	59	WM.	&	MARY	L.	REV.	387,	467	(2017);	Barack	Obama,	The	President’s	Role	in	Advancing	Criminal	
Justice	Reform,	130	HARV.	L.	REV.	811,	823	(2017).	
	 134.	 See	generally	Leslie	B.	Arffa,	Note,	Separation	of	Prosecutors,	128	YALE	L.J.	1078,	1103	 (2019)	 (describing	 and	 justifying	 the	 decentralization	 of	 federal	 criminal	prosecution).		 135.	 For	example,	 in	deciding	whether	to	prosecute	an	obscenity	charge,	should	a	federal	prosecutor	be	concerned	about	the	social	norms	of	the	federal	district	(which	
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state?	Or	only	to	those	citizens	in	the	local	prosecutor’s	district?	Assuming	the	answer	is	the	former,	should	the	prosecutor	assess	the	interests	of	the	state	with	a	special	eye	toward	the	needs	of	the	local	community?	Further,	efforts	to	discern	the	will	of	the	public	may	be	in	tension	with	the	previously	discussed	principle	that	prosecutors	may	not	serve	the	interests	of	private	subgroups.	If	the	prosecutor	implements	the	policy	judgments	of	the	particular	political	party	of	which	the	prosecutor	is	a	member,	 one	 might	 consider	 that	 the	 prosecutor	 is	 acting	 in	 an	impermissibly	partisan	 fashion,	 promoting	 the	 interests	 of	 a	political	party—a	private	group—at	 the	expense	of	 the	general	public.	Or	one	might	 say	 that	 the	 prosecutor	 is	 giving	 impermissible	 priority	 to	 the	preferences	of	a	subgroup,	not	necessarily	carrying	out	the	will	of	the	public	at	 large.	Of	course,	no	resolution	of	a	policy	question	will	ever	reflect	the	preference	of	every	member	of	the	public.	But	arguably,	the	general	preference	to	which	a	prosecutor	must	defer	is	not	that	of	the	prosecutor’s	party.136	Finally,	assuming	that	loyalty	to	the	public	requires	deference	to	the	public’s	 discernable	 policy	 preferences,	 the	 question	 remains	 how	 to	make	 discretionary	 decisions	 that	 give	 appropriate	 weight	 to	 those																																																									would	 be	 the	 relevant	 ones	 for	 determining	whether	material	 is	 obscene	 under	 the	federal	 criminal	 law)	 or	 the	 social	 norms	 of	 the	 broader	 national	 population?	 Cf.	Freedberg	v.	U.S.	Dep’t	of	Justice,	703	F.	Supp.	107,	111	(D.D.C.	1988)	(enjoining	federal	obscenity	prosecutions	 in	multiple	 federal	districts,	notwithstanding	 that	 states	may	apply	different	obscenity	standards).	In	general,	 the	popular	norms	that	restrain	and	influence	prosecutors	are	likely	those	of	the	population	served,	from	which	jurors	are	chosen,	if	only	for	the	instrumental	reason	that	those	are	the	norms	on	which	a	jury	is	likely	to	draw.	See	generally	Anna	Offit,	Prosecuting	in	the	Shadow	of	the	Jury,	113	NW.	U.	L.	REV.	1071,	1105–06	(2019)	(describing	empirical	 findings	that	 federal	prosecutors	make	discretionary	decisions	with	an	eye	toward	how	they	believe	a	jury	would	perceive	the	case).	
	 136.	 See	 Green	 &	 Zacharias,	 supra	 note	 37,	 at	 869–70	 (discussing	 ideal	 of	prosecutorial	 nonpartisanship).	 Needless	 to	 say,	 prosecutors	 have	 not	 always	comported	with	this	understanding.	Both	elected	and	appointed	prosecutors	may	be	heavily	engaged	in	partisan	politics	and	beholden	to	political	parties	for	their	positions.	
See	Michael	J.	Ellis,	Note,	The	Origins	of	the	Elected	Prosecutor,	121	YALE	L.J.	1528,	1565–67	 (2012);	cf.	 Scott	 Ingram,	George	Washington’s	Attorneys:	The	Political	 Selection	of	
United	States	Attorneys	at	 the	Founding,	 39	PACE	L.	REV.	163,	164–65	(2018).	At	 least	before	 the	 prevalence	 of	 contemporary	 understandings	 regarding	 prosecutors’	obligation	to	be	impartial	and	not	politically	partisan,	prosecutors	who	were	beholden	to	a	political	party	were	more	likely	to	accede	to	its	influence	when	making	discretionary	decisions.	 See	 Carolyn	 B.	Ramsey,	The	Discretionary	 Power	 of	 “Public”	 Prosecutors	 in	
Historical	Perspective,	39	AM.	CRIM.	L.	REV.	1309,	1338–39	(2002)	(describing	influence	of	the	Tammany	Hall	political	machine	on	late	nineteenth	century	prosecutors	in	New	York	City).	
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policy	 preferences	 along	 with	 the	 considerations	 that	 are	 properly	within	the	prosecutor’s	bailiwick.	For	example,	a	prosecutor	adopting	a	“tough	on	crime”	approach	in	deference	to	public	demand	would	still	be	expected	 to	weed	out	cases	where	 the	evidence	 is	too	weak	to	 justify	prosecution.	 The	 prosecutor	 might	 still	 be	 expected	 to	 treat	 certain	defendants	 leniently	 in	light	of	mitigating	considerations	 that	suggest	that	the	offense	was	aberrant	or	understandable.	The	prosecutor	might	still	prioritize	the	prosecution	of	more	serious	crimes,	given	resource	limitations.	All	 of	 these	questions	pose	a	 challenge	 to	 the	 idea	of	prosecutorial	accountability,	 to	which	we	will	 return.	 If	prosecutors	owe	the	public	duties	of	care	and	loyalty,	there	presumably	must	be	some	process	to	hold	prosecutors	accountable.	But	the	ambiguity	regarding	the	scope	of	prosecutors’	 obligations	 poses	 an	 obstacle.	What	 does	 it	 mean	 for	 a	prosecutor	to	make	careful	discretionary	decisions	or	to	be	loyal	to	the	public,	 in	the	affirmative	sense;	what	does	it	mean	to	be	faithful	to	the	public	 interest	 or	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 public	 purpose	 competently	 in	 a	criminal	 case?	 The	 complexity	 and	 opacity	 of	 prosecutors’	 decision	making	 as	well	 as	 the	 amount	 of	 independence	 that	prosecutors	must	necessarily	exercise	make	it	difficult	to	determine	whether	prosecutors	are	acting	carefully	and	faithfully	or	even	to	know	what	faithful	execution	of	the	criminal	law	entails	in	any	given	situation.	III.				ACCOUNTABILITY	VS.	INDEPENDENCE	This	Part	argues	that	while	accountability	and	independence	seem	at	odds,	 they	 are,	 in	 truth,	 two	 alternate	 ways	 to	 best	 define	 the	beneficiary’s	interest	and	ensure	that	the	prosecutor	remains	loyal	to	that	interest.137	Prosecutors	need	to	give	meaning	to	the	vague	mandate	to	do	justice.	Other	public	fiduciaries	like	agency	heads	may	be	able	to	look	to	statutes	or	bylaws	to	assess	the	purpose	or	goal	they	serve	and	give	it	more	concrete	meaning.138	Prosecutors	have	no	such	framework.	The	 structure	 of	 the	 office,	 created	 in	 part	 by	 the	 system	 of	accountability	and	independence	itself,	must	over	time	serve	that	role.	Accountability	 demands	 consequences	 when	 prosecutors	 fail	 to	pursue	 the	public	 interest.	 It	 assumes	 an	 institutional	mechanism	 for																																																										 137.	 For	an	argument	that	prosecutorial	independence	is	at	odds	with	accountability,	see	Davis,	supra	note	4,	at	438–48.	
	 138.	 See	Criddle,	supra	note	2,	at	151–52	(explaining	that	“administrative	agencies	owe	 fiduciary	 duties	 to	 their	 statutory	 beneficiaries”	 in	 executing	 their	 “statutorily	defined	missions”).	
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monitoring	prosecutors.	Independence,	on	the	other	hand,	ensures	that	prosecutors	can	use	their	experience	and	expertise	to	assess	the	public	interest	 and	 determine	 how	 best	 to	 achieve	 it	 without	 caving	 in	 to	political	 influence	 or	 mob	 pressure.139	 Independence	 requires	 some	insulation	 from	 elected	 officials	 and	 the	 public.	 The	 challenge	 is	 to	maximize	accountability	without	jeopardizing	independence.	Accountability	 can	 have	 any	 of	 several	 different,	 if	 inter-related,	meanings.	 At	 a	 minimum,	 accountability	 suggests	 meeting	 one’s	responsibilities—that	is,	doing	what	one	is	supposed	to	do	in	the	way	in	which	one	is	supposed	to	do	it.	Accountability	may	also	mean	justifying	what	one	does,140	and	facing	consequences	when	failing	to	fulfil	one’s	responsibilities.	Prosecutors	can	be	held	accountable	in	different	ways.	The	lay	public	can	exercise	direct	control	over	prosecutorial	decisions	or	could	have	a	more	robust	role	 in	how	those	decisions	are	made.	A	prosecutor	can	be	subject	either	to	direct	political	consequences	for	his	or	her	work,	or	the	political	official	who	appointed	the	prosecutor	can	face	 repercussions	 for	 the	 prosecutor’s	 conduct.	 Alternatively,	accountability	can	require	processes	for	reaching	decisions.	Prosecutors	can	 be	 subject	 to	 internal	 and	 external	 mechanisms	 of	 review	 and	resulting	 sanctions.	 Finally,	 all	 these	 forms	 of	 accountability	 may	require	varying	degrees	of	transparency.	Transparency	in	prosecutors’	decision	making	is	complicated	because	much	of	what	prosecutors	do	requires	secrecy.	Prosecutorial	 independence,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 assumes	 that	experience	and	expertise	are	the	best	guarantee	that	prosecutors	will	seek	the	public	interest.	Professional	reputation,	legacy,	and	self-image	will	ensure	that	prosecutors	adhere	to	their	obligations	of	duty	and	care.	Any	 intrusion	 into	 their	 work	 threatens	 the	 purity	 of	 the	 exercise.	Lawyers’	 independence	was	originally	conceived	 in	republican	 terms.	Lawyers,	as	part	of	an	aristocracy,	were	uniquely	suited	to	guard	liberty																																																									
	 139.	 See	 Davis,	 supra	 note	 4,	 at	 438	 (“[P]rosecutors	 require	 a	 certain	 level	 of	independence	to	make	their	decisions	without	inappropriate	and	extraneous	political	pressures.”);	Richman,	 supra	 note	4,	 at	957–59	 (discussing	 the	view	 that	 “insulation	from	narrow	interest	groups	and	corrupt	influences”	allows	prosecutors	to	effectively	“divine	the	public	interest”).	
	 140.	 See	 Barbara	 O’Brien,	 A	 Recipe	 for	 Bias:	 An	 Empirical	 Look	 at	 the	 Interplay	
Between	 Institutional	 Incentives	 and	 Bounded	 Rationality	 in	 Prosecutorial	 Decision	
Making,	74	MO.	L.	REV.	999,	1018	(2009)	(“Psychologists	who	study	accountability	define	it	 broadly	 as	 the	experience	 of	 feeling	pressure	 to	 justify	 judgments	 or	 decisions	 to	others.	 Under	 the	 right	 conditions,	 imposing	 accountability	 on	 decision	makers	 can	make	them	more	thorough	and	objective.”	(footnote	omitted)).	
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by	 ensuring	 the	 good	 of	 all	 citizens.141	 Their	 wealth	 made	 them	independent	 of	 any	 faction,	 immune	 to	 the	 kind	 of	 domination	 that	might	 distract	 them	 from	 this	 duty,	 or	 in	 Rave’s	 terms,	 trigger	 the	“tyranny	 of	 the	 majority”	 problem.142	 Initially,	 only	 a	 small	 class	 of	aristocrats	were	 thought	 to	possess	 the	necessary	virtue	 to	 fulfill	this	role.143	As	the	nineteenth	century	drew	to	a	close,	a	burgeoning	middle	class	based	its	claim	to	this	special	status	on	merit,	skill,	and	training,	as	opposed	to	aristocratic	pedigree.	Lawyers	were	seen	as	a	separate	estate	that	stood	poised	to	protect	against	an	arbitrary	exercise	of	power	by	the	state	and	the	dominion	of	one	man	or	one	group	over	another.144	Fiduciary	theorists	have	also	traced	fiduciary	law	to	republican	theory.145	While	many	have	been	justifiably	skeptical	about	this	rhetoric,	it	can	be	 useful.146	 At	 least	 some	 prosecutors,	 like	many	 other	 lawyers	 and	public	 officials,	 take	 pride	 in	 what	 they	 do	 and	 want	 to	 do	 it	 well.	Additionally,	 they	 are	 trained	 in	 certain	 practices	 that	 are,	 at	 least	theoretically,	 designed	 to	 ensure	 justice	 in	 particular	 cases.147	 This																																																									
	 141.	 See	Rebecca	Roiphe,	Redefining	Professionalism,	26	U.	FLA.	J.L.	&	PUB.	POL’Y	193,	203–04	(2015)	(describing	the	historical	view	that	lawyers—who,	according	to	Alexis	de	Tocqueville,	“constituted	an	American	brand	of	aristocracy”—had	“sufficient	means	to	think	beyond	[their]	own	self-interest”).		 142.	 Rave,	 supra	 note	 87,	 at	 54–61;	 see	 Roiphe,	 supra	 note	 141,	 at	 203–05	(summarizing	the	theory	that	only	those	with	means	to	“provide	for	[their]	own	basic	material	needs”	could	exercise	the	independence	required	to	be	a	lawyer).”	
	 143.	 Id.	at	205.	
	 144.	 See	 id.	 at	 206	 (describing	 the	 belief	 that	 lawyers’	 education	 and	 training	uniquely	positioned	them	to	act	for	the	good	of	all).	
	 145.	 See	Evan	J.	Criddle,	Liberty	in	Loyalty:	A	Republican	Theory	of	Fiduciary	Law,	95	TEX.	L.	REV.	993,	994–1000	(2017)	(arguing	that	republican	theory	is	 the	best	way	to	interpret	fiduciary	law).	
	 146.	 See	Rebecca	Roiphe,	The	Decline	of	Professionalism,	29	GEO.	J.	LEGAL	ETHICS	649,	650–53	(2016)	(suggesting	that	“aspects	of	the	older	understanding	of	professionalism,”	which	 have	 generated	 skepticism	 among	 lawyers	 and	 scholars,	 “can	 and	 should	 be	relevant	and	vital	 today”).	Attorney	General	William	Barr,	when	testifying	before	the	Senate	 as	 a	 nominee	 for	 the	 position,	 used	 this	 notion	 of	 professionalism	 and	accountability	to	the	American	people	to	explain	why	he	was	suited	for	the	job.	Hearing	
on	the	Nomination	of	the	Honorable	William	Pelham	Barr	to	be	Attorney	General	of	the	
United	 States	 Before	 the	 S.	 Comm.	 on	 the	 Judiciary,	 116	 Cong.	 1–2	 (2019)	 (written	testimony	 of	 William	 P.	 Barr),	 https://judiciary.senate.gov/	imo/media/doc/Barr%20Testimony.pdf	[https://perma.cc/YHE2-KFDS].	
	 147.	 See	Timothy	Fry,	Prosecutorial	Training	Wheels:	Ginsburg’s	Connick	v.	Thompson	
Dissent	and	the	Training	Imperative,	102	J.	CRIM.	L.	&	CRIMINOLOGY	1275,	1277–78	(2012)	(explaining	 that	 while	 the	 Court	 noted	 in	 Connick	 v.	 Thompson	 that	 “[i]ndividual	prosecutors	have	received	‘professional	training	and	have	ethical	obligations’”	related	to	the	fair	administration	of	justice,	the	dissent	viewed	this	training	as	more	theoretical	than	practically	effective).	
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training	allows	them	to	draw	on	their	experience,	knowledge,	and	skill	to	 exercise	 judgment	 in	 ways	 that	 avoid	 miscarriages	 of	 justice,	distortions,	and	abuse.	Even	when	an	individual	prosecutor	may	lack	the	judgment	we	would	like	and	expect,	that	prosecutor	is	constrained	by,	and	often	invested	 in,	 the	procedures	and	traditions	of	 the	office	 that	create	a	real	check	on	the	prosecutor’s	conduct.	The	dangers	to	the	beneficiary	are	significant	when	prosecutors	are	not	held	accountable	for	their	acts.	Social	movements,	like	the	innocence	movement	and	Black	Lives	Matter,	have	highlighted	just	how	vulnerable	communities	are	to	prosecutorial	abuse.148	Some	have	even	pointed	to	independence	as	the	problem.149	But	fiduciary	theory	helps	explain	why	eroding	prosecutorial	independence	has	its	own	potential	perils.	If	we	are	not	vigilant,	partisan	political	groups	or	powerful	private	individuals	or	groups	might	seek	to	use	prosecutors	to	advance	their	own	personal	or	 political	 interests	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 broader	 public	 mandate.	Organized	 factions	within	the	public	might	 try	 to	 influence	or	even	 take	over	 prosecutors’	 offices	 for	 their	 own	 ends.	 Those	 without	 an	understanding	of	the	criminal	justice	system	might	seek	results	that	are	not	in	keeping	with	all	 the	rules	and	procedures	designed	to	ensure	 justice.	Vulnerable	groups	or	unpopular	defendants	might	suffer	at	the	hands	of	a	majority	that	does	not	fully	grasp	the	need	for	processes	and	protections.	There	is	a	risk	not	only	to	individuals	who	may	be	wrongly	pursued	for	a	political	pay-off	but	also	to	unpopular	defendants,	who	may	face	a	kind	of	mob	justice.150	The	rule	of	law	requires	not	only	accountability	but	independence.	Fiduciary	theory	offers	a	way	to	balance	these	competing	concerns.	If	a	 prosecutor’s	 fiduciary	 obligation	 is	 to	 pursue	 the	 public’s	 abstract	interest	in	justice,	then	prosecutors	need	some	degree	of	insulation	to	weigh	 those	 central	 concerns.	The	public	should	not	have	 a	direct	 or	even	 indirect	 ability	 to	 control	 how	 prosecutors	weigh	 concerns	 like	fairness,	proportionality,	deterrence,	and	retribution.	Those	concerns,	which	 are	 central	 to	 the	 prosecutors’	 fiduciary	 mission,	 ought	 to	 be	evaluated	both	in	light	of	the	office’s	prior	decisions	in	similar	cases	and	in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 facts	 of	 that	 particular	 case.	 The	 public	 is	 ill-equipped	 to	make	 this	 sort	 of	 evaluation.	On	 the	other	hand,	when	a																																																									
	 148.	 See	Green	&	Yaroshefsky,	supra	note	13,	at	89–90,	93–95.	
	 149.	 See	Davis,	supra	note	4,	at	408–15	(describing	prosecutors’	wide	discretion	to	make	outcome-determinative	decisions,	like	charging,	and	the	limited	mechanisms	for	monitoring	potential	abuses	of	such	discretion).		 150.	 Green	&	Roiphe,	Punishment	Without	Process,	supra	note	17.	
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prosecutor	considers	extrinsic	concerns	that	are	not	central	to	the	core	criminal	 justice	mission,	 there	 is	 more	 room	 for	 public	 input,	 either	directly	 or	 through	 another	 elected	 official.	 The	 extent	 to	 which	prosecutors	 should	 serve	 social	 justice	 or	 take	 into	 account	 the	economic	 disadvantage	 of	 the	 accused,	 potential	 foreign	 policy,	 or	immigration	repercussions,	are	all	questions	of	broad	social	policy	that	may	 be	 relevant	 in	 any	 given	 prosecution	 but	 are	 not	 central	 to	 the	prosecutor’s	 fiduciary	 mandate.	 Other	 actors	 may	 well	 be	 better	situated	than	the	prosecutor	to	assess	the	public’s	interest	with	regard	to	those	extrinsic	concerns.	This	Part	will	proceed	by	identifying	each	mechanism	of	accountability	and	analyzing	the	risks	they	pose	to	prosecutorial	independence.	This,	in	turn,	 provides	 a	 framework	 for	 assessing	 which	 mechanisms	 of	accountability	will	work	best	to	align	the	prosecutor’s	interest	with	that	of	 the	 public	 without	 making	 too	 great	 a	 sacrifice	 to	 prosecutorial	independence.	This	Part	then	returns	to	fiduciary	theory,	arguing	that	the	 unique	 nature	 of	 prosecutors’	 role	 offers	 new	 insight	 into	 the	fiduciary	theory	of	governance.	
A.			Mechanisms	of	Accountability	
1.	 External	control	over	prosecutors	Some	scholars,	particularly	those	who	lament	the	decline	in	the	role	of	the	jury	trial,	have	suggested	greater	lay	control	over	prosecutorial	decision	making.	Stephanos	Bibas	has	argued	that	juries	should	review	plea	 bargain	 sentence	 recommendations.151	 Josh	 Bowers	 and	 Jocelyn	Simonson	 have	 similarly	 suggested	 greater	 lay	 participation	 in	 the	criminal	 justice	 system.152	 These	 scholars	 argue	 that	 the	 rise	 in	 plea																																																										 151.	 Stephanos	 Bibas,	 Observers	 as	 Participants:	 Letting	 the	 Public	 Monitor	 the	
Criminal	 Justice	Bureaucracy,	127	HARV.	L.	REV.	F.	342,	342–44	(2014)	(advocating	for	public	 participation	 in	 plea	 hearings);	 Stephanos	 Bibas,	 Essay,	 Transparency	 and	
Participation	 in	 Criminal	 Procedure,	 81	 N.Y.U.	 L.	 REV.	 911,	 961	 (2006)	 (“[P]lea	 and	sentencing	juries	would	serve	many	of	the	functions	that	grand	and	petit	juries	once	did,	checking	 executive	 and	 judicial	 conduct.”);	 see	 also	 Roger	 A.	 Fairfax,	 Jr.,	Grand	 Jury	
Innovation:	Toward	a	Functional	Makeover	of	the	Ancient	Bulwark	of	Liberty,	19	WM.	&	MARY	BILL	RTS.	 J.	339,	356,	358	 (2010)	 (arguing	 for	 grand	 jury	 supervision	over	plea	bargaining	and	sentencing	decisions).	
	 152.	 See	 Josh	Bowers,	Legal	Guilt,	Normative	Innocence,	and	the	Equitable	Decision	
Not	to	Prosecute,	110	COLUM.	L.	REV.	1655,	1657–62	(2010)	(arguing	for	lay	input	into	charging	 decisions);	 Jocelyn	 Simonson,	 The	 Criminal	 Court	 Audience	 in	 a	 Post-Trial	
World,	127	HARV.	L.	REV.	2173,	2176–77	(2014)	(arguing	that	the	Constitution	embodies	“the	 idea	 that	 the	 function	of	 the	 public	 in	 the	 criminal	 courtroom	 goes	 beyond	 the	
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bargaining	 and	 the	 decline	 in	 jury	 trials	 account	 for	 some	 of	 the	harshness	of	the	current	system.153	Some	of	these	proposals	may	be	wise,	particularly	those	that	seek	to	educate	 members	 of	 the	 public	 about	 the	 way	 the	 criminal	 justice	system	works	so	that	they	can	exercise	their	rights	to	alter	and	reform	the	system	when	it	has	gone	awry.154	Involving	the	lay	public	directly	in	prosecutorial	decision	making	is	more	problematic,	at	least	where	those	decisions	involve	 the	core	 interests	 intrinsic	 to	 justice.	Doing	so	risks	undermining	prosecutorial	 independence	by	allowing	the	influence	of	those	who	may	lack	a	commitment	to	the	processes	and	traditions	of	the	office	 and	 who	 certainly	 lack	 the	 information	 to	 make	 appropriate	decisions.	While	lay	input	might	arguably	mitigate	an	unjustifiably	harsh	system,	public	 influence	may	also	 threaten	greater	harshness	 toward	unpopular	defendants.	There	may	be	a	greater	role	for	the	public	to	play	either	directly	or	indirectly	 through	 elected	 officials	 in	 determining	 which	 extrinsic	values	ought	to	bear	on	prosecutors’	decisions.	So,	prosecutors	ought	to	be	more	responsive	to	public	concerns	and	public	opinion	about	immigration	or	foreign	policy,	both	of	which	are	at	least	to	some	degree	extrinsic	to	a	determination	of	what	is	just	in	any	individual	case.	Holding	public	fiduciaries	responsible	for	their	actions	is	necessarily	difficult	 and	 imperfect.	 The	 imperfect	 mechanisms	 for	 holding	fiduciaries	responsible	are	justified	by	trust.	Fiduciary	models	rely,	 in	part,	on	the	idea	that	the	fiduciary	has	the	character	to	resist	temptation	and	abide	by	the	beneficiary’s	interest.155	Theorists	suggest	that	when	the	 beneficiary	 is	 particularly	 vulnerable,	 the	 law	 should	 recognize	residual	 control	 rights	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 agent	 does	 not	 betray	 the	
																																																								protection	of	individuals	to	implicate	the	ability	of	citizens	to	.	.	.	hold	the	criminal	justice	system	accountable”).	
	 153.	 Cf.	Adriaan	Lanni,	The	Future	of	Community	Justice,	40	HARV.	C.R.-C.L.	L.	REV.	359,	387,	399	(2005)	(arguing	that	“[i]nvolving	local	laypeople	in	charging	and	sentencing	decisions	 would	.	.	.	 reverse	 the	 current	 trend	 toward	 ever-harsher	 policies,”	 and	specifically	that	“in	a	world	of	guilty	pleas,	the	grand	jury	as	focus	group	or	judicial	body	may	be	the	only	mechanism	to	ensure	that	charging	policies	do	not	deviate	too	much	from	local	community	opinion”).	
	 154.	 See	Simonson,	supra	note	152,	at	2174–78	(emphasizing	the	importance	of	the	public	audience	in	courtrooms	for	“hold[ing]	the	criminal	justice	system	accountable”).	
	 155.	 See	Leib	et	al.,	supra	note	2,	at	706–07	(identifying	the	beneficiary’s	trust	in	the	fiduciary	as	one	of	three	indicia	of	the	fiduciary	relationship).	
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principal.156	 The	 public	 is	 quite	 vulnerable	 to	discretionary	decisions	made	by	prosecutors,	but	it	is	difficult	to	give	control	over	prosecutors	directly	 to	 the	 public	 in	 part	 because	 the	 beneficiary’s	 interest	 is	 an	abstraction	rather	than	a	particular	individual	or	group	with	a	defined	interest.157	 Any	 control	 exercised	 indirectly	 by	 the	 legislature	 or	executive	risks	undermining	prosecutorial	independence.	That	leaves	us	with	the	need	to	devise	creative	ways	to	hold	prosecutors	accountable	that	will	not	simultaneously	undermine	independence,	thereby	risking	other	distortions	of	their	duty	of	loyalty.	Others	suggest	that	legislatures,	courts,	or	disciplinary	authorities	ought	to	exercise	 control	 over	 prosecutors’	 decisions.158	 These	 mechanisms	 have	proved	ineffective.	Legislatures	are	incapable	of	taking	into	account	the	kind	of	 specific	 facts	 and	 circumstances	 necessary	 to	 constrain	 prosecutors’	decisions,	and	courts	are	limited	both	by	separation	of	powers	concerns	and	by	 their	 capacity	 to	 review	 the	 fact-specific	 decisions	 in	 individual	 cases.	Disciplinary	authorities	are	limited	because	the	directly	punitive	structure	is	best	suited	to	intentional	misconduct.	
2.	 Political	accountability	Some	 argue	 that	 the	 best	 way	 to	 ensure	 that	 prosecutors	 pursue	socially	beneficial	ends	is	to	hold	them	politically	accountable	for	their	acts.159	 Perhaps	 the	 most	 prominent	 proponent	 of	 political																																																									
	 156.	 Cf.	 id.	at	707–08	 (“[W]here	 residual	 control	 rights	 are	particularly	weak,	 the	beneficiary’s	 vulnerability	 to	 predation	 is	 greater	 and,	 therefore,	 the	 fiduciary	must	meet	a	higher	standard	of	conduct.”	(footnote	omitted)).	
	 157.	 Cf.	 Miller	 &	 Gold,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 523–24	 (explaining	 that	 some	 fiduciary	mandates	 “are	not	 identified	with	determinate	persons	and	 their	practical	 interests;	they	are,	in	this	sense,	abstract”).	
	 158.	 See	ANGELA	J.	DAVIS,	ARBITRARY	JUSTICE:	THE	POWER	OF	THE	AMERICAN	PROSECUTOR	180–82,	189	(2007)	(arguing	for	more	rigorous	bar	disciplinary	processes	for	prosecutors	and	 prosecutorial	 reform	 legislation	 as	 necessary);	 Richard	 A.	 Rosen,	 Disciplinary	
Sanctions	Against	Prosecutors	 for	Brady	Violations:	A	Paper	Tiger,	65	N.C.	L.	REV.	693,	733–36	(1987)	(proposing	changes	in	bar	disciplinary	proceedings);	James	Vorenberg,	
Decent	Restraint	of	Prosecutorial	Power,	94	HARV.	L.	REV.	1521,	1568–72	(1981)	(calling	for	more	robust	judicial	review	of	prosecutors’	discretionary	decisions).		 159.	 See,	 e.g.,	 JEREMY	 TRAVIS	 ET	 AL.,	 PROSECUTORS,	 DEMOCRACY,	 AND	 JUSTICE:	 HOLDING	PROSECUTORS	 ACCOUNTABLE	 6–10	 (2019),	 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/	5c4fbee5697a9849dae88a23/t/5d6d8d224f45fb00014076d5/1567460643414/Prosecutors%2C+Democracy%2C+Justice_FORMATTED+9.2.19.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/	 Q28B-JS9W]	(suggesting	that	the	public	can	hold	prosecutors	accountable	by	electing	prosecutors	who	are	truthful,	transparent,	and	equitable);	Sara	Sun	Beale,	Rethinking	the	Identity	and	Role	
of	United	States	Attorneys,	6	OHIO	ST.	J.	CRIM.	L.	369,	391–413	(2009)	(arguing	that	United	States	Attorneys	lack	the	political	accountability	of	local	prosecutors).	But	see	David	Alan	Sklansky,	Unpacking	 the	 Relationship	 Between	 Prosecutors	 and	 Democracy	 in	 the	 United	
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accountability	for	prosecutors	is	Justice	Scalia	in	his	dissent	in	Morrison	
v.	 Olson.160	 In	 arguing	 for	 the	 unconstitutionality	 of	 the	 special	prosecutor	under	the	Ethics	in	Government	Act,	Scalia	complained	that	by	 insulating	 the	 role	 from	 presidential	 control,	 the	 legislature	 had	essentially	ensured	that	no	political	actor	could	be	held	accountable	for	the	special	prosecutor’s	acts.161	As	 Professor	 Dan	 Epps	 has	 asked,	 “why	 is	 the	 right	 goal	 letting	politically	 accountable	 prosecutors	 follow	 the	 political	 winds?”162	 A	prosecutor	 attuned	 to	 the	 political	 majority	 might	 well	 do	 the	 right	thing.	 The	 prosecutor	 might,	 for	 instance,	 decline	 to	 prosecute	 a	technically	guilty	individual	who	is	not	morally	blameworthy.	But	at	the	same	 time,	 a	 political	 majority	 might	 be	 particularly	 bloodthirsty,	especially	in	a	case	that	has	had	an	immediate	impact	on	the	community.	A	political	majority	might	unfairly	target	a	particular	group	or	demand	a	 conviction	 when	 a	 prosecutor	 thinks	 the	 evidence	 is	 lacking.	 In	addition,	we	have	long	abandoned	the	notion	that	political	actors	always	pursue	socially	useful	ends.	Powerful	interests	can	capture	the	political	process:	even	if	following	the	majority’s	will	would	lead	the	prosecutor	to	do	the	right	thing,	political	calculations	often	lead	elected	officials	to	follow	a	powerful	minority’s	interest	rather	than	that	of	the	majority.	The	public	is	often	only	interested	in	a	select	group	of	cases—the	most	gruesome	crimes	or	those	involving	celebrities	or	other	popular	causes.	This,	too,	threatens	to	warp	a	prosecutor’s	ability	to	respond	to	the	more	abstract	public	purpose.	Prosecutors,	who	are	directly	responsive	to	the	public,	may	have	little	incentive	to	follow	the	will	of	the	public	if	no	one	cares.	 Even	 if	 citizens	 do	 care,	 the	 public	 would	 have	 a	 hard	 time	assessing	a	prosecutor’s	job,	at	least	when	it	comes	to	the	obligation	to	weigh	intrinsic	criminal	justice	concerns,	given	that	cases	hinge	on	facts	and	law	that	are	hard	to	assess.163	A	few	cases	then	could	work	as	cover																																																									
States,	in	PROSECUTORS	AND	DEMOCRACY:	A	CROSS-NATIONAL	STUDY	276,	277	(Máximo	Langer	&	David	Alan	Sklansky	eds.,	2017)	(discussing	the	widely-shared	view	that	“[t]he	last	thing	we	should	want	from	prosecutors	is	‘democratic	accountability’”).		 160.	 487	U.S.	654	(1988).	
	 161.	 See	id.	at	728–31	(Scalia,	J.,	dissenting)	(“[E]ven	if	it	were	entirely	evident	that	unfairness	was	in	fact	the	result	[of	the	work	of	an	independent	counsel]	.	.	.	there	would	
be	no	one	accountable	to	the	public	to	whom	the	blame	could	be	assigned.”).	
	 162.	 See	 Epps,	 supra	 note	 44,	 at	 848;	 see	 also	 Richman,	 supra	 note	 4,	 at	 973–74	(arguing	that	electoral	control	is	far	less	likely	to	force	prosecutors	to	be	responsive	to	the	community	than	if	prosecutors	are	encouraged	to	decide	cases	in	the	shadow	of	jury	decisions).	
	 163.	 Cf.	Richman,	supra	note	4,	at	965	(“[T]he	bulk	of	the	discretionary	decisions	that	prosecutors	make	turn	.	.	.	[on]	case-specific	factors.	Electoral	or	appointive	politics	are,	
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for	 the	 rest.	 Even	 if	 the	public	 could	be	made	 to	 care	 about	 all	 cases	equally,	 voters	 are	 not	 in	 a	 good	 position	 to	 assess	 the	 prosecutors’	discretionary	choices	in	more	complex,	factually	or	legally	complicated	cases.	As	we	discussed	above,	it	is	not	clear	whether	a	local	prosecutor	owes	loyalty	to	members	of	the	district	in	which	the	prosecutor	works,	to	 the	 state	 as	 a	 whole,	 or	 to	 the	 United	 States.164	 If	 it	 is	 the	 latter,	elections	of	local	or	state	prosecutors	will	not	work	to	align	her	interest	with	that	of	the	beneficiary.165	Despite	Justice	Scalia’s	assertions	in	Morrison,	federal	prosecutors	are	even	 less	accountable	 than	state	prosecutors.	United	States	Attorneys	are	appointed	by	the	President,166	often	with	input	from	local	legislators.	They	have	little	incentive	to	serve	local	communities,	and	it	is	unlikely	that	 the	 President	 would	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	 something	 that	happened	 in	 one	 of	 the	 ninety-four	 federal	 districts.	 Theoretically,	 the	Attorney	General	would	be	held	responsible,	and	this,	in	turn,	would	reflect	on	the	President,	but	that	seems	unlikely	at	best.167	Local	prosecutors	may	be	more	responsive	to	the	public,	but	pathologies	in	local	politics	render	this	solution	problematic.	Most	district	attorneys	run	uncontested,	and	the	voting	public	pays	little	attention	to	the	campaigns.	Not	only	is	political	accountability	ineffective,	it	can	also	be	dangerous	in	its	threat	to	prosecutorial	independence.	The	greater	the	hierarchical	control	of	prosecutors	either	by	a	political	actor	or	by	the	voting	public,	the	greater	the	danger	that	decisions	that	ought	to	be	characterized	by	the	 disinterested	 application	 of	 law	 to	 facts	 will	 instead	 reflect	 the	partisan	 preference	 of	 certain	 groups.168	 Political	 accountability	may	have	a	role	to	play	in	aligning	the	interest	of	the	public	with	its	principal,																																																									at	best,	a	poor	way	of	holding	prosecutors	accountable	for	this	myriad	of	low-visibility	enforcement	decisions.”).	
	 164.	 See	supra	Section	II.C.		 165.	 Others	have	noted	the	difficulty	in	identifying	the	relevant	principal.	See	Ethan	J.	Leib	et	al.,	Translating	Fiduciary	Principles	into	Public	Law,	126	HARV.	L.	REV.	F.	91,	94	(2013).		 166.	 Beale,	supra	note	159,	at	370.	
	 167.	 Cf.	William	J.	Stuntz,	The	Pathological	Politics	of	Criminal	Law,	100	MICH.	L.	REV.	505,	543	(2001)	(“United	States	Attorneys’	offices	.	.	.	have	the	power	to	set	their	own	agendas,	to	decide	what	cases	they	wish	to	spend	time	on	and	what	cases	they	wish	to	ignore.”).	
	 168.	 Cf.	 Green	&	Roiphe,	 supra	 note	 15,	 at	 72	 (“[C]onflicts	 of	 interest	 threaten	 to	undermine	 [prosecutors’]	 impartial	 decision-making	.	.	.	.	 Allocating	 responsibility	 for	decisions	in	individual	cases	to	career	prosecutors	who	are	lower	down	in	the	hierarchy	helps	achieve	the	fair	and	disinterested	administration	of	criminal	 justice	by	making	these	sorts	of	conflicts	less	likely.”).	
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but	it	cannot	serve	as	a	panacea.	Political	accountability	works	better	where	the	question	is	prosecutorial	policy	as	opposed	to	effectiveness.	It	 works	 better	 when	 it	 concerns	 policies	 extrinsic	 to	 the	 central	fiduciary	mission	 of	 the	 prosecutor.	 A	 local	 prosecutor	 and	 a	 federal	prosecutor	 may	 well	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	 implementing	 policy	promises.	As	we	discussed	above,	 the	public	may	prefer	or	disfavor	a	broken	windows	approach	to	prosecution	and	is	in	a	fairly	good	position	to	assess	the	prosecutor’s	position.169	As	we	have	argued	elsewhere,	and	in	part	because	of	the	question	of	accountability,	the	President	has	a	role	to	 play	 in	 setting	 federal	 prosecutors’	 policy	 agendas	 but	 not	 in	controlling	individual	cases.170	
3.	 Internal	processes	and	structures	for	decision	making	A	 different	 mechanism	 to	 ensure	 accountability	 requires	 internal	processes	for	decision	making.	Many	scholars	have	suggested	reforming	prosecutors’	offices	to	better	align	their	actions	with	the	public	interest.	Even	if	the	substance	of	public	interest	is	elusive,	it	is	easier	to	agree	on	processes	designed	to	approximate	it.	If	public	officers	are	fiduciaries,	then	their	actions	must	be	made	on	behalf	of	the	public.	Processes	are	important	and	at	times	critical	to	ensure	that	this	is	the	case.171	We	 have	 argued	 elsewhere	 that	 deliberation	 among	 differently	situated	prosecutors,	the	recording	of	decision-making	processes,	and	internal	review	of	these	processes	can	help	reduce	prosecutorial	conflicts	of	 interest.172	 Others	 have,	 in	 different	 contexts,	 proposed	 changes	 in	institutional	 design	 to	 counter	 implicit	 bias	 and	 other	 distortions	 in	prosecutors’	judgment.173	Prosecutors	should,	at	the	very	least,	consciously	weigh	 different	 factors	 in	making	 important	 decisions	 about	 the	 public	interest	 and	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 broad	mandate	 to	 serve	 justice.	While	people	may	not	agree	about	which	factors	ought	to	take	precedence	over	others	 in	 any	 given	 decision,	 all	 can	 agree	 that	 prosecutors	 should	consider	only	proper	factors	and	make	a	deliberate	decision	about	how	to	weigh	them	given	the	facts	of	the	case.	
																																																								
	 169.	 Supra	notes	125–28	and	accompanying	text.		 170.	 Green	&	Roiphe,	supra	note	15,	at	6.	
	 171.	 Cf.	EVAN	J.	CRIDDLE	&	EVAN	FOX-DECENT,	FIDUCIARIES	OF	HUMANITY:	HOW	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	 CONSTITUTES	 AUTHORITY	 103–04	 (2016)	 (exploring	 how	 non-domination	 and	 a	fiduciary	 theory	 of	 international	 norms	 protect	 individuals	 subject	 to	 public	 power	against	abuse).	
	 172.	 See	Green	&	Roiphe,	supra	note	55,	at	525–27.	
	 173.	 See	Barkow,	supra	note	3,	at	883,	887–88.	
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Extrapolating	 from	the	private	 law	theory,	Ethan	Leib	and	Stephen	Galoob	 argue	 that	 all	 fiduciary	 relationships	 are	 characterized	 by	 a	respect	 for	 the	 principal	 and	 therefore	 involve	 a	 commitment	 to	deliberation,	conscientiousness,	and	robustness.	Deliberation	involves	not	just	a	particular	outcome	but	a	process	for	arriving	at	that	outcome.	Leib	 and	 Galoob	 claim	 that	 fiduciaries	 must	 maintain	 a	 continued	commitment	 to	 a	 decision-making	 process.	 To	 be	 conscientious,	 a	fiduciary	must	 act	 for	 the	 right	 reasons,	 namely,	 to	 help	 realize	 and	pursue	the	interest	of	the	beneficiary.	Finally,	robustness	requires	that	this	process	of	conscientious	deliberation	be	continuous	and	account	for	new	information.174	Prosecutors	could	be	required	to	engage	in	this	sort	of	 conscientious	 deliberative	 process.	 They	 could	 be	 encouraged	through	structural	change	within	offices	to	account	for	new	information	and	 consciously	and	explicitly	 engage	with	prior	practices	within	 the	office.175	These	 sorts	 of	 reforms	are	promising	 in	part	 because	 they	pose	 little	threat	 to,	 and	 possibly	 foster,	 prosecutorial	 independence.	 Encouraging	internal	processes	and	structural	change	offers	a	way	to	help	ensure	that	prosecutors	adhere	to	certain	traditions	and	thought	processes	that	work	to	align	their	discretionary	decisions	with	the	public	interest.	Among	other	things,	the	problem	with	these	sorts	of	internal	controls	is	that	there	are	few	guarantees	that	prosecutors	will	adhere	to	them	and	that	if	they	do,	they	will	do	so	seriously.	Those	who	are	concerned	that	prosecutors,	left	to	their	own	devices,	are	not	good	at	monitoring	their	own	behavior	may	be	skeptical	 that	 these	 sorts	 of	 changes	 will	 really	 help	 align	 prosecutors’	decisions	with	the	public	interest.	
4.	 Transparency																																																									
	 174.	 See	Ethan	Leib	&	Stephen	Galoob,	Fiduciary	Political	Theory:	A	Critique,	125	YALE	L.J.	1820,	1839	(2016).	While	Leib	and	Galoob’s	theory	is	controversial,	we	do	not	plan	to	wade	into	this	argument	because	we	are	using	their	contribution	as	well	as	that	of	others	as	a	means	of	exploring	prosecutors’	obligations.	Since	we	are	doing	so	in	the	spirit	of	analogy	as	a	pragmatic	endeavor	rather	than	applying	it	in	a	literal	fashion,	all	aspects	 of	 the	 theory	 can	be	 useful.	 Some	critics	 of	 Leib	 and	Galoob	argue	 that	 this	elaboration	of	fiduciary	duty	mistakes	a	moral	conception	of	loyalty	for	a	fiduciary	one.	Paul	B.	Miller,	Dimensions	of	Fiduciary	Loyalty,	in	RESEARCH	HANDBOOK	ON	FIDUCIARY	LAW	180–81	(Andrew	S.	Gold	&	D.	Gordon	Smith	eds.,	2018).	While	we	do	not	take	a	side	in	the	debate	about	with	whether	or	not	the	deliberative	norms	Leib	and	Galoob	identify	are	a	necessary	feature	of	all	fiduciary	relationships	or	a	common	feature	of	some,	we	do	draw	on	the	observation	that	for	prosecutorial	decision	making,	the	duty	of	loyalty	requires	certain	deliberative	processes.		 175.	 Green	&	Roiphe,	supra	note	55,	at	525–33.	
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Transparency	 can	 work	 in	 conjunction	 with	 these	 other	 forms	 of	accountability	to	ensure	a	more	direct	kind	of	control	for	the	beneficiary.	Linked	to	progressive	politics,	transparency	is	thought	to	be	necessary	to	promote	democratic	goals,	efficiency,	and	egalitarianism.176	An	electorate	cannot	 hope	 to	 hold	 a	 public	 official	 accountable	 without	 a	 clear	understanding	 of	 how	well	 that	 official’s	 job	 has	 been	 done.	 If	 political	accountability	has	any	function	in	reining	in	prosecutors,	their	work	must	be,	 in	 some	 sense,	 transparent.	 Direct	 control	 over	 the	 prosecutor’s	decisions	 similarly	 requires	 greater	 transparency.177	 If	 the	 public	 is	going	 to	 enjoy	 greater	 participation,	 then	 it	 needs	more	 information	about	 the	decisions	prosecutors	are	making,	prosecutors’	 reasons	 for	making	these	decisions,	and	the	processes	by	which	decisions	are	made.	Perhaps	greater	public	engagement	in	prosecutorial	decision	making,	in	turn,	would	educate	the	public	about	the	nature	of	the	criminal	justice	system.178	Transparency,	which	in	other	contexts	can	be	key	to	accountability,	is	more	problematic	for	prosecutors,	however.	Much	of	what	prosecutors	do	is	necessarily	secret.	Grand	jury	secrecy,	enforced	by	statute,	ensures	the	safety	 of	 witnesses	 and	 the	 dignity	 of	 uncharged	 suspects.179	 Secrecy	preserves	 the	 integrity	 of	 future	 or	 ongoing	 investigations	 and,	 at	 times,	protects	 national	 security.180	 As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 public	 is	 not	particularly	well	suited	to	review	discretionary	decisions,	and	there	is	a	risk	to	prosecutorial	independence	when	it	does.	Even	 reforms	 in	 processes	 within	 prosecutors’	 offices	 could	 work	together	 with	 transparency	 to	 create	 a	 closer	 alignment	 between	prosecutors’	interests	and	those	of	the	public.	While	it	is	unrealistic	and																																																									
	 176.	 See	David	E.	Pozen,	Transparency’s	Ideological	Drift,	128	YALE	L.J.	100,	107–08	(2018)	(discussing	the	aims	of	transparency	policies	during	the	Progressive	Era	and	in	the	decade	between	the	mid-1960s	and	the	mid-1970s,	which	included	more	“efficient,”	“egalitarian,”	and	“democratically	accountable	regulation”).	
	 177.	 See	Simonson,	supra	note	152,	at	2205,	2216	(explaining	that	the	public’s	ability	to	hold	government	officials	accountable	depends	on	the	transparency	of	“the	routine	appearances	that	make	up	criminal	justice	in	[the	public’s]	neighborhoods”).		 178.	 For	a	discussion	of	transparency	and	prosecutors,	see	generally	Jessica	A.	Roth,	
Prosecutorial	 Declination	 Statements,	 110	 J.	 CRIM.	 L.	&	CRIMINOLOGY	 (forthcoming	 Apr.	2020).	
	 179.	 See	JoEllen	Lotvedt,	Availability	of	Civil	Remedies	Under	the	Grand	Jury	Secrecy	
Rule,	 47	CATH.	U.	L.	REV.	237,	241–42	 (1997)	 (“[Grand	 jury]	 [s]ecrecy	.	.	.	 protects	 the	anonymity	of	the	witness	pool	and	.	.	.	prevents	the	release	of	derogatory	information	about	an	unindicted	individual.”).	
	 180.	 See	id.	at	241	(“Maintaining	secrecy	decreases	the	possibility	that	a	suspect	may	escape,	destroy	evidence,	or	harass	adverse	witnesses.”).	
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undesirable	to	require	prosecutors	to	reveal	the	details	of	each	decision,	they	could	be	required	to	reveal	the	mechanisms	by	which	they	came	to	that	decision	and	the	evolving	standards	governing	those	decisions.	This	would	give	 the	public	 an	opportunity	 to	 supervise	prosecutors’	work	without	involving	them	in	factual	and	legal	inquiries	for	which	they	are	untrained	and	ill	suited.	In	 addition,	 when	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 institutions	 is	 in	 doubt,	transparency	 may	 trump	 independence.	 When	 the	 public	 ceases	 to	believe	that	the	processes	for	ensuring	loyalty	and	care	are	working,	it	may	be	worth	compromising	the	independence	of	prosecutors	for	the	sake	of	transparency	and	accountability.	
B.			Assessing	Mechanisms	for	Prosecutorial	Accountability	In	a	private	fiduciary	relationship,	accountability	can	mean	that	the	beneficiary	enjoys	direct	control	over	some	or	all	of	the	fiduciary’s	work.	This	 model	 of	 accountability	 does	 not	 and	 should	 not	 translate	 to	prosecutors’	work.	As	we	discuss	above	and	elsewhere,	direct	and	plenary	control	by	political	actors	does	not	work	to	align	prosecutors’	work	with	the	public	 interest.181	Once	we	 conceive	of	 the	prosecutor’s	objective	as	seeking	justice,	not	carrying	out	the	contemporary	public’s	will	in	a	more	general	sense,	it	follows	that	direct	control	would	be	unwise.	Because	prosecutors’	work	is	specialized	in	nature,	it	might	be	better	to	 hold	 them	 accountable	 to	 other	 prosecutors	 or	 to	 other	knowledgeable	public	officials	or	official	bodies	rather	than	to	the	public	directly.182	When	it	comes	to	federal	and	other	appointed	prosecutors,	the	public	lacks	removal	authority	in	any	event.	At	best,	it	can	influence	the	official	who	possesses	 the	authority	 to	remove	the	prosecutor.	 In	federal	 cases,	 public	 influence	 is	 especially	 attenuated,	 because	 the	President	 has	 direct	 authority	 to	 fire	 only	 the	 Attorney	 General	 and	
																																																								
	 181.	 See	 Green	&	Roiphe,	 supra	 note	 15,	 at	71	 (“The	 discretion	 of	.	.	.	 prosecutors	promotes	the	fair	and	even-handed	administration	of	justice	.	.	.	.	American	prosecutors	sometimes	 fail;	 but	 presidential	 influence	 over	 individual	 cases	 would	 only	 make	matters	worse.”	(footnotes	omitted)).	
	 182.	 See	 O’Brien,	 supra	 note	 140,	 at	 1046–47	 (“Research	 on	 accountability	demonstrates	that	decision	makers	come	closest	to	this	ideal	when	they	know	that	they	will	 be	 judged	primarily	 for	 the	process	of	 their	decision	making,	 as	opposed	 to	 the	outcome.	This	sort	of	accountability	could	come	through	internal	procedures,	by	way	of	review	 within	 a	 prosecutor’s	 office,	 or	 through	 an	 outside	 agency’s	 supervision.”	(footnotes	omitted)).	
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United	 States	 Attorneys,183	 not	 subordinate	 prosecutors.184	 And	 it	 is	unlikely	given	the	many	public	concerns	that	voters	are	motivated	by	federal	 prosecutorial	 policy	 when	 they	 cast	 their	 vote	 for	 president.	With	respect	to	elected	prosecutors,	the	public	does	not	presently	have	enough	 information	 to	 assess	 whether	 prosecutors	 are	 faithful	 to	professional	norms.185	But	even	if	prosecutors	were	substantially	more	transparent,	it	is	doubtful	whether	voters’	criterion	would	be	whether	prosecutors	were	“seeking	justice”	as	that	concept	is	understood	in	the	legal	profession.	Other	 public	 officials	 or	 official	 bodies	 might	 be	 particularly	 good	 at	offering	input	or	monitoring	the	extrinsic	factors	that	go	into	prosecutorial	decision	making.	They	too	would	be	removed	from	the	facts	of	individual	cases,	making	 it	 hard	 for	 them	to	monitor	discretionary	decisions	 in	 that	regard.	But	they	might	serve	as	good	proxies	for	public	opinion	on	other	factors,	 even	 those	 that	 straddle	 the	 line	 between	 concerns	 intrinsic	 and	extrinsic	to	criminal	justice,	like	how	much	prosecutors	ought	to	consider	social	or	racial	justice	or	mass	incarceration.	Additionally,	 accountability	 can	 mean	 being	 subject	 to	 some	procedural	mechanism	to	ensure	that	one	meets	one’s	responsibilities	and	can	be	removed	from	one’s	position	when	one	does	not	live	up	to	the	applicable	standard.	For	public	officials,	accountability	in	this	sense	may	or	may	not	imply	some	public	transparency,	depending	on	whether	the	removal	process	involves	a	public	election	or	an	act	by	a	supervisory	official	or	body.	Even	in	an	electoral	process,	it	is	not	obvious	what	must	be	publicly	disclosed	and	when.	The	answer	presumably	turns,	at	least	in	part,	on	the	nature	of	the	official’s	responsibilities—on	what	it	means	to	do	the	job	well	or	poorly.	
																																																									 183.	 28	USC	§	541(c)	(2012).		 184.	 §	 542(b)	 (Assistant	 United	 States	 Attorneys	 are	 subject	 to	 removal	 by	 the	Attorney	General).	Further,	 the	termination	of	a	subordinate	prosecutor	 is	subject	to	review	and	reversal	by	the	Merit	Systems	Protection	Board.	See,	e.g.,	Goekev.	Dep’t	of	Justice,	2015	M.S.P.B.	1,	2	(2015).		 185.	 Russell	M.	Gold,	 “Clientless”	Lawyers,	 92	WASH.	L.	REV.	87,	117	 (2017)	(“[T]he	political	check	on	elected	prosecutors	does	not	work	well	because	voters	lack	sufficient	information	about	their	prosecutors’	enforcement	priorities.”);	Richman,	supra	note	4,	at	 963	 (“[E]ven	 direct	 elections	are	 not	 likely	 to	 prove	an	 effective	means	 of	 giving	prosecutors	guidance	as	to	a	community’s	enforcement	priorities	or	of	holding	them	accountable	for	the	discretionary	decisions	that	they	have	already	made.”);	Ronald	F.	Wright,	 How	 Prosecutor	 Elections	 Fail	 Us,	 6	 OHIO	 ST.	 J.	 CRIM.	 L.	 581,	 591	 (2009)	(“[P]rosecutor	elections	.	.	.	 do	not	assure	 that	the	public	knows	and	approves	of	 the	basic	policy	priorities	and	implementation	of	policy	in	the	prosecutor’s	office.”).	
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A	fiduciary	theory	of	prosecutors	suggests	that	monitoring	the	processes	of	 decision	 making	 would	 be	 the	 optimal	 way	 to	 hold	 prosecutors	accountable.	Public	officials	giving	input	into	extrinsic	considerations	that	ought	to	drive	discretionary	decisions	might	also	prove	useful	in	aligning	the	interest	of	the	prosecutor	with	that	of	the	beneficiary.				
C.			Fiduciary	Theory	of	Governance	Revisited	Analyzing	 prosecutors	 as	 fiduciaries	 contributes	 to	 the	 developing	fiduciary	 theory	 of	 governance.	 The	 question	 of	 accountability	 and	independence	 is	not	as	central	 for	most	other	public	officials.	But	the	general	tension	between	the	two	values	is	relevant	to	some	extent	for	all	 public	 fiduciaries.	 Are	 leaders	 picked	 to	 use	 their	 judgment,	knowledge,	and	skill	on	behalf	of	the	public	or	are	they	expected	to	be	more	 directly	 accountable	 to	 the	 electorate’s	 will?186	 The	 answer,	 it	seems,	 is	 both.	 The	 proper	 balance	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 role	 and	responsibilities	 of	 different	 public	 officials,	 but	 to	 some	 degree,	expertise—which	 is	 fostered	 by	 a	 kind	 of	 exclusivity—and	 popular	responsiveness	must	go	hand	in	hand.	Our	examination	of	prosecutors’	fiduciary	role	does	suggest	a	critique	of	fiduciary	theory:	it	tends	to	exalt	the	value	of	discretion.	As	Paul	Miller	argues,	the	fiduciary	by	definition	exercises	discretionary	power	over	the	interests	of	the	beneficiary.187	In	the	private	law	context,	scholars	have	argued	that	this	definition	of	fiduciary	obligation	does	a	disservice	to	the	principal,	diminishing	the	principal’s	power	and	rationalizing	a	paternalistic	 relationship.	 The	 agent	 should	 serve	 the	 principal.	 The	fiduciary	should	take	direction	from	the	beneficiary.188	Of	course,	when	the	beneficiary	has	a	vast	and	complex	amalgam	of	abstract	interests	as	the	 fiduciary	 governance	 model	 points	 out,	 minimizing	 discretion	 is	difficult,	 if	 not	 impossible.	 And	 even	 if	 it	 were	 possible,	 it	 is	 not	necessarily	desirable.																																																									
	 186.	 See	generally	SOPHIA	ROSENFELD,	DEMOCRACY	AND	TRUTH:	A	SHORT	HISTORY	15,	20,	26	(2019)	(arguing	that	truth	has	been	contested	throughout	American	history	and	ought	to	be	a	collaboration	between	experts	in	government	and	the	lay	public).		 187.	 Paul	B.	Miller,	A	Theory	of	Fiduciary	Liability,	56	MCGILL	L.J.	235,	262	(2011).	
	 188.	 See	W.	Bradley	Wendel,	Should	Lawyers	Be	Loyal	to	Clients,	 the	Law,	or	Both?	(forthcoming)	 (on	 file	with	authors)	 (describing	 the	 fiduciary	 theory	 that	 the	 agent	should	 “interpret	 the	 instructions	 of	 the	 principal	.	.	.	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 agent’s	understanding	of	the	principal’s	wishes”).	
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In	the	context	of	governance,	Seth	Davis	has	expressed	an	analogous	concern.	He	argues	that	the	fiduciary	model	generally	minimizes	and	at	times	 can	mask	 domination	 and	 hegemony.189	 There	 is	 reason	 to	 be	concerned	about	 this	dynamic	 in	prosecution	 in	particular.190	 In	 fact,	some	have	argued	that	domination	under	the	mantel	of	fiduciary	service	characterizes	the	criminal	justice	system	in	general.191	It	is	no	surprise	that	 scholars	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	who	 are	 concerned	with	minority	rights	and	protecting	the	less	powerful	seek	to	restrict	rather	than	expand	or	justify	discretion.192	Broad	discretionary	power	is	dangerous.	It	risks	not	only	abuse	but	also	a	more	insidious	form	of	power	in	which	expert	dominance	takes	on	the	guise	of	disinterestedness.	If	we	assume	that	professionals	are	particularly	good	at	assessing	what	is	in	the	public	interest	and	particularly	well	suited	to	avoid	this	kind	of	dynamic,	then	perhaps	the	fiduciary	model	of	prosecutorial	power	could	avoid	this	critique.	But	ever	since	the	1970s,	scholars	 and	 critics	have	 shown	 just	how	central	 professions	 and	other	experts	have	been	to	just	this	sort	of	social	control.193	That	 said,	 discretion	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 government	 power	 is	inevitable.194	And	discretion	in	the	application	of	the	criminal	laws	is	no	exception.	 As	we	 explained	 above,	 allowing	 the	 public	 direct	 control	over	intrinsic	factors	that	go	into	decisions	in	individual	cases	is	not	only	impracticable	but	also	potentially	dangerous.195	Thus,	we	are	stuck	with	
																																																									 189.	 Seth	Davis,	Pluralism	and	the	Public	Trust,	in	FIDUCIARY	GOVERNMENT	281,	288–99	(Evan	J.	Criddle	et	al.	eds,	2018).	
	 190.	 See	 Davis,	 supra	 note	 4,	 at	 408–15	 (describing	 prosecutors’	 discretion	 and	abuses	of	such	discretion	that	result	in	a	level	of	control	over	the	accused).	
	 191.	 See	 MICHELLE	 ALEXANDER,	 THE	NEW	 JIM	 CROW:	 MASS	 INCARCERATION	 IN	 THE	 AGE	 OF	COLORBLINDNESS	1–15	(2010)	(likening	the	domination	over	people	of	color	and	the	poor	that	resulted	from	the	“government’s	zealous	.	.	.	efforts	to	address	rampant	drug	crime”	during	the	War	on	Drugs	beginning	in	the	1980s	to	the	Jim	Crow-era	racial	caste	system).	
	 192.	 See,	e.g.,	Davis,	supra	note	4,	at	400,	409–10	&	n.63	(suggesting	that	prosecutors’	discretionary	decisions	may	be	the	result	of	bias,	like	unconscious	racism,	and	proposing	reforms	to	hold	prosecutors	accountable	to	their	constituents).	
	 193.	 See	Roiphe,	supra	note	146,	at	675,	677	(explaining	scholars’	critique	of	lawyers	who	 “substitut[ed]	 their	 own	 political	 and	 ideological	 agenda[s]	 for	 those	 of	 the	.	.	.	communit[ies]	for	whom	they	were	purportedly	fighting”	and	scholars’	increasing	focus	on	a	theory	of	lawyers	as	“zealous	advocate[s]”	and	“minimiz[ing	of]	the	professional	obligation	to	society	as	a	whole”).		 194.	 H.	L.	A.	Hart,	Discretion,	127	HARV.	L.	REV.	652,	663–64	(2013).	
	 195.	 See	supra	Section	III.A.2.	
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Paul	 Miller’s	 definition	 of	 a	 fiduciary.196	 A	 more	 direct	 control	 over	prosecution	 would	 risk	 partisan	 influence	 or	 a	 powerful	 faction	controlling	prosecutors’	decisions.	 It	could	also	 involve	 those	without	experience	 or	 knowledge	 who	 will	 likely	 act	 in	 an	 arbitrary	 way	inconsistent	with	the	public	interest	in	criminal	justice.	Independence	 should	 be	 protected	 when	 it	 can	 foster	 expertise,	experience,	 and	 professional	 pride.	 While	 they	 should	 never	 go	unchecked,	these	aspects	can	be	harnessed	to	promote	processes	and	norms	that	will	tend	toward	good	social	outcomes.	In	order	to	do	that,	prosecutors	and	public	officials	in	general	need	to	be	insulated	from	the	public.	But,	expertise	is	not	infallible;	experience	is	not	incorruptible.	To	make	 sure	 that	 these	 processes	do	not	 get	 coopted	 or	 ignored	 for	 the	private	ends	of	individual	officials	or	corrupted	by	implicit	bias	and	other	distortions	in	decision	making,	the	public	has	a	right	to	monitor	their	public	officials.	The	proper	degree	of	input	and	control	from	the	public	will	depend	on	the	particular	official	and	the	nature	of	his	or	her	role.	Some	functions	are	better	performed	in	isolation,	protected	from	public	clamor;	 others	 are	 better	 aired	 in	public,	 performed	 in	 collaboration	with	the	beneficiary.	With	regard	to	prosecutors,	the	best	way	to	ensure	this	balance	is	to	insulate	 prosecutors	 in	 making	 discretionary	 decisions	 in	 individual	cases	but	require	them	to	be	more	deliberate,	rational,	and	transparent	in	 developing	 processes	 to	 make	 these	 decisions.	 In	 addition	 to	implementing	 regular	 procedures,	 prosecutors’	 offices	 should	 be	transparent	both	about	the	policies	motivating	their	decisions	and	how	the	decisions	are	made.	Bringing	this	insight	to	bear	on	the	fiduciary	theory	of	governance	in	general	 leads	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 fiduciary	relationship	between	public	officials	and	the	electorate	is	complex	and	depends	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 office.	 The	 best	way	 to	 ensure	 faithful	principals	is	by	employing	all	possible	mechanisms	to	ensure	that	the	official	is	accountable	to	the	public	in	a	way	that	respects	and	preserves	the	unique	nature	of	his	or	her	expertise	and	experience.197	While	the																																																									
	 196.	 See	Miller,	supra	note	187,	at	262	(defining	a	fiduciary	relationship	as	“one	in	which	one	party	(the	fiduciary)	enjoys	discretionary	power	over	the	significant	practical	interests	of	another	(the	beneficiary)”	(emphasis	added)).		 197.	 Evan	Criddle	has	essentially	made	this	argument	about	federal	administrative	agencies.	Under	the	fiduciary	model,	administrative	agencies	are	not	anti-democratic	but	 rather	 fiduciaries.	 The	 key	 in	 the	 relationship	 is	 to	 foster	 accountability	 while	preserving	an	arena	for	expert	deliberation.	Criddle,	supra	note	51,	at	447–49.	
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mechanism	of	doing	 so	will	 vary	depending	on	 the	official’s	 role	 and	responsibilities,	the	goal	remains	constant.	Political	 officials	 ought	 to	 educate	 the	 public	 about	 the	 role	 of	different	 officials	and	 institution	and	avoid	 spreading	misinformation	that	might	undermine	the	norms	that	have	developed	over	the	years.198	In	order	to	enhance	accountability,	public	officials	who	are	in	the	right	position	to	do	so	should	clarify	what	the	norms	and	processes	that	govern	their	role	are	and	why	they	are	necessary	 for	 the	proper	 functioning	of	government.199	A	faithful	public	servant	should	be	responsible	not	just	for	making	 decisions	 according	 to	 these	 norms	 and	 traditions	 but	 for	educating	the	public	about	how	important	they	are.200	CONCLUSION	This	Article	 introduces	 the	 fiduciary	 theory	of	prosecution	not	as	a	fully	 developed	 proposal	 but	 as	 an	 invitation	 for	 further	 inquiry.	 In	addition	to	reframing	old	debates	in	a	new	and	potentially	helpful	way,	the	 theory	 raises	 novel	 questions	 about	 how	 prosecutors	 ought	 to																																																										 198.	 Many	 have	 accused	 the	 Trump	 Administration	 of	 failing	 to	 live	 up	 to	 this	responsibility.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Aaron	 Blake,	 The	 Trump	 Team	 is	 Running	 a	 Disinformation	
Campaign	 About	 Russian	 Interference,	 WASH.	 POST:	 THE	 FIX	 (Aug.	 1,	 2018),	https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/08/01/the-trump-teams-vast-disinformation-campaign-about-russian-interference;	 Max	 Boot,	Donald	 Trump’s	
Biggest	 Disinformation	 Campaign	 Yet,	 FOREIGN	 POL’Y:	 VOICE	 (Oct.	 31,	 2017),	http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/31/donald-trumps-biggest-disinformation-campaign-yet	 [https://perma.cc/VDJ8-DENF];	 David	 Rhode,	 How	 Disinformation	
Reaches	 Donald	 Trump,	 NEW	 YORKER:	 NEWS	 DESK	 (Oct.	 3,	 2019),	http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-disinformation-reaches-donald-trump	[https://perma.cc/N3VY-NLY3].		 199.	 Some	officials	seem	to	intuit	this	role.	In	giving	a	press	conference	after	charging	Michael	Cohen—President	Trump’s	personal	lawyer—in	federal	court,	Deputy	United	States	Attorney	Rob	Khuzami	not	only	announced	the	charges	but	also	explained	the	importance	 of	 the	 laws	 and	 the	 equal	 application	 of	 those	 laws.	 Robert	 Khuzami	
Statement	 on	 Michael	 Cohen	 Case,	 CSPAN	 (Aug.	 21,	 2018),	 https://www.c-span.org/video/?450331-1/lead-prosecutor-speaks-reporters-michael-cohen-guilty-plea	[https://perma.cc/MKP2-P4L3]	(“The	rule	of	law	applies	.	.	.	.	It	is	our	commitment	[as	 law	enforcement]	that	we	will	pursue	.	.	.	 those	who	choose	to	break	the	 law	and	vindicate	the	majority	of	people	who	lead	law-abiding	lives	.	.	.	.	The	message	is	that	we	are	here,	prosecutors	are	here	.	.	.	we	are	a	nation	of	laws	and	the	essence	[of]	.	.	.	this	case	.	.	.	is	justice[:]	.	.	.	that	is[,]	an	equal	playing	field	for	all	persons	in	the	eyes	of	the	law.”).	
	 200.	 See	Bruce	A.	Green	&	Russell	G.	Pearce,	“Public	Service	Must	Begin	at	Home”:	The	
Lawyer	as	Civics	Teacher	 in	Everyday	Practice,	 50	WM.	&	MARY	L.	REV.	1207,	1211–13	(2009)	 (describing	 lawyers	 as	 civics	 teachers	who	 have	 “an	obligation	 to	 convey	 to	clients	[their]	understanding	of	proper	civic	conduct”).	
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function	and	offers	broad	outlines	to	be	filled	in.	We	invite	others	to	join	us	in	developing	this	theory,	which,	unlike	other	theories	of	prosecution,	is	firmly	rooted	in	history	and	tradition.	The	 principle	 value	 of	 the	 fiduciary	 theory	 of	 prosecution	 is	 not	prescriptive	in	the	following	sense.	It	does	not	tell	prosecutors	what	to	do,	except	perhaps	when	it	comes	to	extreme	conduct	that	prosecutors	should	 avoid	 under	 virtually	 any	 understanding	 of	 their	 function.	Because	it	places	discretion	at	the	center	of	prosecutors’	work	and	asks	prosecutors	to	act	in	service	of	an	amorphous	beneficiary	with	a	vague	objective,	it	cannot	dictate	particular	decisions	in	concrete	situations.	The	theory	does	prescribe,	in	broad	outline,	how	prosecutors	should	reach	decisions,	but	not	the	decisions	they	should	ultimately	reach.	In	other	words,	a	fiduciary	theory	of	prosecution	requires	a	certain	process	for	decision	making	but	not	particular	outcomes.	Observers	cannot	use	the	theory	to	evaluate	or	critique	charging	or	plea-bargaining	decisions	because	 the	 relevant	 facts	 about	 prosecutors’	 decision-making	processes	will	 rarely	be	 available.	Nor	does	 the	 theory,	 in	 itself,	 help	answer	whether	traditional,	progressive,	or	other	styles	of	prosecuting	are	preferable.	The	theory’s	value	is	primarily	explanatory.	To	begin	with,	the	fiduciary	theory	makes	sense	of,	and	legitimates,	conventional	understandings	of	the	prosecutor’s	role,	 including	the	idea	of	prosecution	as	a	public	trust,	the	requirement	 of	 prosecutorial	 independence,	 and	 most	 importantly,	 the	prosecutorial	 duty	 to	 seek	 justice.	 The	 theory	 offers	 insight	 into	 the	meaning	and	significance	of	the	vague	duty	to	seek	justice	and	underscores	that,	as	fiduciaries,	prosecutors	have	further	duties—in	particular,	duties	of	care	 and	 loyalty.	 These	 other	 duties	 are	 not	 themselves	 elements	 of	“justice”	 but	 rather	 are	 legal	 imperatives	 governing	 how	 prosecutors	should	pursue	justice.	Further,	the	theory	offers	a	new	distinction	between	prosecutors’	pursuit	of	 justice	as	opposed	to	other	relevant	social	policy	objectives	(while	acknowledging	that	the	distinctions	are	not	always	clear	and	that	there	is	sometimes	overlap),	and	it	gives	priority	to	the	pursuit	of	conventional	criminal	justice	interests.	Consequently,	the	theory	both	gives	 greater	 clarity	 to	 the	 defining	 concept	 of	 “seeking	 justice”	 and	shows	 how	 and	 why	 there	 is	 more	 to	 prosecutors’	 work	 than	 this	pursuit.	Fiduciary	 theory	 also	 contributes	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 how	 to	regulate	 prosecutors.	 By	 demonstrating	 that	 accountability	 and	independence	 are	 two	 mechanisms	 designed	 to	 align	 prosecutors’	interests	with	those	of	the	public,	fiduciary	theory	suggests	regulatory	reforms	that	maximize	both.	Scholars	and	critics	of	the	criminal	justice	
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system	 often	 point	 to	 the	 insulation	 of	 prosecutors	 from	 outside	regulation	 as	 cause	 for	 concern.	 This	may	 be	 true,	 but	 any	 effort	 at	reform	 must	 be	 careful	 not	 to	 sacrifice	 too	 much	 in	 prosecutorial	independence	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 transparency	 or	 direct	 public	accountability	 because	 independence,	 too,	 is	 essential	 in	 aligning	prosecutors’	work	with	the	interest	of	the	beneficiary.	And	perhaps	most	 importantly,	 fiduciary	 theory	helps	 justify	 some	features	 of	 prosecuting	 that	 many	 find	 frustrating,	 including	 that	different	 prosecutors	 evidently	 take	 different	 approaches	 to	discretionary	 decision	 making,	 resulting	 in	 disparate	 outcomes	 on	similar	 facts;	 that	 prosecutors	 often	 seem	 to	 act	 undemocratically,	ignoring	 public	 preferences;	 and	 that	 prosecutors	 often	 give	 no	explanations	 for	 the	 controversial	 decisions	 they	 make.	 These	frustrations	are	understandable	and,	to	some	extent,	can	be	addressed.	As	we	suggest,	both	internal	and	external	processes	can	strike	a	better	balance	 between	 prosecutors’	 accountability	 and	 independence.	Further,	 the	 processes	 for	 training,	 electing,	 appointing,	 and	 hiring	prosecutors	 can	 better	 identify	 lawyers	 who	 will	 exercise	 good	judgment	 in	 their	 fiduciary	 role.	But,	 in	 the	 end,	 the	 fiduciary	 theory	reminds	us	that	the	essential	features	of	prosecutorial	decision	making	and	regulation,	which	may	give	one	pause,	are	neither	arbitrary	nor	the	product	of	a	political	process	 in	which	prosecutors	have	accumulated	power	for	its	own	sake.	These	features	grow	out	of	a	long	legal	tradition,	undergirded	 by	 a	 theory,	 that	 casts	 prosecutors	 as	 fiduciaries,	 a	professional	 role	 with	 significant	 substantive	 and	 procedural	implications.	With	prosecutors’	power,	comes	fiduciary	responsibilities.	And	that	should	be	a	source	of	some	comfort.	
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